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Abstract
The modern consumer credit bureau is a powerful institution that has received much attention with regard
to database surveillance and identity theft, but little scholarly inquiry into its origins and cultural
significance. This study offers an historical account of consumer credit reporting in the United States,
from its nineteenth-century antecedents in commercial credit reporting through its professionalization
and transformation into a key communication infrastructure during the first half of the twentieth century.
Like the nineteenth-century nation-state, which pioneered its own rationalized systems of textual
identification in the form of passports and criminal registries, early credit reporting organizations sought
to impose protocols of legibility in the marketplace. This study describes the development and
information processip.g techniques of these private firms and merchant associations, the work of retail
cre.dit managers in extracting and classifying customer information, and the role of the Retail Credit
Men's National Association (formed in 1912) in laying the foundation for a national consumer credit
reporting apparatus.
In addition, this study also draws special attention to one of the most consequential effects of credit
reporting: the invention of financial identity. Formalized systems of credit assessment translated personal
knowledge and local opinion (traditional sources of credit information) into disembodied textual
representations of individual responsibility-first in narrative reports and later alphanumeric ratings. Within
this totalizing system of disciplinary surveillance, the concept of financial identity circulated as a
surrogate self, producing its own category of social reality and fostering new forms of economic
objectification. Moreover, the centrality of character-one's reputation for honesty and respectability-in the
determination of creditworthiness reveals the moral underpinnings of financial identity and indeed all
systems of credit assessment despite their claims to objectivity and technical neutrality. Financial
identity, it is argued, is a form of moral identity.
The title of this study refers to the goodness of credit consumers in several contexts: as prompt paying
customers, as trustworthy and morally upright citizens, and as profitable target markets, and collectively
as a vital force behind the growth of the twentieth-century American economy and an ideological
vindication of consumer
credit itself.
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ABSTRACT

THE GOOD CONSUMER:
CREDIT REPORTING AND THE INVENTION OF FINANCIAL IDENTITY
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1840-1940

Josh Lauer

Carolyn Marvin
Dissertation Supervisor

The modern consumer credit bureau is a powerful institution that has received
much attention with regard to database surveillance and identity theft, but little
scholarly inquiry into its origins and cultural significance. This study offers an
historical account of consumer credit reporting in the United States, from its
nineteenth-century antecedents in commercial credit reporting through its
professionalization and transformation into a key communication infrastructure during
the first half of the twentieth century. Like the nineteenth-century nation-state, which
pioneered its own rationalized systems of textual identification in the form of
passports and criminal registries, early credit reporting organizations sought to impose
protocols of legibility in the marketplace. This study describes the development and
information processip.g techniques of these private firms and merchant associations,
the work of retail cre.dit managers in extracting and classifying customer information,
and the role of the Retail Credit Men's National Association (formed in 1912) in
laying the foundation for a national consumer credit reporting apparatus.
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In addition, this study also draws special attention to one of the most
consequential effects of credit reporting: the invention of financial identity.
Formalized systems of credit assessment translated personal knowledge and local
opinion (traditional sources of credit information) into disembodied textual
representations of individual responsibility-first in narrative reports and later
alphanumeric ratings. Within this totalizing system of disciplinary surveillance, the
concept of financial identity circulated as a surrogate self, producing its own category
of social reality and fostering new forms of economic objectification. Moreover, the
centrality of character-one's reputation for honesty and respectability-in the
determination of creditworthiness reveals the moral underpinnings of financial identity
and indeed all systems of credit assessment despite their claims to objectivity and
technical neutrality. Financial identity, it is argued, is a form of moral identity.
The title of this study refers to the goodness of credit consumers in several
contexts: as prompt paying customers, as trustworthy and morally upright citizens, and
as profitable target markets, and collectively as a vital force behind the growth of the
twentieth-century American economy and an ideological vindication of consumer
credit itself.
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INTRODUCTION
Consumer credit reporting has attracted much attention in recent years,
especially in connection with the rise of database surveillance and the scourge of socalled identity theft. However the origins and development of the consumer credit
bureau have received very little scholarly analysis. No history of this institution,
popular or academic, exists. This is curious given the recent profusion of scholarship
in three closely related areas: surveillance studies, economic sociology, and the history
of consumer society. Lendol Calder, the author of a pioneering cultural history of
American consumer financing, suggests that credit has been ignored by historians
because of its economic complexity, its dearth of textual evidence, and, compared to
livelier studies of advertising and material culture, its apparent dullness. The study of
credit, Calder wryly observes, is "the neglected stepchild of consumer culture"
studies. 1 This oversight, unfortunately, has prevented the recognition of important
connections between the economic, social, and cultural trajectory of twentieth-century
American life. In particular, it ignores the role of credit reporting and financial identity
as an instrument of social control-an instrument first devised by retailers to assess
individual creditworthiness, but later wielded by banks, personal finance companies,
insurance companies, employers, tax assessors, advertisers, utility companies,
landlords, and law enforcement agencies for their own purposes. The study of credit
and its relationship to financial identity provides an opportunity to discern connections

1

Lendo! Calder, Financing the American Dream: A Cultural History of Consumer Credit (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 13.

1
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between macro- and micro-levels of social organization, and especially those between
individuals and institutions.
This study has two principal objectives. First, it provides a much needed
historical study of consumer credit reporting. This history connects the development
of consumer credit reporting to that of commercial credit reporting, and describes the
significance of both as systems of communication. The problem of consumer credit,
like that of commercial credit reporting before it, was fundamentally a "crisis of
control," one that inspired new methods of rational information management akin to
those associated with railroad transportation, manufacturing, and retail distribution
during the late nineteenth century. 2 Indeed, the scientific management of production
inspired by the "control revolution" had an analogue in the scientific management of
consumption, of which consumer credit reporting was a major innovation. And, in
keeping with the movement toward specialization in so many spheres of activity
during this time, the rationalization of credit also produced its own expert figure: the
credit man. The history of consumer credit reporting is intimately connected to the
professionalization of the credit manager and the associations that such professionals
spawned, in particular the Retail Credit Men's National Association, founded in 1912.
Second, this study examines the emergence of financial identity as a formal
category of social classification and traces its significance as a privileged source of
identification and legitimacy in contemporary American life. Within the textualizing
system of consumer credit reporting, financial identity represents the point at which

2

James R. Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the Information
Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
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individual flesh and blood human actors are detached from embodied social
relationships and reduced-and reproduced-as textual entities. While improving the
efficiency and speed of communication among credit agencies and their subscribers,
this translation of interpersonal experience and public reputation into "scientific"
systems of identification was fraught with difficulties, not least of which was the
centrality of character as a criterion of assessment. Character, together with capital and
capacity (an individual's experience, acumen, and record of successful earning),
formed the holy triumvirate of credit evaluation, referred to by creditors as the "three
C's." The idea that character-a moral rather than a quantifiable financial categorywas the primary indicator of creditworthiness persisted well into the twentieth century.
A 1951 manual published by the leading national consumer credit organization, for
example, cites character as the most important category of assessment: "More than any
other, this factor determines whether a credit applicant will make every effort to fulfill
his promise to pay as agreed."3
Credit, as one author proposed in 1920, was undergoing a process of
"spiritualization."4 Instead of judging the creditworthiness of individuals based on the
extent of their property and assets-criteria that obviously gave advantage to those of
established wealth and position-creditors were more interested in the past behavior
of the borrower. In this way, those oflittle material means might gain access to credit
simply through an established record of honesty and integrity, whereas a well-to-do

3

Credit Reporting Fundamentals: A Manual of Credit Bureau Procedures (St. Louis, MO: Associated
Credit Bureaus of America, 1951), sec. 1, p. 2.
4
Charles Johnston, "The Spiritual Significance of Credit," North American Review (September 1920):
343-354.

3
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gambler or drunk might be rejected. Thus the allocation of credit, the lifeblood of the
modem economy, was subject to codified moral values that could be inferred through
individual behavior. "More significant than property or income," the author of a 1936
guide to personal finance noted, "is the character of the purchaser as evidenced by his
reputation for integrity and honesty." The author continues,
Examples are not lacking, in either the business or the social world, of buyers
who are regarded as 'poor' or 'slow' payers despite the apparent possession of
substantial property and income. The individual, therefore, who hesitates to
open a charge account because of limited personal resources, should realize
that a good reputation is regarded as the strongest kind of recommendation,
and that the lack of property is not a conclusive factor. Worthiness is much
more a matter of integrity and honesty than of physical assets. It cannot be
emphasized too strongly that credit is chiefly a matter of faith and confidence" 5
Financial identity, in the end, is moral identity. Those who are most valued are those
who have clearly and consistently demonstrated their obedience to their creditors and
the social norms that credit reporting institutions impose.
The title of this dissertation refers to the goodness of credit consumers in
multiple contexts: as prompt paying customers, as profitable target markets, as
trustworthy and morally upright citizens, and collectively as a vital force behind the
growth of the twentieth-century American economy and an ideological vindication of
consumer credit itself.

Overview
This study examines the formative years of consumer credit reporting
betweenl 840 and 1940. This periodization may seem unusual given its remoteness
5

David F. Jordan, Managing Personal Finances: How to Use Money Intelligently (New York: PrenticeHall, 1936), 56-57.
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and the fact that organizations specifically devoted to consumer credit reporting did
not appear until 1870. However, the development of consumer credit reporting cannot
be contextualized without examining the institution that informed it: the commercial
credit reporting agency, or "mercantile agency." The mercantile agency system,
introduced in 1841 by New York merchant Lewis Tappan and elaborated by
competitors such as The Bradstreet Company, provided a model for systematic credit
reporting. Consumer credit reporting departed from this model in important waysnotably its use of ledger experience rather than third-party informants-but Tappan's
totalizing vision and the concept of financial identity implicit in his system remained
at its center. Though historians of commercial credit reporting have tended to ignore
the development of consumer reporting, reflecting a conventional philosophical
division between the two forms of credit, this study draws attention to their
interconnection. Consumer creditors--especially grocers, butchers, installment
dealers, and department stores-not only looked to the mercantile agency system for
inspiration, but joined the same business associations as commercial creditors and read
the same instructional texts and trade publications as they professionalized during the
late nineteenth century. Just as it is impossible to explain the evolution of consumer
credit reporting without describing the mercantile agency system, it is impossible to
explain the rise of the retail credit manager without describing his (and increasingly
her) counterpart in wholesaling andmanufacturing firms. These retail credit
professionals would form their own national
association during the 191 Os and a
,\
national network of credit bureaus by 1940.

5
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At the same time, these two types of creditors-commercial and consumerfaced very different circumstances, offering important points of contrast. For one,
consumer credit, unlike commercial credit, applied to everyone. "This [consumer]
credit is extended to a vast number of people," the author of a standard credit textbook
lamented in 1906. "The task of classifying them is a most onerous one. Their earning
power is a question of the widest possible variance, as is also the nature of their family
responsibilities and demands."6 Moreover, where commercial creditors could insist
upon signed financial statements from borrowers by the early twentieth century,
consumer creditors could not. In an atmosphere of fierce competition and shrinking
profit margins, many retailers turned to installment selling and charge accounts (open
book accounts settled on a monthly basis) to attract and keep customers. But unlike
small-town tradespeople and storeowners who extended credit to theit neighbors, the
new urban retailer provided generous terms to virtual strangers. Drawing attention to
the lax credit practices of many retailers, another commentator wrote,
The chief advertisement of many retail houses is "We will give you credit" or
"Your credit is good." When this inducement is offered to buyers, the sellers
cannot exercise reasonable care in distinguishing between those entitled to
credit and those not so entitled. Moreover, other stores send out notices to
prospective customers made up from lists without any reference to credit
standing, telling them that their credit is good at the stores. Such loose methods
in giving credit stand in the way of positive reforms in systematizing personal
credit.''r
During the first half of the twentieth century, consumer credit expanded at an
astonishing rate. Commenting on the promiscuity of charge account purchasing in
1915, one credit manager observed, "It is now possible to buy food, houses, clothing,
6

7

William A. Prendergast, Credit and Its Uses (New York: D. Appleton, 1906), 85.
James Edward Hagerty, Mercantile Credit (New York: Henry Holt, 1913), 92.
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steam threshers, sealskin coats, pearl necklaces, theater tickets, shoe shines, comer
lots, American Beauty roses, baths, haircuts, operations, publicity, and balloons on
account." 8 In addition to installment selling, which multiplied exponentially with the
advent of automobile financing in 1913, working and middle-class consumers gained
direct access to cash loans through two new institutions, the industrial (or Morris Plan)
bank and the licensed personal finance company. To supporters of consumer credit,
whether motivated by an interest in social justice or business opportunism, the
extension of such loans was heralded as the "democratization" of credit.
The use of credit for consumption was nothing new-indeed, it was pervasive
in nineteenth-century America-but the mass advertisement and availability of credit
for this explicit purpose was. Mass production, after all, required mass consumption.
For many business boosters, the modem credit system was a defining mark of
advanced civilization. If credit was suddenly abandoned, one warned in 1917, "Untold
and widespread suffering and death would follow, and man would quickly relapse into
a state of semi-savagery. So integral a part of our social system is credit at the present
time." 9 Consumer credit was the last link in a chain binding society together in
economic interdependence. "It is obvious," a writer for Banker's Magazine observed
in 1914, "that personal credit is the very foundation of the whole credit structure," the
foundation upon which the entire national credit edifice rests. 10 Despite the
fragmentation and anomie often associated with industrial capitalism and modernity,

8

George Fitch, "Charge It," Credit World 5, no. 5 (April 1915): 30.
Peter P. Wahlstad, Credit and the Credit Alan. New York: Alexander Hamilton Institute, 1917, 9.
10
W.H. Kniffin, Jr., "The Theory and Practice of Credit," Banker's Magazine 89 (December 1914):
668.
9

7
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the fundamental basis of this sprawling credit-nexus remained, paradoxically, social
trust. The attenuation of traditional associational ties and interpersonal relationships
may have splintered neighborhoods and estranged individuals from each other, but
retailers and financial brokers sought a new intimacy with their customers. "Credit is a
delicate and powerful fabric in which our whole civilization is suspended," a magazine
writer explained, "and the credit of the grocer in Whinney [Oklahoma] is a part of the
whole and belongs to the whole and is everybody's business. " 11
The consumer credit bureau, more than any other institution, formalized
individual financial identity as an integral dimension of personal identity in the U.S.
The development of financial identity, initiated by commercial credit reporting,
introduced new ways of "seeing" people. 12 Like the nineteenth-century nation-state,
which pioneered its own rationalized systems of textual identification in the form of
passports and criminal registries, the credit reporting agency sought to impose
protocols of legibility in the commercial sphere. The credit reporting agency, like the
nineteenth-century nation-state, sought to render the subjects of its gaze visible. "The
age of mystery as related to business affairs is happily passing away," one advocate of
. credit reporting observed at the end of the nineteenth century.
The time was when business men considered it akin to an insult to be called
upon, when asking credit, for a statement of their affairs. Fortunately wiser and
sounder views now prevail, and no right-minded man or well-managed
institution now hesitates, when asking favors, to place the prospective creditor

11
William McClintock, "Other People's Business," Everybody 's Magazine 41, no. 4 (October 1919):
29.
12
James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have
Failed (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).

8
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in full possession of the facts upon which credits can be intelligently
extended. 13
The collection and interpretation of such "facts" was the object of a massive
surveillance system that emerged the mid nineteenth century.

14

Though the nation-

state is traditionally and with justification viewed as the driving force behind the rise
of modem mass surveillance, it is important to note that the American commercial
credit reporting system was, in scale and scope, one of the most impressive
apparatuses of social monitoring anywhere in the nineteenth-century world. These
early agencies brought tens of thousands of American citizens-merchants, traders,
manufacturers, and artisans-into a sophisticated system of identification and
observation designed to facilitate safe business relationships in a world increasingly
inhabited by strangers. As commercial credit reporting agencies turned their scrutiny
away from individuals and toward organizational entities-in principle if not in
practice-consumer credit reporting took its place.

15

The first consumer credit reporting organizations emerged in New York during
the 1870s, but by the 1890s others could be found in cities throughout the U.S.
Disorganized and fragile, these early organizations struggled to provide affordable
service and to maintain the participation of suspicious merchants, whose confidential

13
S.S. Lacy, quoted in Frederick B. Goddard, Giving and Getting Credit: A Book for Business Men
(New York: Baker & Taylor, 1895), 39.
14
Mary Poovey, A History ofthe Modern Fact: Problems ofKnowledge in the Sciences of Wealth and
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998).
15
Even today the separation of individual and corporate credit identity is contested, as a recent law suit
filed by Donald Trump against the author 9f TrumpNation attests. According to Trump, the
biographer's estimation of his net worth, wi;:11 below what Trump claimed, constituted defamation since
it negatively impacted his ability to ascertajp_ future commercial loans as chairman of The Trump
Organization. See "Trump Sues Author, Time Warner Over Book," Wall Street Journal, 25 January
2006, 1.
.

9
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ledgers they depended on for credit information. "Mercantile Agencies, Credit
Companies, Credit Bureaus, Credit Associations, Merchants' Protective Associations,
and many others, are all working for the same end, though using many different
systems," one writer observed in 1914. 16 During the 1910s newly professionalized
credit managers, most of whom came from department stores, large specialty shops,
and installment houses, worked together to develop cooperative credit reporting
organizations in their communities and to codify protocols of information gathering.
Between the First and Second World Wars they also devoted themselves to public
relations campaigns emphasizing the moral foundation of credit and the dire
implications of a poor credit rating. By 1940 a national consumer credit reporting
network was well established in the U.S. It was comprised of more than 1400 credit
bureaus which together maintained records for more than 60 million Americans.
Together, the assembled records of the credit bureau (and the credit
departments that supplied much of their information) represented a tableau of
humanity. "Each one a romance-a biography-history," one credit expert remarked
on their intimacy and diversity. "Millions of personal, human documents which tell
not only the story of honesty in varying degrees, but the story of America's social
development." 17 Interestingly, as intellectuals struggled to come to terms with mass
society during the 1920s and 1930s, retail credit managers were already working to
deconstruct the mass-to isolate the individual and his or her personal characteristics

16

Willis V. Sims, "Credit Reporting in a Town of Thirty Thousand," Credit World 5, no. 1 (December
1914): 6.
17
Frank C. Hamilton, "The Public Appeal Publicly Made Will Help Retail Credit," Credit World 18,
no. 9 (May 1930): 28.
·

10
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and buying behavior. This study traces the institutionalization of financial identity
between 1840 and 1940 and the communication infrastructure that emerged to manage
consumer credit relationships by converting interpersonal forms of knowledge into
depersonalized, textual representations of creditworthiness.

Historiographic review
Primary sources
The history of consumer credit reporting is hampered by a lack of primary
source material; there are no public archives or obvious concentrations of
documentary evidence to consult. This is a complex and, in many ways, obscure
subject that involves multiple organizational entities, many of which were ephemeral
and difficult to resurrect through textual evidence. The few noteworthy personalities
that figure in this history were generally unknown outside of the business and banking
community, thus inspiring little commentary outside of the trade press.
Credit reporting agencies have long maintained a deliberately low profile to
avoid legal action and public condemnation, both of which harried their activities
almost from their start. Their administrative records and internal correspondence were
(and still are) highly secretive. Unlike the history of commercial credit reporting,
which is greatly aided by the R.G. Dun archive, a 2500-volume collection of credit
ledgers housed at Harvard Business School's Baker Library, the scholar of consumer
credit reporting has no such repository to which to tum. While consumer credit
bureaus typically participated in cooperative networks, they remained local,

11
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independently-owned businesses until the late 1970s, when computerization and
consolidation reduced their number to three dominant firms, TransUnion, Equifax, and
TRW (now Experian). Unfortunately, once acquired, these independent local bureaus
seem to have vanished altogether, leaving no organizational archives. As Calder
writes, explaining his own struggle to locate primary sources, "the credit industry has
left a paper trail to follow, found in trade journals, annual reports, public relations
pamphlets, and occasional releases of statistical information. But the trail is faint
indeed, since most of the credit industry's records are either lost or unavailable." 18 In
this light, the absence of a historical account of consumer credit reporting is perhaps
unsurprising.
Yet, as Calder indicates, sources do exist. In fact, they are plentiful if one
knows were to look. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries a serious
effort to professionalize and develop scientific principles of credit management
emerged within the business community. This movement produced a rich dialogue in
several trade periodicals, including The Lawyer and the Credit Man, Business, System,
Bulletin ofthe National Association of Credit Men, and, beginning in 1912, Credit
World, the official publication of the Retail Credit Men's National Association. 19

These are especially rich sources of institutional history; they also provide an
unvarnished view of the social prejudices that guided the new "science" of credits. As
the leading journal of retail credit professionals during the twentieth century, Credit
World provides the primary source material for much of this study. Taken together,
18

Calder, Financing the American Dream, 14.
The Retail Credit Men's National Association underwent several name changes and is currently
operated as the Consumer Data Industry Association.
19
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these sources provide much insight into the organization, techniques, and concerns of
credit managers during this time.

Secondary sources

As already indicated, there is no body of secondary literature bearing directly
on the early history of consumer credit reporting. What does exist on the subject can
rather easily be separated into two general categories: 1) histories of nineteenthcentury commercial credit reporting and 2) analyses of consumer credit reporting after
1950.20 The first category includes several book-length histories of Dun & Bradstreet
and a handful of articles. 21 These are primarily historical studies of Tappan and the
business he founded; none connect the development of commercial credit reporting to
its consumer counterpart. The second category begins with journalistic exposes of
credit reporting, notably those of Myron Brenton, a former private investigator, and
journalist Vance Packard, both of which contain damning sections on consumer credit
reporting. 22 By the late 1960s and early 1970s numerous critical accounts of credit
reporting were published, most of which centered on issues of privacy and the

°

2

For an insightful analysis of popular press accounts of credit assessment, see Joe Arena, "Framing an
Ideology of Information: Retail Credit and the Mass Media, 1910-1930," Media, Culture & Society 18
(1996): 423-445. While focusing on credit granting procedures and the role of the professional credit
manager, Arena does not excavate the history of the consumer credit bureau and incorrectly asserts that
"credit reporting arrived well after quantification had been established in many other spheres of human
activity" (424).
21
Citations for these sources appear in Chapter 1, note 71.
22
Myron Brenton, The Privacy Invaders (New York: Coward-McCann, 1964), esp. 25-43; and Vance
Packard, The Naked Society (New York: David McKay Company, 1964), esp. 168-182. Packard's
account is humorous in retrospect for its emphasis on the danger of wire-tapping over that of the
database computer (41). See also Hillel Black, Buy Now Pay Later (New York: William Morrow,
1961), 35-52.
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emergent problem of database computing.

23

However, after the passage of the Fair

Credit Reporting Act in 1970, a landmark piece of federal legislation that banned the
most egregious abuses of consumer credit reporting, analysis of the institutional
history and social function of the consumer credit bureau seems to have fallen off.

Theoretical perspectives
This study is informed by theoretical insights from the following relatively
new but well-established areas of scholarship: surveillance studies, economic
sociology, and the history of consumer society.

Surveillance studies
Consumer credit reporting arose as a mechanism of social monitoring and, as
such, is primarily associated with the study of mass surveillance. It is in this area of
inquiry that the subject received its first-and, in my ways, most insightful-analysis
by British sociologist James Rule. Rule's Private Lives and Public Surveillance
(1973) includes a chapter entirely devoted to the U.S. consumer credit bureau. This
chapter is an elaboration of a study coauthored with David Caplovitz and Pierce
Barker several years earlier. 24 Both works are enormously useful because they

23

These include Arthur R. Miller, The Assaul( on Privacy: Computers, Databanks, and Dosseirs (Ann
Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1971), esp. 67-89; Alan F. Westin, Databanks in a Free
Society: Computers, Record-keeping, qnd Privacy (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1972), 111-167; Al
Griffin, The Credit Jungle (Chicago: f.{enry Regnery, 1972), esp. 153-172; and Thomas Whiteside,
"Anything Adverse?" New Yorker 51 (~l April 1975): 45-50, 53-54, 56, 59, 61-64, 69-71, 74-76, 80-82,
84-86, 89-92, 95-96, 98-101.
24
James B. Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance (London: Allen Lane, 1973); and James Rule,
David Caplovitz, and Pierce Barker, "The Dossier in Consumer Credit," in On Record: Files and
Dossiers in American Life, ed. Stanton Wheeler (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), 143-175.
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describe in detail the organizational structure and internal procedures of the credit
bureau at the moment of its transition from local, paper-based bureaus to computerized
national agencies, thus preserving much information that might have been lost. What
is perhaps most striking is that these studies describe the decentralized and manual
functioning of the credit bureau as late as the early 1970s. Credit reports were housed
in massive filing cabinets overseen by all-female staffs and, in most cases, reports
were read aloud to members over the telephone. Investigators still supplemented their
files with newspaper clippings and regularly visited local courthouses to cull items
such as marriages, divorces, law suits, liens, and criminal records from public
documents. This changed dramatically with the gradual adoption of computerization
during the 1970s, but the situation described by Rule was not much different than that
during the early twentieth century. Rather than focusing on privacy issues-though
they are implicit-Rule views credit reporting primarily in terms of its institutional
function: "the art and science of credit management lie in determining, in advance,
who will pay and who will not, and in screening credit applicants accordingly. This is
of course a problem of social control."25
After Rule, the next major work to take consumer credit reporting seriously is
Oscar Gandy's The Panoptic Sort. 26 Gandy's analysis is a valuable contribution to the
study of modem surveillance because it illustrates how public and private systems of
identification, classification, and statistical research form an integrated, mutually
reinforcing whole. While commercial marketers use census data generated by the
25

Rule, Private Lives and Public Surveillance, 178.
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy ofPersonal Information (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1993).
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federal government to target consumers, for example, government agencies consult
consumer credit data to identify criminal activity. 27 The panoptic sort, Gandy argues,
represents a grave threat to personal privacy and individual autonomy because it is by
definition a discriminatory system that reduces individuals to a set of limited
characteristics (wealth or race, for example) that are used, in turn, to select and
exclude whole classes of people, often without their knowledge or ability to intervene
on their own behalf. This, in effect, negatively impacts the life chances of certain
classes of individuals in specific, consistent ways. The institutional reality produced
by the panoptic sort, Gandy concludes, fosters insidious power asymmetries with real
social and economic consequences. The consumer credit bureau figures prominently in
Gandy's study, though it is only one of many institutional actors in the panoptic sort.
Interestingly, his analysis includes a rank-order list of the most and least trusted
institutions in terms of personal privacy: credit bureaus were the least trusted
organization-beneath the Internal Revenue Service-in both years of analysis (1978
and 1990). 28
In the two-decade-long interim between Rule and Gandy, the discovery of
Foucault provided Anglo-American scholars with a powerful new theoretical
framework for understanding surveillance technologies. "Despite the fact that James
Rule's groundbreaking study of Private Lives and Public Surveillance had appeared in
the early 1970s," David Lyon, a leading surveillance scholar, explains, "it was not

27
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until Michel Foucault's celebrated, and contentious, historical studies of surveillance
and discipline had appeared that mainstream social theorists began to take surveillance
seriously in its own right. " 29 Indeed, if surveillance studies has a dominant paradigm,
it is F oucauldian-and, in particular, Foucault's elaboration of panopticism. 30 As
Gandy concedes in the early pages of The Panoptic Sort, "The influence of Michel
Foucault on my work is so substantial that it threatens to dominate the construction of
my arguments about power and social control."31 Though Gandy also draws upon
Weber's discussion of bureaucracy, Ellul's vision of technological rationality, and
Gidden's theory of structuration, it is Foucault's concept of disciplinary surveillancewith Bentham's archetypal prison at the center-that bears the weight of his argument.
The panoptic paradigm and Foucault's concept of disciplinary surveillance is
highly seductive. It is a dazzling theoretical lens through which, without the
cumbersome scaffolding of ideology or hegemony, one can view the macro-micro
functioning of power as it moves through the social body in the fom1 of discourse,
classification, and "technologies" of normative restraint. Foucault's analysis of early
modem European institutions-the prison, school, factory, and hospital-and the
transition from violent punishment to deterrence in the form of internalized selfdiscipline has been readily adopted by scholars to explain (or predict) the development
of contemporary surveillance technologies. Yet, when applied to the history of
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consumer credit reporting, this paradigm is problematic. The panoptic model, as it is
typically applied, presupposes a physically isolated individual who 1) acquiesces to
the normative gaze of his or her jailer, and, upon leaving the institutional gaze, 2)
exhibits enduring, pervasive behavioral modifications. In short, the panoptic model of
disciplinary surveillance is totalizing; it does not easily account for subjects who
ignore or resist institutionally-sanctioned behaviors, and it does not help us understand
the limited spheres of influence exerted by such institutional surveillance.
The history of consumer credit reporting, as told through the trade press and
associated textbooks, suggests that early credit bureaus wielded considerable power,
but their influence over the consciousness of individual consumers remained limited;
in any case, it was a weak variety of "soul training" and far from totalizing. A
representative of the National Association of Retail Credit Agencies, a fledgling
consumer credit reporting organization, noted in 1906, "It is safe to say that scarcely
one individual in a thousand has knowledge of the fact that in the files of some
member of this association, his financial record is carefully kept and upon his record
of the past, his credit accommodations of the present and of the future largely
depend." 32 Sixty years later, little seems to have changed. "Although credit bureaus
maintain records on very many Americans, perhaps one hundred million of them,
public understanding of these practices appears quite superficial," Rule and his
colleagues observed. "[T]he existence of the bureau remains a matter of which most
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individuals are only vaguely aware." 33 In this light, it would be disingenuous to assert
that such credit surveillance was panoptic. For soul training to work according to
Foucault's analysis, the panopticon's incarcerated subjects must not only be acutely
aware of their constant inspection, but also react self-consciously.
Whether or not individual consumers were responding to the coercive
pressures of credit reporting or other norms is not clear. It is worth nothing that the
trustworthiness of the vast majority of Americans was a common refrain in the earlytwentieth-century trade press. As a 1923 Collier's headline boasted, "In Every 100
Men 99 Are Honest."34 Of course this might be interpreted as mere flattery or business
propaganda that, in either case, touted the safe and legitimate use of consumer credit.
But this interpretation only goes so far. American consumers, it seems, did not require
intensive soul training to conform to the new discipline of installment buying and loan
repayment schedules; they had already internalized this imperative and were
overwhelmingly reliable. This does not imply that consumers always paid on time or
in full, but that on the whole they made good faith efforts to meet their obligations;
they were not deliberate cheats or "skips." Thus the development of consumer credit
reporting was not primarily a mechanism of individual rehabilitation (though it might
also have served this purpose), but an instrument of exclusion. "The good customer,
though unreasonable and unjust in his demands, must be retained. It is the man who
pretends to be good and is not, who must be refused and avoided " 35 It might be said
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that this form of surveillance is more akin to the ancient penalty of ostracism rather
than incarceration. It is social death rather than social rehabilitation.
The Foucauldian analysis of contemporary surveillance has received several
noteworthy critiques. Deleuze, for example, has asserted that the enclosed physical
sites of disciplinary surveillance studied by Foucault do not apply to contemporary
"societies of control," in which information is highly mutable and circulates freely. 36
Others, drawing upon Deleuze and Guattari, have suggested that the hierarchal bias of
Foucault's formulation has been replaced by the "surveillant assemblage," a system of
horizontal information flows from which even the rich and powerful are not immune. 37
Even more sweeping is Lianos, who makes a strong argument that uncritical reliance
on Foucault's model of social control is a symptom of "intellectual laziness" that,
ironically, has reduced Foucault's subtle critique of power into a "sacred narrative"
itself. 38 Haggerty has recently added to this critique, suggesting among other things
that the panoptic model is exhausted and the very concept of surveillance has been so
widely applied that it has lost its meaning as an analytical category. Calling for a
reevaluation that takes into consideration the multiple, overlapping and often
contradictory functions of surveillance practices, Haggerty writes, "The panoptic
model masks as much as it reveals, foregrounding processes which are of decreasing
relevance, while ignoring or slighting dynamics that fall outside of its framework. " 39
36
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Though this study does not aim to provide a thorough-going critique of
panopticism, it does address a second major weakness within emergent surveillance
scholarship: a troubling lack of historical perspective. The proliferation of new
surveillance technologies during the last three or four decades, particularly those
associated with database computing and new media, has transformed contemporary
life in significant ways. There is little question that these technologies and their
applications (present and future) are important subjects of study with real, immediate
consequences. However, the focus on existing and emergent technologies should not
deter surveillance scholars from taking seriously the development of record-keeping
and social monitoring systems prior to the computer. 40 Unfortunately, much work in
the field of surveillance studies tends to suggest that systems of mass surveillance
were relatively insignificant before computerization. Though the growth of
surveillance is regularly associated with modernity, broadly conceived, analyses of
surveillance practices prior to the 1960s are rare. 41 It is often assumed or implied that
prior to computerization social relationships were simply "traditional" (i.e., personal,
unmediated, localized encounters) or, at worst, ponderously bureaucratic, a mere
harbinger of efficiencies to come. This view is simplistic and reductive. On the one
hand it fails to grasp the fundamental role of social surveillance in all societies,
whether primitive or "information"; on the other it cultivates a strain of technological

°

4

For a critique ofpanopticism that address!!s the centrality ofrecordkeeping, see Mark Poster, The
Mode ofInformation: Poststructuralism and Social Context (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1990), 69-98, esp. 91.
41
For an important exception, see Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., Documenting Individual Identity:
The Development ofState Practices in the Modern World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2001).

21

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

determinism that is totalizing and speculative. This study illustrates the development
of key institutional infrastructures and social categories-the credit bureau and the
concept of financial identity-that appeared long before computerization and, more
importantly, will situate these developments in historical context. 42
Despite such weaknesses, Lyon offers suggestive insight into how surveillance
might be understood more generally as a process oftextualization. "The rise of
surveillance societies has everything to do with disappearing bodies," he writes.
Disappearing bodies is a basic problem of modernity that has been accentuated
with the growth and pervasiveness of communication and information
technologies. To compensate for the growing difficulties of embodied
surveillance that watches visible bodies, social agencies have arisen that keep
track of personal traces. 43
The consumer credit bureau is of course one such agency to have emerged to deal with
this problem. The concept oftextualization, implicit in Lyon's observation and
elaborated elsewhere by Carolyn Marvin, offers a powerful analytical framework for
understanding the development of contemporary surveillance practices. 44
Textualization refers to the progressive use of graphic representations-particularly
writing, printing, photography, and, more recently, computer code-as an extension of
and surrogate for embodied communication.
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Though human beings have created "texts" since time immemorial, it is the
more recent ascendancy of the text as a privileged medium of communication and
legitimacy that is most striking. In thoroughly textualized societies such as our own,
power is not primarily exercised through physical strength or embodied rhetorical
skill, but is instead exerted through textual mastery and systems of credentialing, all of
which work to conceal the body to the advantage of dominant textual classes. The
primacy of texts, as compared to bodies, has obvious moral dimensions. Texts are
idealized as static, orderly, compliant; bodies are messy, unpredictable, recalcitrant.
By ascribing textual attributes to bodies-that is, by transforming intractable bodies
into textual representations with unique names, numbers, and discrete classificationsthose with textual authority attempt to bring individuals into abstract systems of
45

record-keeping and "accountability." Indeed, the first complete writing systems in
the ancient Near East emerged not for religious worship but to serve the needs of
bureaucratic bookkeeping-to keep track of relationships between property, money,
and people. 46 Textualization, it can be said, is a technology of social control. From
boundary markers to simple lists to literary canons, textualization functions as an
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organizational technology that enables human actors (and the institutions they
represent) to make claims and to enforce norms, rules, or standards across time,
geography, and populations. Of course some forms oftextualization are more effective
than others, and some exert far more social control. 47 Yet one might say that there is
an implicit element of surveillance in all texts. A shopping list might not be a work of
art, but it is still a shopping list, and thus evidence of the literary artist's domestic
consumption. Textualization, then, is also associated with an evidentiary paradigm that
privileges textual forms of proof over embodied forms-signed documents, for
example, rather than verbal oaths; DNA "signatures" over witness statements. 48 In the
context of surveillance, it refers to the process by which embodied subjects are
selectively reduced, re-presented, and processed as textual evidence. All of this is to
suggest that contemporary surveillance studies might find fertile historical roots in the
concept oftextualization. In this way, such studies might avoid the myopic assumption
that social surveillance is a unique feature of modernity. It is not surveillance per se
that is new, but the ever-expanding textualization of identity and social interaction-·
and the evidentiary paradigm that this entails-that distinguishes surveillance in
earlier times from that of our own.
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Economic sociology

During the mid 1980s, economic sociology emerged as a reinvigorated and
highly productive branch of sociological inquiry. Despite its formidable provenance in
the German and French intellectual schools of Weber and Durkheim, economic
sociology was marginalized and all but abandoned in the 1940s as sociologists ceded
analysis of economic issues to trained economists. 49 As a result, a gaping disciplinary
rift developed between the study of society and the economy. The "new" economic
sociology, unofficially inaugurated by Mark Granovetter's seminal 1985 essay on
"embeddedness," signaled a movement among sociologists (as well as scholars in
other disciplines) to reconsider economic institutions~specially the market-as
socially constructed and constituted phenomena. so This sociological perspective is
integral to the history of consumer credit reporting and an understanding of financial
identity as an institutional category of individual valuation.
As suggested by Granovetter's essay, the concept of embeddedness, derived
from the work of Hungarian intellectual Karl Polanyi, was central to this
reconceptualization. The term "embedded" appears only several times in Polanyi's
1944 magnum opus The Great Transformation, but it exerted much influence as a
conceptual counterpoint to the neoclassical paradigm, which viewed the "real"
economy as function of autonomous, self-regulating markets populated by asocial,
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self-interested actors. For Polanyi, economic activity was inherently social. The
economy-any economy-could not exist as a self-regulating, autonomous entity
since it was always already embedded in social relationships. "The outstanding
discovery ofrecent historical and anthropological research is that man's economy, as a
rule, is submerged in his social relationships." 51 Polanyi was not hostile to economics
or even industrialization, but to the ideological concept of the self-regulating market,
which, he argued, was a utopian illusion forced upon society during the nineteenthcentury with disastrous effects. Market economies, Polanyi asserted, were grossly
unnatural because they operated on the false assumption that individuals are motivated
primarily by their own material profit. Rejecting this, he argued that material profit
was valuable not in itself, but only insofar as it enhanced one's status or standing in
the eyes of society.
In arguing that the economic is embedded in the social-and that market-based
economies work to obscure this--Polanyi offers a conceptual framework in which the
history of credit reporting can be viewed. Credit relationships, as already noted,
depend above all upon trust between individuals (and later individuals and
institutions). Though the development of credit reporting represented an effort to
enhance social trust through systemization, the process of translating individual
histories and behavior into quickly referenced codes had a reifying effect. Credit
decisions, once an informal process based upon direct interpersonal relationships,
were rent from such social contexts and became increasingly abstract. The individual,
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reduced to alphanumerical codes and impersonal files, began to assume an
institutional reality that circulated in ever-expanding contexts beyond the direct
intervention of individuals themselves. In this way, financial identities took on a life of
their own. Within the logic of a market economy that functioned increasingly upon
credit relationships between strangers, financial identity emerged as a privileged
category of objective knowledge. Since, strictly speaking, economic relationships are
always social, credit relationships were not disembedded from social relationships,
they were disembodied
This process, however, did not go unopposed. The first commercial credit
reporting firms were denounced as vehicles of espionage and defamation. In
particular, opponents of credit reporting cited fundamental flaws in the rating system
and criticized the bias and incompetence of the agencies' reporters. In short, they
objected to the idea that the sum of an individual's character and entrepreneurial
potential could be meaningfully represented in such highly reductive reports. The new
transparency insisted upon by creditors obscured as much as it revealed. Such
opposition, though clearly present, does not seem to have risen to the level of
generalized popular discontent. And consumer credit reporting, which emerged during
the late nineteenth century, does not seem to have elicited any backlash comparable to
that surrounding mercantile credit. Yet, public resistance can be inferred from the
reluctance among retailers to request personal financial information from their credit
customers. Such requests were viewed as a breach of propriety; they were insulting
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not only as an invasion of privacy, but also for injecting social relationships with
explicit calculations of monetary risk.
Here the study of credit reporting runs parallel to the work of Viviana Zelizer,
a leading figure in the cultural branch of contemporary economic sociology. In Morals
and Markets, Zelizer examines changing American attitudes toward the concept of life

insurance during the nineteenth century. 52 This emergent industry encountered strong
social resistance during its early years because it was perceived as an amoral system
for assigning monetary values to individual lives. As Zelizer describes, the insurance
industry overcame this resistance through vigorous advertising and public relations
campaigns designed to cloak the profane profitability of death in religious rhetoric and
appeals to paternalistic responsibility. While much of Zelizer's focus is on the
development of nineteenth-century attitudes and rituals surrounding death-and the
key role played by the insurance industry in establishing them-the social and moral
dimensions of insuring individual lives is similar to that of codifying individual
creditworthiness. In essence, both involve the calculation of risk and the assignment of
differential monetary valuations to individuals.
The development of life insurance highlights the problematic role of money as
a mediator of social relationships, an issue that Zelizer has elaborated upon in

52

Viviana A. Zelizer, Morals and Markets: The Development ofLife Insurance in the United States
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Zelizer's "Human Values and the Market: The Case of
Life Insurance and Death in 19th-Century America," American Journal ofSociology 84 (1978): 5916 I 0, derived from the Morals and Markets, appears in several anthologies of contemporary economic
sociology.

28

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

subsequent works. 53 The development of credit reporting involves similar issues. Thus
one of the underlying concerns of this study is the connection between financial
identity and monetary value. How has credit reporting-and particularly the
development of quantitative systems of credit scoring-worked to monetize
individuals in the modem credit economy? While insurance companies employed
statistical and actuarial methods to ascribe monetary values to individuals, credit
reporting functioned much more directly in its effort to isolate and classify individual
behavior. As· a mechanism of deterrence, credit reporting sought to predict the
likelihood of individual success or failure by entering into the moral and psychological
(as well as the financial) disposition of credit seekers. Charles H. Cooley, an
unheralded but not inconsequential figure in history of American economic sociology,
observed this practice among professional credit reporters. Commenting on the
defining characteristics of "social intelligence," he wrote,
The most intelligent man is he who can most adequately dramatize that part of
the social process with which he has to deal. ... [A] business man must see a
proposed transaction as a living, moving whole, with all the parties to it in their
true human characters. I remember talking with an investigator for one the
great commercial agencies who told me that in forming his judgment of the
reliability of a merchant he made a practice, after an interview with him, of
imagining him in various critical situations and picturing to himself how such a
man would behave--of dramatizing him. 54
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Such dramatizations illustrate the striking centrality of character, rather than capital, as
a measure of creditworthiness.
If the democratization of mass finance freed individuals from credit restraints
based upon material collateral, it came with new strings attached. Indeed, one of the
ironies of formalized credit transactions is that, unlike cash payments-which, as
Simmel once observed, offer the possibility of anonymity and privacy-credit
produces textual evidence: a money trail. 55 Though the money trails produced by
individual consumers were initially scattered and, from the perspective of local
agencies, difficult to apprehend in their totality, the implementation of database
computing during the late twentieth century profoundly changed this. One of the
questions that this study addresses is how the textualization of financial identity,
formalized in the institution of national consumer credit bureaus, both facilitated and
obscured the conflation of financial and moral dimensions of personal identity.
The development of individual financial identity provided an entry point
through which money values penetrated the individual. As Evans Clark, a pioneering
historian of consumer credit, observed, "In this campaign for markets the average man
has undergone a metamorphosis. He is revealed as a sort of business concern in
himselt:'' 56 It has long been observed that money ·subverts and even degrades social
relationships. But financial identity does this more discreetly, at an institutional level.
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Very much like the development of life insurance, which permitted the monetary
valuation of human life, the development of financial identity, a by-product of credit
reporting, facilitated the valuation of individuals as customers first, but later as
employees and citizens as well. This monetized self is a privileged form of identity in
many sectors, but paiticularly in the sphere of consumption. While I make no claims
that the monetized self is the only or even dominant identity carried by individuals, it
should not be controversial to claim that it is a crucial dimension of individual identity
in a society in which access to goods, services, and even employment is regulated by
financial identity.

History of consumer society
During the mid 1980s-the same time that surveillance studies and economic
sociology emerged (or reemerged) as significant fields ofinquiry-the development of
consumer society attracted newfound scholarly attention as a historical and cultural
phenomenon. Public debate over the limits and propriety of consumption is certainly
nothing new; it is as old as the American colonies. However, as Lawrence Glickman
notes, "It was only in the late 1970s and 1980s that historians began to treat
consumption as an important part of the fabric of American life, one worthy of
study."
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and their acquisition came to dominate social experience with a particular new
valence.
The rise of consumer culture in the United States was a complex economic,
social, and technological phenomenon. "No single 'linchpin' explains the vitality of
modem consumer societies," as Calder observes. "Nevertheless, the economic and
cultural importance of consumer credit is hard to overestimate." 58 This view is hardly
reflected in the growing body of historical studies of U.S. consumer society. Instead,
recent scholarship is disproportionately devoted to the visual technologies of
advertising and retail merchandising during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. This is unsurprising, and perhaps not unwarranted, since advertising and
merchandising provide some of the most compelling evidence of consumption's
apotheosis-or at least carefully crafted claims to this effect-during this period.
While advertisements in mass-circulation periodicals incited desire and insecurity
among their readers, the development of palatial urban department stores transformed
the shopping experience and lifted the aesthetics of commodity fetishism to new
heights. All of this captivated late-nineteenth-century shoppers and by the early
decades of the twentieth century succeeded in cultivating a new acquisitive disposition
that penetrated deeply into the American psyche. However, as Daniel Miller has
argued, "To think that we have studied capitalism by reading off the semiotics of
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advertising is self-delusion. We need to be inside business examining it with the same
intensity and scrutiny as might be employed inside the home. " 59
Though the use of credit-the purchase of goods on time and the development
of credit cards--often appears in such accounts, it is rarely treated as more than a side
note. One noteworthy exception is Leach's Land ofDesire, which includes a brief
section on the "Consumer Credit Apparatus." As credit relationships became formal
transactions between individuals and institutions, Leach observes, the wiggle room
permitted in face-to-face negotiations with creditors--even abusive pawnbrokers and
loan sharks-vanished. "Now the sources of cash were being displaced to some extent
by more impersonal finance companies and banks, who joined creditmen's
associations and retail store detectives in shadowing, monitoring, and disciplining
consumer behavior." According to Leach, "Consumers had much to dread from the
credit agencies and merchants, which, on the one hand, encouraged spending and
heavy reliance on credit . . . and, on the other hand, extracted payments, imposed liens
on wages, and took laggards to court. " 60
The fact that consumer credit constrained as much as it liberated is a point that
Calder also makes. Cautioning against accounts of consumer culture that weigh too
heavily on either side, Calder writes, "I regard consumer credit as an instrument of
both cupidity and control."61 The tension between indulgence and denial was even

59

Daniel Miller, "Consumption as the Vanguard of History: A Polemic By Way oflntroduction," in
Acknowledging Consumption: A Review ofNew Studies, ed. Daniel Miller (London: Routledge, 1995),
52.
60
William Leach, Land ofDesire: Merchants, Power, and the Rise of a New American Culture (New
York: Vintage, 1993), 300.
61
Calder, Financing the American Dream, 3 I .

33

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

played out within retail operations themselves, as sanguine sales clerks battled sober
credit managers over the creditworthiness of their consumers. Yet Calder's insightful
and highly informative "cultural history of consumer credit" says almost nothing about
credit reporting as an instrument of discipline. Without placing too great a burden on
his path-breaking work, it is a curious omission, especially since much of his analysis
focuses on the institutional lenders that emerged to dispense consumer credit. What
Calder and others who note the disciplinary force of debt imply but do not directly
address is how the web of institutional relationships imposed by credit actually exerted
its power. To say that consumers felt pressure to work hard in order to pay one's bills
is one thing; to speak of the consequences for failing to do so, or the way consumer
behavior was implicated in the construction of financial identities, is quite another.
Perhaps Calder, in an effort to strike a balance between the positive and
negative aspects of consumer credit, shied away from credit reporting. For as a
mechanism of social control and surveillance, consumer credit reporting weighs
heavily on the side of coercion and constraint. Though recent studies of consumer
culture have done much to rehabilitate the consumer as an active, self-making agent
rather than a passive dupe, the history of credit reporting traces the progress of
institutions as a mediating force in the lives of individuals. While the power of early
credit reporting organizations was limited, this is less true a century later. Credit
reporting is integral to the history of U.S. consumer society because, among other
things, it is a communication infrastructure that has only grown in significance over
the last thirty years. Beneath the spectacular surface semiotics of advertising, credit
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reporting emerged as a subterranean system of communication through which
information about individuals was collected, classified, and controlled. The
institutionalizing of consumer behavior and identity, facilitated by credit reporting,
profoundly changed how individuals are conceptualized and communicated with in a
wide variety of economic and social contexts.
One of these contexts is target marketing. It is here that this study draws upon
the institutional perspective of Joseph Turow, whose investigations of target marketing
consider the logic and social implications of consumer segmentation. 62 As Turow has
argued, modem marketers do not simply address already existing customers; they
draw upon statistical and demographic data to construct ideal, often narrowly defined,
audiences for their messages. These "industrial constructions of society" are
significant because they reinforce existing divisions (by race, income, age, or gender,
for example) and serve to isolate individuals in ascribed niches that are valued
differently and kept out of conversation with one another. Discriminatory marketing is
thus implicated in issues of identity and representation, as "segment-making media"
encourage individuals to think of themselves as part of ever-shrinking and insular
consumer communities. Target marketing was revolutionized by database computing
in the 1970s and 1980s, however, the drive to identify and classify consumers was
well underway by the 1920s. Early credit bureaus did not compile marketing data
(though contemporary credit reporting firms do), but the store credit departments that
62

Joseph Turow, Breaking Up America: Advertisers and the New Media World (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1997); "Segmenting, Signalling and Tailoring: Probing the Dark Side of Target
Marketing," in Critical Studies in Media Commercialism, ed. Robin Andersen and Lance Strate (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 239-249; and Niche Envy: Marketing Discrimination in the
Digital Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006).

35

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

provided the bureaus with much of their information did. Eager to maximize their
promotional expenditures, retailers turned to their in-house credit records to identify
their most profitable customers. Early filing and punch card systems were developed
to track the age, gender, marital status, occupation, buying preferences, and credit
standing of individual customers. These "customer control" technologies were
cumbersome by modem standards, but the logic behind them was the same. The
intersection of credit management and sales promotion during the 1920s and 193 Os
reveals the early stirrings of discriminatory marketing and the systematic
disaggregation of the American mass consumer.

Limitations
As already noted, the historical study of consumer credit reporting is hampered
by a lack of clearly defined bodies of evidence, an obstacle that has no doubt
discouraged scholars from addressing the topic. Under ideal conditions a study of this
type would focus on one or several credit bureaus in a single geographic region over a
narrow period of time. Unfortunately, the absence of neatly bounded archives makes
this impossible. While tracing the development of credit reporting and financial
identity over the period of a century and over a national canvass, distortions are
inevitable. Consumer credit reporting did not emerge uniformly over time or in the
same way in all places, urban or rural, on the East coast or in the Midwest. This study
seeks to introduce and illuminate a pivotal but overlooked chapter in American
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cultural history. It is the beginning of a conversation, one with many rich connections
and potential digressions, rather than its end.
Additionally, while using the descriptive term consumer credit reporting, the
focus of this study is limited to retail credit-open book accounts, charge accounts,
and installment purchases. The development of credit checking systems among banks
and finance companies is excluded. This may seem peculiar given the importance of
credit reporting to contemporary financial institutions. However, few Americans
obtained personal loans for consumption prior to the founding of industrial banks and
finance companies in the 191 Os (illegal pawnbrokers and loan sharks,
notwithstanding). Neither of these institutions, nor the personal loan departments of
banks that emerged in the late 1920s, played a significant role in the development of
credit reporting. This was partly because the sums lent were so small as to obviate the
expense of credit investigations, and partly because loans received for durable items,
especially automobiles, could be recouped through repossession in the event of
default.
Also, while focusing on the techniques developed by early-twentieth-century
credit professionals to collect and evaluate individual credit risk, this study does not
address a related function that they performed: collections. From the beginning, credit
and collections were two sides of the same coin. Credit managers were as concerned
with allocating credit as they were with recovering unpaid debts, and many credit
reporting organizations provided collection services for their subscribers. The history
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of collections, as a specialized practice and emergent industry, deserves its own study
and it thus omitted here.
Finally, while describing consumer credit reporting as a system of disciplinary
surveillance, this study says little about its effect on the behavior or psychology of
individual consumers. For better or worse, this is a history of consumer credit
reporting seen largely through the eyes of those who founded it: professional credit
managers and bureau operators. Any claims to powerful effects made by such sources
must be taken with a grain of salt. Though every effort has been made to infer effects
though readings of contemporary press accounts, the near silence of the American
public on the matter of consumer credit reporting leaves little evidence with which to
work. Were Americans resigned to consumer credit reporting? Ignorant of it? Too new
to mass credit privileges to assert their rights over its regulation? These are open
questions. This study does not address the efficacy of consumer credit reporting-that
is, whether or not it "works"--but the ideological aspirations of its organizers and the
formation of financial identity as a morally-laden concept with broad significance in
contemporary American life.
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CHAPTER 1: The Birth of Systematic Credit Reporting
"There is probably no other country in which credit is so purely personal as in
the United States," Francis Grund wrote in an 1837 account of American life and
society. Grund, an Austrian-born political journalist who immigrated to the United
States in the 1820s, was impressed by the moral rather than material basis of credit
granting in the United States. In Europe, he observed in his Tocquevillian study, credit
was reserved for those with ample collateral property, thus reinforcing Old World
hierarchies and a class-bound distribution of wealth and opportunity. "In America the
case is different. Men there are trusted in proportion to their reputation for honesty and
adaptation to business. Industry, perseverance, acquaintance with the market,
enterprise, in short, every moral qualification of a merchant increases his credit as
much as the actual amount of his property." This, Grund concluded, was the true
"genius" of the American credit system. 63
The apparent egalitarianism of American credit was as much a product of
practical necessity as it was of any political ideology. During the nineteenth century
the United States was transformed into an increasingly complex credit economy. The
roots of this transition extended deep into the colonial period, but the development of
private banking institutions, lengthening inland trade connections, shortages of
circulating currency, and burgeoning industrialization during the early republic all
contributed to the expanded use and importance of credit relationships. "Credit is the
vital air of the system of commerce," Daniel Webster told the U.S. Senate in 1834. "It
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has run deep and wide into our whole system of social life." 64 Credit-its nature and
legitimacy-was central to hotly debated issues of national monetary policy
throughout the nineteenth century. While many, notably bankers, investors, and
upstart merchants, embraced the so-called "credit system" as a necessary tool of
economic development, others opposed credit as a dangerous and unnatural
contrivance that gave unfair advantage to the wealthy and, even worse, tempted
economic disaster by encouraging rampant speculation. Evidence of such disasters
was not difficult to find, as the panics of 1819 and 183 7 demonstrated. Yet, what all
sides in the debate came to understand was that credit, in addition to being an
economic and institutional phenomenon, was also distinctly social. As nineteenthcentury commentators often reminded their readers, credit is based, for good or ill,
upon one person's faith in another's ability and willingness to pay in the future.
"Credit, in commercial nations," a writer for Hunt's Merchant's Magazine observed in
1840, "is little more than public opinion. " 65
The proliferation of credit, which accelerated during the Jacksonian market
revolution of the 1820s and 1830s, signaled the capitalist transformation of American
society. This was a transformation characterized by great booms and busts.
Summarizing witness accounts of the period, historian Marvin Meyers wrote:
"Everywhere the observers of Jacksonian society discovered violent motion: in the
continuous migrations; in the rise and transformation of communities; in the perpetual
revolution oftechnics, trade patterns, and business organization; in wild business
64
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fluctuations, monetary instability, and the rapid rise and fall of private fortunes."

66

As

urban concentrations on the eastern seaboard swelled during the early decades of the
nineteenth century, and westei11 migration brought growing numbers inland, American
society began to exhibit telltale signs of modernity. Chief among them was a
breakdown of social trust within the commercial sphere. 67 This had a profound impact
on merchants and traders whose business depended upon lengthening chains of credit.
Each spring and fall, tradesmen from all parts of the country converged on New York
City and other coastal hubs, seeking (often on credit) merchandise from importers,
manufacturers, wholesalers, and jobbers that they could resell in their home markets
(again, often on credit). By offering liberal credit terms, merchants, in effect, became
bankers first to one another and then to local customers and communities. Nineteenthcentury communities were bound together tightly by networks of mutual obligation.
The extent of such financial entanglements is vividly illustrated in a mid-nineteenthcentury newspaper account. "I shall doubtless be able to pay you in a few days-a
month at most," the cheerful recipient of credit goods reassured his creditor.

66

Marvin Meyers, The Jacksonian Persuasion: Politics and Belief (Stanford, CA: Stanford University
Press, 1960), 122. See also Charles Sellers, The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).
67
The problem of trust (and its obverse, risk) as a defining feature of modernity occupies much of
contemporary sociological theory, particularly in connection with the mediating role of institutions and
technical expertise. See Anthony Giddens, The Consequences ofModernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1990), and Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. Mark Ritter
(London: Sage, 1992). Georg Simmel, among the first to underscore the importance of trust in modem
financial relationships, notes the paradoxical interdependence of strangers in the burgeoning credit
economy. See Simmel, "The Sociology of Secrecy and Secret Societies," trans. Albion W. Small,
American Journal ofSociology 11 (1906): 441-498, esp. 445-446, and The Philosophy ofMoney. The
risk management perspective is dominant among economists, who generally view credit reporting as a
solution to the problem of imperfect or asymmetrical information in lending situations. See Margaret J.
Miller, "Introduction," in Credit Reporting Systems and the International Economy, ed. Margaret J.
Miller (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003), 1-21.

41

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Squire Jones is expecting some money in a few days, and then he will be able
to pay Tom Briggs for cutting that lot oflogs. Tom cut them last spring, you
know. -Briggs owes Muggs, the butcher, who owes Cripps the shoemaker,
who owes Wiggins, the tanner, who owes me for ten cords of bark. When
Jones pays Briggs, he will pay Simpson, who will pay Cripps, who will pay
Wiggins; then Wiggins will pay me and I shall be able to settle for this little
bill of goods. So you see the money must come in time. " 68
Such local networks were one end of a very long chain that extended to the highest
levels of commerce at the other-wholesalers, importers, manufacturers, banks, and
financiers. But as many discovered, often through disaster, the traditional way of
assessing a credit-seeker's trustworthiness-direct experience, word of mouth, and
letters of recommendation-proved increasingly unreliable. 69 "Next door neighbors
are perfect strangers in the city; whereas in the country, the lineage of every family
within ten miles is as well known as that of one's own kindred," a journalist noted in
1838. "The repositories of all traditionary information-the old people-are versed in
the occupations, way of life, characters and tempers, of all their neighbors for half a
century back."70
Beginning in the 1840s a new institution of mass surveillance, the commercial
credit reporting agency or "mercantile agency," emerged to facilitate safe business
relationships in a world increasingly inhabited by strangers. 71 These private-sector
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organizations brought thousands of U.S. citizens-merchants, traders, manufacturers,
and artisans-into national networks of social monitoring. Though the development of
modern surveillance is typically associated with the rise of the nation-state, American
credit reporting was among the most totalizing and invasive systems of surveillance to
emerge anywhere in the nineteenth-century world. 72 The model for these early
agencies was established in 1841 by Lewis Tappan, an evangelical Christian and noted
abolitionist who ran a silk wholesaling business in New York City with his brother
Arthur. 73 Emerging nearly bankrupt from the panic of 1837, an economic crisis
precipitated by a cascade of defaulted debt, Tappan launched The Mercantile
Agency-a name that became generic for such institutions-to implement a national
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system of credit checking. "This AGENCY," he announced in an 1843 advertisement,
"was established ... for the purpose of procuring by resident and special agents,
information respecting the standing, responsibility, &c., of country merchants .... It
is not a system of espionage, but the same as merchants usually employ--only on an
extended plan-to ascertain whether persons applying for credit are worthy of the
same and to what extent."74 As one agency advocate explained in 1858, "False and
fraudulent representations by a purchaser are mercilessly exposed by the Agency;
plausible swindlers are detected; the weak and incompetent trader described, and the
extravagant checked."75
As a system of mass surveillance, the mercantile agency functioned as a
system of surveillance and social control by textualizing absent bodies. Like the
nineteenth-century nation-state, it sought to render the individual legible. 76 Such
legibility centered upon texts: handwritten reports, correspondence, ledgers, notes and,
later, printed reference volumes and newsletters that compressed an individual life into
a brief statement of creditworthiness, ultimately represented by a numerical value. At
the core ofTappan's reporting system was a library of imposing ledgers in which all
known businesses in the U.S. were documented along with detailed reports on the
personal character, financial means, and local reputations of their proprietors. 77 This
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information was tightly controlled. Until coded reference books appeared in the late
1850s, subscribers-wholesalers, merchants, bankers, and insurance companiesreceived it only in the offices of the Mercantile Agency, and only as read by a discreet
clerk who summarized it from the ledgers; copies were not available, and no written
traces other than the subscribers' notes could leave the premises.
After Tappan relinquished his stake in the agency in 1854, his system was
continued by several associates, including Robert Graham Dun, who took over in 1859
and ran the firm as R.G. Dun and Company. Tappan's agency was the first to achieve
wide success, but it was not the only one in existence. Its chief rival was The
Bradstreet Company, founded in 1849 by John M. Bradstreet, a former dry goods
merchant based in Cincinnati, Ohio. In 1855 Bradstreet moved his base of operations
to New York City, and the two companies competed aggressively until 1933, when
they merged to form Dun and Bradstreet, one of the preeminent commercial credit
rating firms in the world today. By the late nineteenth century specialized reporting
firms were formed to serve a number of industries, such as manufacturers of iron and
steel, jewelry, furniture, shoe and leather, and construction materials. 78 In the lumber
trade, for example, the John W. Barry Company published "Barry's Book," which
listed some 35,000 retail lumbermen and 2000 wholesale dealers. "This concern has a
system of interchange of information peculiar to itself," a Chicago journalist wrote in
1896, "which is so thorough and comprehensive that a retail lumberman out in Dakota
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village cannot stand the milkman off for half a dollar's worth of tickets without every
wholesale lumberman in the country being apprised of the fact before night."79
The American mercantile agency system represented a radical new technology
of institutional surveillance. Credit reporting served a different purpose than other
forms of bureaucratic centralization and communication that emerged during the midnineteenth century, notably those associated with the railroad and telegraph. 80 The
mercantile agency's raison d'etre was to collect information about people. In the
absence of certified financial statements, the basis of corporate credit assessment
today, nineteenth-century commercial credit reporting was a study of individuals
rather than faceless organizations. As nineteenth-century businesses were typically
sole proprietorships or small partnerships, commercial credit reporting entailed
investigations into the integrity of these particular persons. Moreover, the information
processed by these agencies was not primarily for internal recordkeeping or
administrative use, but for commodification and distribution. 81 In this light, the
mercantile agency can be seen as a distant harbinger of the modem information
economy.
The mercantile agency system of the 1840s introduced an entirely new way of
identifying, classifying, and valuating individuals as economic subjects. What Tappan
and his successors invented was not just a highly coordinated system of disciplinary
79
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surveillance, but the very idea of financial identity itself. This new technology of
identification became a key infrastructural component of the modem credit economy
and, in tum, produced its own category of social reality. Within the mercantile
agency's integrated network of recordkeeping and transcription-an example of what
Foucault termed "disciplinary writing"-financial identity served as the primary unit
of analysis. 82 Such disembodied textual representations fostered a new epistemology
of risk, one that converted the financial means and reputation of individuals into quasiempirical facts. 83 The purported facticity of financial identity not only imposed
parameters of normative behavior, but also offered the tantalizing possibility of
rational calculation. Here, the development of American credit reporting can be
viewed in the broader context of nineteenth-century quantification, particularly the
new sciences of statistics and accounting. 84 The same ideals of objectivity and
transparency that stimulated the quantification of populations, social phenomena, and
commercial transactions were also manifest in the development of financial identity as
a site of individual accountability.
The national credit reporting apparatus forged during the ante-bellum market
revolution constituted a new regime of economic objectification, one that facilitated
the penetration of market values and commercial morality into the everyday lives of
nineteenth-century Americans. Importantly, the surreptitious operation of these private
82
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agencies incited vigorous opposition among many Americans, resistance evident in
numerous published denunciations, legal battles, and legislative efforts to curtail the
mercantile agency system. The concept of financial identity that emerged in the 1840s
is the direct precursor of consumer credit identity, and the privacy debates that flared
around its early development remain with us today. Above all, the history of
nineteenth-century financial identity reveals the moral underpinnings of all credit
reporting systems, including those in which financial behavior and performancesocially determined markers of trustworthiness and economic legitimacy-are
obscured behind the veil of quantification and technical neutrality.

The development of the mercantile agency system

Until the early nineteenth century, commercial activity was essentially local
and credit assessment was largely an informal, embodied practice based on personal
observation and conversation with neighbors and associates. Such direct experience
provided a measure of security (perhaps illusory) that one knew who one was dealing
with. "The most trifling actions that affect a man's credit are to be regarded,"
Benjamin Franklin instructed. "The sound of your hammer at five in the morning, or
eight at night, heard by the creditor, makes him easy six months longer; but ifhe sees
you at the billiard-table, or hears your voice at a tavern, when you should be at work,
he sends for his money the next day." 85 Thus the judicious creditor actively surveilled
his neighbors, looking and listening for evidence of integrity or, contrarily, sloth and
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vice. Such information culled from prying eyes and ears was distilled in community
opinion, which could be tapped as needed. Knowledge of an individual's property and
financial assets was fundamental, but equally important was knowledge of his or her
character. It was not simply a matter of whether one had the means to repay one's
debts, but whether one was the sort of person who felt sufficiently constrained, by
conscience or social obligation, to do so. Not everyone did. Legal remedies for
collecting debts were imperfect, and the passage of a federal bankruptcy law in 1841
provided the insolvent with generous legal and financial protection. Not surprisingly,
jilted creditors sought more penetrating and reliable information about the financial
reputation of would-be borrowers, especially those they did not know. 86
When credit information could not be obtained through personal knowledge or
the word of a trusted acquaintance, letters of recommendation were accepted as
surrogates. Written by clergymen, lawyers, bankers, and business associates, these
open-ended testimonials vouched for the honesty of their bearer, providing a modicum
of security in the absence of contradictory evidence. Such letters became more
common as the geography of American commerce expanded. Seeking to drum up new
business in the South, the Tappans advertised their willingness to extend credit terms
to all who could produce "respectable letters."87 Unfortunately, such letters were not
difficult to obtain (through either persistence or collusion), and the Tappans suffered
great losses when they trusted a system vulnerable to misrepresentation. Tappan's
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"strange mercantile agency" may have seemed "a curious and somewhat thankless
office" to one observer in the summer of 1841, but its appeal to "those merchants, who
have suffered bitterly from dishonest men" was apparent. 88
Commissioned investigations were embraced as a more dependable way to
sound out distant strartgers. Individual storekeepers and lawyers in the South would
sometimes provide local credit information to eastern wholesalers, but this was rarely
shared or systematic. 89 In the early nineteenth century, some large firms hired
traveling reporters to canvass various areas of the country for information about
businessmen who sought credit relationships, an approach that was both slow and
expensive. One notable exception was Thomas Wren Ward, a retired Boston attorney
who worked for Baring Brothers & Company, a London-based financial house. 90
Hired in 1829 to report on the firm's U.S. interests, Ward traveled from Maine to
Louisiana to inquire into the standing of local businesses. This labor-intensive
endeavor centered almost entirely on personal consultations. As Ralph Hidy has
observed, "Merchants were averse to writing particulars about their neighbors and
competitors. They would tell much more in private conversation, but that method
involved constant travel." 91 Ward's good reputation and network of acquaintances
gained him access to the candid opinions of his contacts, which he dutifully submitted
to Baring Brothers until 1853. His terse reports, the first of their kind, summarized the
88
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subject's capital and character. For example, "William Goddard [ofBoston]-Safe
and handsome property. $60,000 upwards. Very particular-energetic in businesshas influence-apt to like strongly and dislike strongly."92
The mercantile agency system implemented by Tappan represented a major
innovation in that it pooled the resources of the business community in a centralized,
subscription-based reporting service. Key to its success was the use of unpaid local
correspondents instead of lone traveling reporters. Most members of this vast network
were attorneys who filed reports in exchange for referrals to prosecute debt collections

in their communities. Commenting on the superiority of the local correspondent over
the traveling reporter, Tappan wrote that, "the local agent ... having his eye upon
every trader of importance in his county, and noting it down as it occurs, every
circumstance affecting his credit, favorably or unfavorably, becomes better acquainted
with his actual condition than any stranger can be."93 Tappan's agency had over 300
correspondents in 1844 and nearly 700 in 1846. 94 By the early 1870s this number
soared to more than 10,000. 95 As business writer Jesse R. Sprague noted in 1943,
"Lewis Tappan, it might be said, was first to apply the principles of mass production
to credit reporting. "96
The correspondent's primary task was to convey the local standing of
individuals in situ. "Hence," a contemporary account explained, "the main object with

92

Quoted in Foulke, The Sinews ofAmerican Commerce, 363.
Quoted in Norris, RG. Dun & Co., 1841-1900, 22.
94
Wyatt-Brown, "God and Dun and Bradstreet," 444, 447.
95
The Mercantile Agency: Its Claims Upon the Favor and Support of the Community (New York: Dun,
Barlow, 1872), 6.
96
Jesse R. Sprague, The Romance of Credit (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1943), 111.
93

51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

the agency is, to furnish THEHOMESTANDING of the merchant obtained from
intelligent and reliable sources, THERE.... There, and only there, can [w]e learn
whether he owns property, and is a man of good character-whether he does a
legitimate or a speculative business-and whether he is competent, steady, and
attentive, or otherwise."97 In essence, the correspondent was to extract and reproduce
the individual's local reputation for a national audience. During the early years of the
mercantile agency-indeed, until at least the 1860s-public records or personal
statements were not a major component of these reports.
So what then was the basis of the correspondent's assessment? Personal
opinion, informed hearsay, rumor, and anecdotes judiciously culled from local news
and conversation. To modern observers these sources appear perilously subjective. But
as Tappan indicated in the prospectus quoted above, his system was "not one of
espionage, but the same as merchants usually employ---only on an extended plan." As
this method was based primarily upon personal knowledge and communal opinion, the
system was merely an attempt to formalize and elaborate these time-honored and
trusted ways of knowing. "Particularly in the early years," as James H. Madison has
noted, "correspondents relied on their general, personal knowledge of business
conditions in the town or area of their responsibility. Most of their reports simply
stated the subject's general reputation in the community." 98 Typical of such reports is
the following excerpt:
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Oliver Hutchins [New York City] Shoes
Apr 28/52 Has been in bus[iness] 10 yrs. Is a hard scrubbing, Indus[trious],
money m[a]k[in]g man; prud[ent] & econom[ical]. [I]s s[ai]d to have made
money & to be w[orth] eno[ugh] to m[a]ke him g[oo]d for all he wants. He
owns R[eal] E[state] & is out of debt. 99
At a fundamental level these reports served just two purposes, both of which
were predictive: estimating the individual's chance of success in business and gauging
the likelihood of securing repayment, particularly in the event of failure. Toward this
end, the key information was encapsulated' in what would later be formalized as the
"three C's" of credit reporting: character, capacity, and capital. Each category had its
own implicit indicators. For character: the individual's work habits (hard working?
conscientious?), local reputation (well liked? trusted?), and personal life (married?
alcoholic? gambler? philanderer?). For capacity: age, experience in business, past
employment, and known history of successes or failures. For capital: assets, liabilities,
and property owned by the individual, as well as assets potentially available through
well-to-do family or business connections who might rescue an individual in
default. 100 When information in one category was not available, which was often the
case, additional details in another might serve to compensate. Thus, for example,
where little information was known of the subject's debts or property, a few extra
words might be said about his or her habits or family connections.
The heart of the mercantile agency system was the library of ledgers into
which the correspondents' reports were transcribed. 101 According to an observer who
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visited the New York office in 1851, "Upwards of thirty men are constantly occupied
in the details of this office alone, condensing, copying, and giving out reports, carrying
on the correspondence, &c., &c. Their records are contained in more than 100 books,
of the size of the largest leger [sic], extending to 600 and 700 pages each." 102 The
following is a contemporary account of the agency's operations:
Step into one of these offices and you see before you a row of heavy folio
volumes lying at regular intervals upon a long desk, something in the manner
of the newspapers in a hotel reading-room. A young man enters and hands to
one of the clerks a slip of paper on which is written the name of a firm and
place of business. The latter receives the paper, glances over it and proceeds to
open one of the books. In a few moments he takes a pen, jots down something
and passes it to the young man aforesaid, who perhaps finds written the
following: "Peter Mullen,--------, - - - Co., Illinois. Has done business in
the same store for the last thirty-five years-made some money--owns a lot in
Chicago heavily mortgaged-is the oldest of two children-has lately married
his second wife-is professionally a Methodist, and enjoys a general reputation
for honesty." 103
The ledgers were organized by location (county and state) and each entry
began with the proprietor's name, line of business, and in some cases a street address.
To conserve space, reports were rendered in a small hand and abbreviated language,
often lacking punctuation or capitalization to separate sentences. The entry for each
business was arranged as a single running paragraph, with updates in the series
preceded by a small blank space, the date, and a code number or initials designating
the source of the report. Such coding was not simply a matter of expediency, but used
to protect the identities of the local correspondents who, if discovered, might be
Change: The Post Office Savings Bank, 1861-1930," Technology and Culture 39 (1998): 1-32; and
Charles W. Wootton and Carel M. Wolk, "The Evolution and Acceptance of the Loose-Leaf
Accounting System," Technology and Culture 41 (2000): 80-98.
102
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stigmatized by their communities. Though local reputation served as a widely trusted
indicator of creditworthiness, its formalization in written reports was often resisted as
a breach of propriety. This sentiment was reflected by Edward Payson Bradstreet, a
friend and distant relative of John Bradstreet who declined an offer to work for
Bradstreet's fledgling agency because he "did not like the plan of constantly nosing
into other people's business." 104 Indeed, one anxious agency correspondent went so far
as to request preprinted return envelopes in which to mail his reports, explaining, "I
fear my handwriting will be recognized at the post-office, and thus my utility will be
cut off." 105
Since the ledgers were updated as reports arrived, they evolved organically and
were not arranged alphabetically or by any universal principle of classification
(although in some instances sections were organized by trade). A single volume might
contain entries dating from the 1840s through the 1870s. Thus a complex system of
numerical indexing and cross-referencing was implemented to locate businesses and
their proprietors within and among many separate ledger volumes, and to track
individuals as they bought and sold businesses, worked under different names or with
partners, or moved to new locations. Multiple page numbering and indexing systems
were often juxtaposed, with pointing fingers drawn to indicate cross-referencing.
Within the entries, key pieces of information, especially sums indicating known assets,
were occasionally glossed with brackets to accent hard data or what might be viewed
as the true bottom line of an individual's credit status.
104
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The New York-based mercantile agency established by Tappan opened its first
branch office in Boston in 1843, followed by Philadelphia in 1845 and Baltimore in
1846. By 1870 the agency had almost thirty branch offices, including several in
Canada and one in London. 106 Each time a branch was established, a new set of
ledgers was hand-copied from an existing set. New copies were also produced to
replace older sets that had fallen into disrepair. With the agency's expansion reports
were submitted to the nearest branch, where a copy was made and then forwarded to
New York, which served as the central repository. Except when news of some
dramatic development-fire, natural disaster, or financial debacle-might have a
direct impact on creditors in other districts, branch offices did not send reports to one
another. While correspondence between reporters, branches, and the main office was
conducted by mail, news of "serious embarrassments, assignments, and failures" was
immediately telegraphed to the New York office. 107 The telegraph, despite its obvious
advantages, was generally reserved for emergencies due to its cost. Seeking a
competitive edge, however, at least one major wholesaling firm strung its own direct
telegraph line to one of the mercantile agencies, establishing a system ofreal-time
credit authorization. Thus "while one partner is showing off the silks and shoddymixed broadcloths" to a prospective customer, an 1857 account explained, another
"clicks a few strokes, and learns-'owns farm worth $8000 clear, failed once five
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years ago, good-,' and returns to assist in bowing and assuring the stranger that he
can have the goods on any terms he chooses." 108
In 1875 R.G. Dun placed an order for 100 Remington typewriters, making the
company an early adopter of this new office technology. Branches were instructed to
duplicate typed reports on tissue paper and transmit them among the sixty-five offices
then in operation. 109 Typed reports soon replaced the handwritten ledger as the core of
the agency's information storage and retrieval system. Commenting on the
"Spenserian" beauty of the agency's early handwritten ledgers, one company historian
noted that the copyists "looked upon the introduction of the typewriter as an offense
against the chirographic art."IIo Yet even the copyists, whose exemplary penmanship
signaled physical presence and the aura of personality, were subsumed in the
disembodying machinery of the credit reporting industry.
By the early 1870s these credit reporting organizations were operating on a
massive scale. "A stranger going into one of these agencies during business hours is
struck by the stupendous machinery at work before him," a contemporary observer
marveled. "Rows of desks, private rooms, particular departments, scores of busy
clerks, hundreds of interested searchers, are around an on all sides of him. A constant
stream of busy men, young and old, is flowing in and out all day, and every
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manuscript volume, of which there are hundreds, seems to be the subject of eager
examination." 111 Describing the internal activities of Dun's Chicago office in 1896,
another writer counted as many as 200 employees, among whom was "a little army of
typewriter girls." 112 A visitor to the office of Dun's archrival, Bradstreet, was similarly
impressed by the size of the firm's workforce, but even more so by its composition.
"There are, indeed, many establishments in the country-factories, machine shops and
the like-where more individuals find work, but how many private corporations are
there which require the services of a thousand brain workers?" 113

Crisis of control: narrativity and dissemination
The development of nineteenth-century communication technologies has been
characterized as a "crisis of control" borne of major shifts in economic production and
distribution.11 4 The emergence of the mercantile agency during the 1840s certainly
reflected anxiety over the changing conduct and scale of commercial affairs. But the
crisis of control that it sought to solve-the problem of rationalized credit
assessment-spawned two new crises directly related to the system oftextualization
itself. These centered around two problems: how to transmute qualitative data into
quantitative fact, and how to control the release of such information to subscribers.
While the idea of codifying the local reputations of merchants seemed straightforward,
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the use of narrative credit reporting to achieve this end proved vexing. Early
mercantile agency reports illustrate the difficulty with which correspondents struggled
to convert their local knowledge into meaningful risk assessments. Their reports were,
for better or worse, highly subjective and often vague, deliberately so in cases where
information was lacking and accurate statements of creditworthiness could not be
ventured. Isolating relevant information proved a complex process, in part because
local opinion was embedded in rich social contexts that when stripped away left
individuals looking rather pallid and one-dimensional at one extreme, or hopelessly
complex and contradictory at the other. In the case of Philadelphia paper dealer
Charles Dull, for instance, the correspondent's report indicated that he was a sound
credit risk but an unlikable fellow.
Mar 20/50 Have known him personally 10 yrs. there is a g[oo]d prej [udi]ce as
among the trade - enjoys generally a poor reputation as a man, but is
gen[erall]y sup[pose]d to have money- owns a g[oo]d Prop[erty] in an
adJoining vil[lage] where he lives-if he gives his note he will no doubt pay
it. 15
What was a prospective creditor in a distant city to make of this? When deployed to
qualify or contextualize a complicated life or personality, the narrative mode
inevitably opened rather than closed the range of potential meanings and
interpretations. In this regard, the legible subject was still quite blurry.
As a form of predictive data, early credit reporting often missed the mark.
While it was fairly easy to identify the extremes of the business community-the upand-up and the ne'er-do-well-it was the vast middle range that proved troublesome.
Entrepreneurial activity was by its nature precarious and risky, and even the most
us "Pennsylvania," Dun archive, vol. 131, 101.
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promising individuals might defy expectation. Consider Alfred Herrenschmidt, the son
of a wealthy French leather dealer who arrived in New York City in 1852 and received
a glowing credit report:
When he came here he had ab[ou]t $15°00 mostly in G[oo]ds & has facilities to
00
do an est[eeme]d bus[iness]; his fa[ther] is s[ai]d to be w[orth] $150° • There
is no reason why he sh[oul]d not succeed. He is of g[oo]d char[acter] &
hab[it]s & det[ermine]d[.] w[orth]y of a reason[a]ble cr[edit].
Alas, two years later Herrenschmidt was out of business and reported to have fled to
Strasbourg. ll 6 Likewise, a more middling prospect, the industrious Oliver Hutchins
cited above, subsequently failed several times-and continued to receive generally
sympathetic credit assessments because he made an effort to repay his creditorsbefore finally going out of business in 1860.
To the nineteenth-century mind, the inadequacies of credit reporting were not
to be found in polysemous texts, but in the fallible instruments of transcription: the
correspondents. Since most of the agency's reporters were unpaid attorneys, critics
argued that this work could attract only the inexperienced, inept, or predatory. "Fit
tools for this kind of work," one observer wrote, "are usually found in the briefless
young lawyer" who in his eagerness to gain favor with the mercantile agency and
drum up business was prone to exaggeration. "[B]riefless lawyers shall have as much
business as their mischief can make." 117 According to Thomas Meagher, a mercantile
agency defector who published what was perhaps the most thoroughgoing damnation
of the system, "The substantial men in a community never sink to this work. It can
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only be performed ... by the ill-at-ease, struggling, acrid spirits of the place-the
meddlesome, mischief-making busy bodies, whose moving springs are envy, greed,
uncharitableness, or disappointed ambition." 118 The perceived utility of the mercantile
agency, implicit in its success, would seem to contradict such claims of widespread
incompetence, but clearly some correspondents were better than others. Indeed, the
ranks of such correspondents included several future U.S. presidents, not least of
whom was Abraham Lincoln.11 9 Even so, as bellwethers oflocal opinion-itself
hardly a stable or monolithic entity---correspondents wielded enormous unchecked
power. The possibility that private grudges might color reports, however subtly, was a
legitimate concern. As late as 1890 the use of unpaid attorneys was still cited as a
source of unreliability. According to Peter Earling, a credit manager who approved of
the system as a whole, "we necessarily have to contend with frequent negligence,
inaccuracy, and incompetency, and sometimes even personal favoritism or prejudice"
as a result of such "gratuitously" rendered services. 120 In rural communities, where
divisions along political or religious lines skewed impressions, accusations of
prejudice were common. "I find that in most country places there are two factions in
the business community," one reporter observed in 1883. "And when the local
commercial reporter belongs to one faction the other fellows will swear that he doesn't
give them a fair send-off." 121
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These flaws and others were remedied to some extent by the introduction of
full-time credit reporters during the 1860s and an increasing reliance on quantitative
data, instead of personal opinion, as the basis of reports. During the 1870s, company
balance sheets were requested as evidence and business owners were provided with
preprinted financial statement forms to submit to reporters. 122 Additionally, full-time
reporters in larger cities began to specialize in a particular trade or area of commerce,
thus improving their ability to gauge the prospects of those involved in such activities.
Full-time reporters were also employed to corroborate the accounts of local
correspondents in cases of glaring inconsistencies, an important step toward quality
control. This system, one advocate concluded, "must certainly approach as near
perfection as is practicable under any circumstance." 123
Efforts to compel business owners to submit signed financial statements were
resisted or ignored well into the 1890s, however, and without them agencies could
only pretend to objectivity. At the turn of the century, the deficiencies of the reports
came under the scrutiny of the National Association of Credit Men, an organization
formed in 1896 to represent the interests of newly professionalized credit managers.
Though careful not to antagonize the agencies it viewed as allies, the association
immediately organized a committee for the "improvement of mercantile agency
service" and registered its deep dissatisfaction with the accuracy, speed, and lack of
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reliable financial data in the reports. 124 As one member argued in 1897, "I should
suggest stripping the reports of all unnecessary verbiage along the line of guessing and
estimates, and confine the information as strictly as possible to facts. " 125 Rebuffed by
representatives of both Dun and Bradstreet, the association began to compile its own
statistics to support its case, and in 1900 conducted a survey that reflected poorly on
the agencies. Among its findings, the study revealed that the information in nearly 60
percent of reports received from Dun and Bradstreet either did not include a financial
statement or was over a year old. 126
While credit reporting firms were under pressure to improve the quality of
their reports, the problem of controlling the information they contained remained an
ongoing struggle. This difficulty involved three separate issues: unauthorized sharing
between subscribers and non-subscribers, outright theft by competitors, and the threat
of libel suits. Tappan's mercantile agency had fewer than fifty subscribers in its first
year of operation, but by 1851 this number had grown to nearly 2,000. 127 Subscribers
paid a prorated fee based on their annual sales and were entitled to an unlimited
number of credit inquiries. As noted above, this information was available only at the
agency, and only in verbal format. When new information was received by the agency,
124
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a subscriber whose particular interests were affected might receive a "call slip"
inviting him to visit the office. There the material would be read to him from carefully
positioned ledgers behind a screened counter. Initially the agency did not compile
credit reports on its subscribers, but this policy was later reversed when overseas
wholesalers demanded credit information on all U.S. interests. 128
From the start, nineteenth-century credit reporting was a secretive endeavor.
When filing reports for Baring Brothers in the 1830s, Thomas Wren Ward entered his
comments in a "Private Remarks Book" and disguised the names and credit status of
individual firms in numerical codes to protect against the "prying eyes" of "inquisitive
sea captains carrying the mail" to London. 129 Tappan's subscribers were not only
forbidden to disclose information from the proprietary reports but encouraged to
conceal their identity as subscribers to the service. "Tappan soon discovered that
despite all his efforts, subscribers could not keep the information to themselves." 130
While the leaking of information to non-subscribers reduced the agency's
subscriptions, a greater problem involved libel suits brought against the agency by
scandalized credit seekers whose businesses were adversely affected by negative
reports. The issue in question was whether such credit reports should be legally
protected as privileged communication between the agency and its subscribers.
The first major libel suit was entered in 1851 by John and Horace Beardsley of
Norwalk, Ohio. The Beardsleys claimed that they had been barred from purchasing
goods in New York because a report filed by a local correspondent informed the
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agency that John Beardsley's wife was about to file for divorce and alimony. The
report anticipated that this development would reduce Beardsley's real estate assets
and put the partners out of business. 131 During the first trial, Tappan's successor,
Benjamin Douglass, steadfastly refused to disclose the identity of any agency
correspondents in Norwalk, an act of defiance that landed him in jail for twenty days.
A second libel suit was brought against the agency in 1854 by Waterman L. Ormsby, a
New York engraver who charged that he had been slandered by a report stating that he
was a counterfeiter and had left his wife for a prostitute. This case was decided in
favor of the mercantile agency on the grounds that the report, though unfavorable to
Ormsby, was without deliberate malice and had been furnished to a subscriber on
terms of strict confidentiality. 132 The Beardsley case was initially settled in favor of
the plaintiff, but in 1870 the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision on a
technicality. Though these and other suits were decided in favor of the agencies, the
legal basis of commercial credit reporting in privileged communication took additional
decades to solidify.
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From narrative to number: the credit rating reference book
The principle of privileged communication used in defending these suits was
predicated, at least in part, upon the argument that subscribers received their reports
orally and within the private confines of the agency office. As a result, subscribers
were faced with the continual inconvenience of visiting the agency. Growing market
demand and competition between the major agencies eventually led to the publication
of reference books with abbreviated credit ratings. The first of these, Bradstreet's
Improved Commercial Agency Reports, was published in 1857 and contained the
names of some 17,000 individuals and firms in nine cities. 134 Bradstreet had begun
experimenting with the publication of coded update sheets several years earlier. These
consisted of abstracts from his full reports with a separate numerical key indicating
words and phases to be inserted into the text by the subscriber. For example, "1 6 8 11
14 17 21 25 following the dealer's name stood for 'making money,' 'economical,'
'business not too much extended,' 'does not pay large interest,' 'good moral
character,' 'credits prudently,' and not sued."' 135 Bradstreet's reference book further
reduced the report to a numerical summary indicating the overall credit standing of the
individual or firm.
R.G. Dun initially resisted the idea of publishing a reference book, as the
owners were loath to open themselves to new libel suits or risk losing control of their
valuable information by putting it directly into the hands of subscribers. However, the
great popularity of Bradstreet's book encroached upon Dun's business and compelled
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the company to respond with its own reference book in 1859. This 519-page volume
included more than 20,000 names and employed a four-part rating system that
provided separate numerical ratings for three different types of creditors and a final
column summarizing the subject's overall credit standing. The top ranking was A No.
1 ("credit unlimited") followed by 1 ("unquestioned"), 1 ½ ("strong"), 2 ("good"), 2 ½
("very fair"), 3 ("fair"), and two lower grades, 3 ½ and 4, so poor as to be beneath
description. The ratings were further qualified through the use of pluses and
minuses. 136 According to the book's preface, ratings were "based upon the historical
facts upon our records, often running back eighteen years, regarding the business
training, the moral and business fitness, the capital, the nature, extent, and hazards of
business, &c." 137 A second edition, published in installments in 1860, was 250 pages
longer with more than 30,000 names, each subdivided into six trade classifications.
R.G. Dun published another, slightly smaller, edition in 1861 before the outbreak of
the Civil War interrupted its production. Each edition was bound in heavy leather and
equipped with a lock to prevent unauthorized usage.
R.G. Dun returned to publishing the reference book in 1864, in an edition that
included a redesigned rating system whose major innovation was the ranking of
"pecuniary strength"; its top category (Al+) identified individuals or firms with
capital estimated at one million dollars or more.
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This marked a radical break from
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previous rating systems: for the first time capital was disconnected from character and
capacity, and articulated in its own explicit terms. A second column, "general credit,"
implicitly captured character and capacity in a parallel ranking from Al ("unlimited")
to 3 1/2 ("fair"). As James D. Norris has observed, "Dun's innovation in the 1864

Reference Book-the inclusion of capital worth as well as general credit ratingstransformed credit-reporting to general credit ratings and allowed subscribers to make
comparisons between firms and to adopt uniform rules and regulations on granting
credit." 139 Though in theory an individual or firm might receive a low "general credit"
rating despite enormous capital, in practice there was a strong correlation between
credit ratings and assets. This was deliberate. In a note to the New York City office,
Robert Dun instructed, "There should be a constant effort to keep the credit marking in
close relation to the capital marking." 140 In 1868 the numbers used for "pecuniary
strength" were changed to letters to avoid confusing them with the "general credit"
column, and in 1877 a system of symbols was added to classify businesses into
various trade classifications. Except for these minor modifications, the credit rating
system established in 1864 remained virtually unchanged into the twentieth century.
In addition to simplifying the practice of credit rating and making ratings
readily available for subscribers, reference books also solved, at least to outward
appearances, the difficulty of interpreting narrative reports. Though subscribers were
encouraged to call at the office for full reports (a service denied to those who only
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purchased the book), the reference books quickly attained an independent authority of
their own. The early annual editions suffered from rapid obsolescence, but by the early
1870s they were published quarterly and supplemented with regular newssheets and
pocket-sized editions for individual cities so that the apparent locus of credit authority
shifted from the hidden ledgers to the published volumes. In reducing individuals to
numerical values (weighted in favor of capital), the textualization of credit risk
became increasingly abstract and, in contrast to earlier modes of credit assessment,
disembodied and impersonal. This system of numerical ranking and classification
paralleled the late nineteenth-century movement toward scientific business
management.
Despite the veneer of objectivity provided by the credit rating systemparticularly as affected by the separation of capital from personality-ambiguities
abounded. The "vagueness" and "looseness" of the credit rating keys was fodder for
Meagher, who lambasted the logic of the capital estimates ("the millionaire and the
$20,000,000 millionaire are 'all one' to the agency") and the meaningless terms
employed to designate creditworthiness (what is the difference, he asked, between
"very good" and "high"?). 141 For all of Meagher's bluster and sensationalism in
exposing the incompetence of the mercantile agency, his opposition hinged on a more
profound observation. "Anything approaching a basis for a credit formula is plainly
out of the question in commercial transactions," he concluded. "No system can be
devised . .. to overcome, or accurately anticipate, conditions and circumstances so
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complex and variable." 142 In short, Meagher saw the mercantile agency's effort to
textualize and control the individual as a gross charade. The alphanumeric credit
ratings, in his view, merely obscured the inherent deficiencies of the entire system, a
system based upon gossip and pseudo-science. His vitriol reflected a deep-seated
skepticism not only toward the quantification of credit risk, but the legitimacy of
credit rating itself. Worse still, as a totalizing system of surveillance, those involved in
commerce and trade were increasingly beholden to its judgments. In 1868 R.G. Dun's
reference book included credit ratings for 350,000 individuals and firms. This number
surpassed 500,000 in 1872 and continued to climb each year, reaching one million in
1886. 143

Financial identity and disciplinary surveillance

By the mid 1850s the mercantile agency system had evolved into a
sophisticated network of mass surveillance that tracked businessman and -women
throughout the nation. This system of surveillance involved constant monitoring and
revision, and its scope was total in that its objective was to identify all individuals who
might seek commercial credit for whatever reason. "A thousand folios include a page
or two or more about you and your affairs," an unnamed "Merchant of Boston"
warned in 1853. "Go where you may to purchase goods, a character has preceded you,
either for your benefit or your destruction." 144 That business reputation was
disconnected from local relationships was viewed positively by advocates of the
142
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system, who contended that such remote centralization actually freed the credit-seeker
from carrying letters of recommendation or conducting business in person. "[The
businessman] is known to the whole list of the agency's subscribers," noted one such
advocate.
He has the range of the entire market in all the cities where these offices are
established; the communication between them being such, that what is known
to one is known to all. He need not even leave home to make his purchases.
His order is as good as his presence, and will always be promptly met, to the
145
extent of what his intelligent neighbors regard as safe and prudent.
The textualized individual inscribed in the ledgers and reference books became
a surrogate for the individual himself. While defending the mercantile agency in the
Ormsby libel suit, the agency's attorney observed, "Under the Mercantile Agency
system no effort is necessary on the part of the proposed buyer to bring with him a
character. The character which exists among his neighbors travels with him." 146 Such
textualized identities may have expedited commercial transactions and facilitated trust,
but inevitably they were imperfect reductions of total lives and social contexts. Capital
was reified as a marker of creditworthiness and, despite the agency's best efforts,
character-a much more perplexing quality-was always prone to rumor-mongering
and prejudice.
More than simply identifying and tracking individuals, however, the
information inscribed in the mercantile agency's "thousand folios" represented a
system of disciplinary surveillance that sought to regulate business behavior under its
omnipresent gaze. "In business or out, have your reputation spotless, your character
clean," a business magazine reminded its readers. "Commercial agencies record every
145
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movement made from the time one enters business. If not fair and upright in all your
dealings, you will be greatly hampered; if honest and trustworthy, your credit may in
time be unlimited. Creditors will have nothing to do with a person tricky and
unscrupulous; merchants and bankers extend credit according to their confidence in
one, therefore, pay bills promptly; the delay of a day may weaken your credit." 147
Commenting on credit reporting in the South, Atherton indicates that "no-change"
reports were as important as those detailing dramatic shifts because it "would
demonstrate to eastern merchants that all storekeepers were constantly under
observation." 148
Among the virtues of the system, according to its supporters, was its ability to
frighten merchants into good behavior. The system, one writer noted with approval,
"tends to promote a high standard of mercantile honor, to check speculation and
extravagance, to enhance the value of punctuality and good character, and to make it
the interest of every trader to be temperate, industrious, economical, and desirous of
an unspotted reputation." 149 While the text served as the locus of disciplinary
surveillance, it was the correspondents who served as its unsleeping eyes and ears.
"The credit reporter's job bears some resemblance to the news reporter's with one
exception," according to a centennial history of the mercantile agency. "[T]he credit
reporter's story is never finished. He writes a continuous story, and a factual one,
concisely recording the credit history of each business concern as long as it remains in
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business." 15°For advocates of the mercantile agency system, continuous surveillance
fortified the trustworthy and deterred the malignant. "It is no discredit, even to an
honest man, to say that he is safe under the wholesome restraints, and jealous
vigilance of society," wrote one supporter. "[P]rudence, like the other virtues, is all the
better for being watched." 151 As another reflected at the end of the nineteenth century,
"the mercantile agency might well be termed a bureau for the promotion of
honesty." 152
Despite the halo of beneficence donned by the agencies, it is clear that the
subjects of their surveillance felt otherwise. Opposition and resentment ran deep.
"These institutions," an 1856 newspaper account observed, "are regarded by country
merchants with something like the affection bestowed by slave-o\\ners on conductors
of the underground railroad." 153 Though welcomed by many in the business
community, 154 the mercantile agency elicited strong resistance from those who
abhorred the remote, seemingly ine~capable system of monitoring that it entailed.
"The systematic plan of espionage adopted and perfected by the 'Mercantile
Agencies,' is far from being generally popular," a Boston merchant noted. "[T]he
whole proceeding bears upon its face the most diabolical jesuitism that has ever cursed
the world." 155 During the mid-l 850s one journalist described credit reporting as "an
organized system of espionage, which, centered in New York, extends its
150
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ramifications to every city, village, and school district in the Union. Spies are
regularly employed by this institution to travel throughout the country, and secretly
obtain precise information on the property, the associations, the business, the family,
and the personal habits of every man engaged in trade." 156 While this persistent
hostility is often underplayed or dismissed by historians of the mercantile agency, it is
important to note. Certainly wholesalers in major trading centers believed they had
much to gain by patronizing the agencies, but smaller merchants and jobbers often did
not. As one journalist explained, "Most men see their commercial hobbies with lover's
eyes, and the very possibility of having them subjected to hostile scrutiny is
revolting." 157 The historical trajectory of this privacy debate is worth noting in light of
more recent concerns about computerized consumer surveillance and the role of credit
bureaus as centralized repositories of sensitive personal information. A glimpse into
the past here places this issue in a much longer historical context.
For some, opposition to the agencies was a matter of principle. The distrust
implied by national networks of credit reporting bred hostility and resentment rather
than confidence and good will, the cornerstones of healthy commerce according to the
optimistic ethos of nineteenth-century American business. A recurring criticism of the
agency system was the threat implied by non-participation, as those who refused to
subscribe believed they would receive poor ratings in retribution. "What they desire,"
a Brooklyn reporter observed, heaping scorn on the agencies, "is to drive the man
within their own inclosure, and force him to become a subscriber to their
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institution." 158 The system, once insinuated into the community, was thus viewed as a
self-justifying cash cow that bullied merchants into participation. From a producerist
perspective, the agencies were condemned as parasitic middlemen that merely
compiled and resold a community's collective knowledge, creating nothing new
themselves. This "scheme," as one contemporary account explained, "consisted only
of getting something from the business-men for nothing and retailing it back to them
again for money." 159 The idea that information could beget information, a
phenomenon not unlike that of money lent at interest, was distasteful to some. The
idea of an information economy-one in which knowledge might be collected,
packaged, and sold as a commodity-was apparently inconceivable. Yet, by the end of
the nineteenth century, the concept of financial identity, implicit in the prodigious
ledgers of the major mercantile agencies, was firmly established in the commercial
sphere and would serve as a model for new efforts to control the proliferation of
"consumptive" credit.
Within the pages of the mercantile agency's books, local social relationships
were abstracted, enumerated, and disembodied as textual data, providing a bridge
between orality and textuality as individuals were brought into a network of
institutionalized surveillance. This rationalized system for identifying, tracking, and
predicting the life chances of individuals based upon economic behavior and
performance, in tum, led to new categories of personal identification and economic
subjectivity. In 1898, Cannon, then president of the NACM, emphasized the
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indispensability of credit before an audience of young men and women at the
Packard's Business College in New York. Recalling Edward Everett Hale's 1863 story
"The Man Without a Country," Cannon said, "Since I perused this story I have often
wondered if I could write one, having for its title, 'A Man Without Credit.' I have
pictured in my mind what such a man would be-a man who would neither give nor
receive credit for any one. Did you ever stop to think what such a condition of affairs
would mean in your life? You could hardly exist." 160
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CHAPTER 2: Nineteenth-century Origins of Consumer Credit Reporting
Systematic credit reporting originated in the commercial sphere, but the
sprawling credit system that it sought to regulate was by no means confined to the
world of "productive" credit. Contrary to the popular mythology of Yankee thrift and
Victorian financial conservatism, consumer credit was ubiquitous in nineteenthcentury America. Cash, the coveted medium of instant debt cancellation, was
perpetually scarce due to shortages of circulating currency and, in the hinterlands, long
delays between income-producing harvests. As a result, households often incurred
small debts with local shopkeepers that were settled when hard money was available,
often as many as six to twelve months later. "A river of red ink runs through American
history," as Lendol Calder has observed, debunking the "myth of lost economic
virtue." 161 Though nineteenth-century moralists, like their Puritan forebears, continued
to warn their fellow citizens against the wiles of debt, for many it simply could not be
avoided. During the Panic of 1837 one observer complained that the credit system had
not only "swallow[ed] up the whole business of society, in all of its departments," but
had also "gradually extended to all the minor concerns of life, so as even to include the
daily consumption of personal necessities." 162 The spread of installment selling during
the second half of the nineteenth century, often viewed as the take-off point of modem
consumer credit, merely expanded the scope and impersonality of a system already in
place.
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Credit morality and reality
The morality of debt and the legitimacy of the credit system itself were
vigorously debated throughout the nineteenth century. 163 But this debate did not pit
strict abstinence against devil-may-care laxity. In fact, many moralists, including
church officials, regarded debt with a much more permissive attitude than is typically
assumed. As a writer for the Boston Christian Watchman noted in 1840, "It is not
necessary, that all debts, of every description, for example, should be immediately
paid. Neither is it necessary that we should pay, at the time of purchase, for every
thing we buy."

164

In other words, it was not debt itself that should be condemned, but

those who violated the moral imperative of timely repayment. During the 1830s a
prominent New York Presbyterian clergyman similarly side-stepped the sinfulness of
debt to exhort the virtue of punctuality. Praising the practical advantages of credit
relationships and reassuring his audience that his remarks were "not intended to forbid
men from entering into pecuniary responsibilities, or using their credit in the way of
lawful business," the reverend argued that the real evil of was slow pay, which robbed
creditors and the community of precious time in the collection of innumerable small
debts. The lesson of the sermon was not to eschew credit but to recognize the broad
social consequences of financial bad faith. Credit properly used was not the bane of
society, as might be expected, but a force for the improvement of social relationships.
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"The punctual payment of debts, promotes confidence between man and man. Mutual
confidence is the strong ligament which binds together the social compact. Society
would dissolve without it. ... The regular payment of debts, has a most happy effect
upon society, in its best interests." 165
When retail credit was denounced, it was often not on moral grounds at all, but
more prosaically as a source of price inflation. Goods purchased on credit were more
expensive, it was repeatedly argued, because sellers tacked on a premium to cover the
losses inevitably incurred by delinquents. Thus "the good paymasters must suffer for
the bad, as they do wherever Credit is given," a New York newspaper explained in
1845, and the "customers of retail Stores" who ran up personal accounts were just as
guilty for the credit system as any big city merchant. 166 A mid-century newspaper
story relates how a well-meaning but ignorant "young mechanic" was taught this
lesson by his wife, who received his jar of credit-bought peach preserve with
something less than gratitude. "I know something about this credit business, and it is
not a fair thing," she reproved. "Do you not know that all traders can afford to sell
cheaper for cash than credit?" 167 Along these lines, an editorialist reasoned in 1867
that dealers sold their goods at prices ten to twenty percent above their real market
value "merely because he knows that one in five, or, at best, one in ten, of this
customers are vagabonds, who do no labor, and have no visible means ofliving, and
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will never pay him." 168 In this way credit was viewed as a collective harm rather than
simply a source of individual folly or vice. Indeed, one of the arguments for the
implementation of consumer credit reporting would be that it promised to purge
dishonest debtors from the pool of eligible buyers, thus keeping prices stable and
equitable.
Nineteenth-century retailers were wise to the fact that people often spent more
liberally if granted credit terms. Instead of walking away from an eye-catching item
that could not be purchased with cash in hand, a credit customer was granted the
privilege--or curse--of instant gratification. "The temptations to expenditure are
great," a Connecticut consumer noted in 1874, "when money is not required, and the
sum is simply smilingly put down to the 'little' account; and it is surprising how such
accounts swell into the incredible and astounding sum total." 169 While on the surface
such arrangements were mutually beneficial-retailers sold more merchandise to
eager consumers and simultaneously kept them away from competitors-it also made
the line between harmless indulgence and outright profligacy more difficult to
perceive. In other words, when was too much really too much? Many retailers and
consumers proved themselves poor judges of spending capacity. This question was
complicated by the fact that credit by its very nature was a gamble on the future. The
most promising debtor with the best of intentions was always subject to unforeseen
disaster, whether in the form of injury, illness, or unemployment. Thus, for some, the
temptation wrought by retail credit was its most damning quality. As one detractor
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reasoned, "In the Lord's Prayer we say, 'Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us
from evil.' What greater temptation can be offered a poor, weak mortal than to be
escorted through a magnificent establishment, invited to feast his eager eyes upon
artistic wares, and to purchase the same without regard to his ability to pay?"

170

The risks associated with retail credit, like those for commercial credit,
remained manageable while embedded in local networks of interpersonal trust. In
1840 the most populous U.S. city was New York, with just over 300,000 inhabitants
(about the size of Toledo, Ohio, in 2000), and the next three largest cities-Baltimore,
New Orleans, and Philadelphia-each had less than a third of New York's population.
Chicago, which by 1890 was the second largest U.S. city behind New York, had fewer
than 5000 inhabitants by 1840. 171 The bustling seaboard metropolises may have been
dizzying to the country bumpkin, but they were not so large as to preclude functional
credit relationships between neighborhood retailers and their local customers. Unlike
urban wholesalers and manufacturers whose interpersonal trade relationships were
attenuated by expanding geography during the 1830s and l 840s, retailers in cities and
towns remained in close contact with their customers. They did not serve an onslaught
of out-of-town strangers, a situation faced by urban manufacturers and wholesalers
during the buying seasons, and the sums owed to them, though perhaps exasperating to
collect, were comparatively small in most cases.
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The necessities of everyday life, even in large cities, were provided by
neighborhood shopkeepers-grocers, butchers, bakers, and druggists-who, in turn,
drew upon their familiarity with local people and conditions to gauge the
creditworthiness of their customers. This was an imperfect system, to be sure, one that
could reinforce undeserved reputations and prejudices for better or worse. Yet this
age-old way of knowing through direct interaction and local opinion was the basis of
retail credit assessment for most of the nineteenth century. As long as retail credit was
conducted on a local basis, retailers had little incentive to develop systems of credit
reporting information. Within such local contexts, the credit reports offered by the
mercantile agencies might even be regarded as irrelevant, as they were by a Georgia
columnist in 1874. "A man's character is fixed and settled for him at home. The
mercantile agency may rate home at Z if they choose; but if all who know him at home
can say, 'I never knew that man to owe a dollar which he did not pay promptly on
demand'-he will not need the endorsement of the agency. He has a credit far more
solid than any agency can give him." 172
An 1869 guide to storekeeping illustrates both the unremarkable practice of

retail credit selling and its limitations just after the Civil War. The author,
Pennsylvania native Samuel H. Terry, went to New York in 1842 to work as a dry
goods jobber and, after running his own business for more than a decade, retired to
rural New Jersey in 1864 to set his experiences down for the benefit of other
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retailers. 173 Commenting on the absence of any existing guides, Terry observed that
"in all our libraries, whether public or private, we look in vain for any hand book or
text book wherein one may learn something about the occupation of a retail dealer,"
something he found curious considering "probably one-tenth of the community are
more or less engaged in the business." 174 His popular manual, republished in
numerous editions during the 1880s, includes an entire chapter devoted to credit
selling. While acknowledging the simplicity and safety of running a cash-only
business-notably its tendency to offer customers lower prices and retailers peace of
mind, "there being fewer circumstances to create difficulties between the dealer and
his customers, such as refusals of credit, dunning, sueing, and the like"-Terry
indicates its rarity in practice. 175 "As the retail business is conducted, it is almost
impossible to do an exclusive cash business, and as every dealer doing business is
desirous of selling as many goods for cash as he can, it follows that practically all
retailing is more or less a combination of both cash and credit sales." 176 The desire to
drive up sales through credit selling came with obvious risks, not least of which was
the problem of judging the creditworthiness of one's customers. Emphasizing the
importance of communal knowledge, Terry noted, "A dealer who has for a year had
daily opportunities for hearing of and seeing the transactions of any particular
individual in the community ought to be able to decide at once whether he is
173
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sufficiently responsible to be credited with goods, and to what amount." 177 Such
confidence in the sufficiency of direct appraisal would be shaken in the next two
decades.
By the early 1870s the risks associated with retail credit became glaringly
apparent to retailers in urban centers, just as it had to credit-granting wholesalers
during the 1840s. While for wholesalers the initial source of the problem was
increasing distances between commercial centers and inland traders, for retailers it
was the increasing density and mobility of populations in their own home community,
which made strangers out of neighbors. As Terry was quick to note, credit risk grew as
one moved down the chain of dependencies, not only because the number of
environmental and financial contingencies multiplied, but because more potentially
dishonest people were added to the equation. Selling on credit to a farmer, for
example, necessitated only the honesty of the farmer, while selling to a mechanic who
relied upon the farmer for money required the honesty of both. Credit sales to a third
link in the chain would further elevate the risk, "as it would now require that all three
should be honest," and so forth on down the line. 178 At the same time, many smalltime retailers, particularly grocers and butchers, were under growing competitive
pressures in their own communities. This, coupled with the travesty of gauging the
trustworthiness of strangers on sight, placed them in a precarious position. Loath to
jeopardize a sale with prying questions about a customer's income or employment,
such retailers often threw caution to the wind, relying wholly upon their instincts and
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impressions. "One of the greatest evils with which the retail merchant has to contend
is the credit system," a Chicago writer howled in 1874, "and, until there is a radical
change in society, credit-customers will be the merchant's bane." 179
The growing number and increasing mobility of Americans in established
seaboard centers, as well as in flourishing interior cities such as Cincinnati, Chicago,
St. Louis, and San Francisco-all among the ten largest U.S. cities by 1870-stretched
the interpersonal basis of retail credit to the breaking point. Echoing the sentiments of
many merchants, a business writer observed the increasingly disconnected and
disembodied relationship between creditors and their credit customers. "In earlier and
simpler, and perhaps happier, times, creditors and debtors came nearer together.
Merchants and customers became friends; they looked into each others' eyes and
discussed resources, advantages, and prospects. But in late years, this pleasant and
beneficial contact has become less frequent. We have no personal acquaintance with a
large proportion of the people we deal with." 180 Within these cauldrons of urban
defamiliarization, transience, and competition the first groping toward organized
consumer credit reporting emerged. The impetus to institutionalize credit relations was
one reaction to what historian Robert Wiebe has called the "distended society" of latenineteenth-century America. 181 By the end ofthe 1880s consumer credit reporting
agencies of some type existed in major urban centers throughout the nation, from New
179
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York to New Orleans and as far west as California. Writing in 1886, a Chicago
journalist noted that "retail commercial agencies, such as the wholesale trade has
enjoyed for years, have been established in many of the principal trade centers,
modeled after the Bradstreet and Dun agencies, only differing in the fact that they
report private individuals and families instead of merchants engaged in active
business." 182
The proliferation of consumer credit during the late nineteenth century was
almost entirely relegated to the world of goods. Cash loans backed by collateral
(whether merchandise, real estate, or equipment) were widely available for
commercial use, but loans for personal consumption were denied to the vast majority
of Americans until the second decade of the twentieth century. Restrictive usury laws
made personal loans unprofitable and unappealing for legitimate bankers, except as a
quiet and generally short-term privilege of the wealthy. Under such circumstances
Americans of modest or little means were forced to tum to pawnbrokers or illegal loan
sharks when pressed for cash, neither of which, for obvious reasons, participated in the
development of credit reporting. 183 But the fact that bankers, the principal brokers of
commercial loans, were absent from the development of nineteenth-century credit
reporting is worth mentioning. Ironically, bankers, those most clear-eyed and exacting
of money handlers, were among the last-after wholesalers and retail merchants-to
implement systematic procedures for managing credit risk. Incredibly, late-nineteenth182
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century banks were not even considered a reliable source of credit information. The
author of an 1895 guide to credit assessment relates a striking anecdote in this regard.
"It is an old saying in the business world that 'if you wish to know anything about a
bank's customer, don't ask the bank."' 184

Retail credit reporting systems
Nineteenth-century credit reporting took two basic forms: the black list and the
affirmative-negative system. The black list was simply a catalog of names belonging
to individuals with overdue bills. Such lists, the archetypal credit report, had long been
compiled by diligent (or perhaps spiteful) merchants to identify slow- or non-paying
individuals in their community. As a rudimentary and wholly negative system of
financial identification, its sole purpose was to quarantine delinquent individuals and
the worst credit risks from the pool of potential customers. Privately compiled and
consulted by shopkeepers, black lists remained a system of informal recordkeeping
rather than a source of shared credit information until the late nineteenth century. This
lack of cooperative communication among nineteenth-century retailers can be
attributed in large part to their resistance to disclose the details of their financial
strength, which might be inferred by the quantity of bad debts on their books. It was
not the privacy of credit customers that needed protection, but that of the merchants
themselves, who sought to shield themselves from the scrutiny of their colleagues and
competitors. A long list of delinquent customers reflected poorly on both the
merchant's judgment in giving, and backbone in collecting.
184
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"Anything like a black list is held in abhorrence by the American people," a
New York journalist proclaimed in 1888 (in response to a harebrained scheme to black
list poets). But it was apparently taken for granted that retailers kept such lists, and
tolerated as long as they remained strictly private and confidential. "The shopkeepers
to be sure, are believed to keep a little list of names under their counters which helps
them to avoid bankruptcy; but that is kept secretly. Even the persons named on it do
not know that their names are there, and can only guess that their neighbors have not
been overlooked. Like the books of the commercial agencies, that list is safely
guarded, and no one openly complains of it." 185 When confidentiality was breeched,
however, public outcry might be expected. This was the case in Corsicana, Texas, a
small town south of Dallas, where in 1885 the community became "exercised" upon
learning that a black list had been published. Noting that "the names of some of the
most prompt and best paying citizens" were erroneously included on the list, a Dallas
reporter dismissed the ill-advised enterprise as folly. "These lists have been tried in
many places for years past, but were soon abandoned." 186
While retailers tended to keep their black lists to themselves, American
newspaper publishers advertised them to shame delinquent subscribers into payment.
During the 1830s and 1840s printers took to publishing the names of those with
unpaid debts in the pages of their paper. As the publisher of a New York newspaper
explained in 1834, "There is, we presume, no description of men in business, who
suffer more from the 'credit system,' or who have poorer facilities for availing
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themselves of the benefit of what is justly due them, than the publishers of
newspapers." 187 Such subscription-based publications, which included many religious
newspapers, vigorously defended their right to embarrass the egregiously negligent
with "gentle personal hints" and "printer's duns." Under the headline "Is a Black List
Proper?" the editor of the Boston's Trumpet and Universalist Magazine answered,
"Yes; what would the printer do without it?-There are people in the community who
get their news by sponging publishers of papers .... Now, when we believe men are
reprehensibly slack, careless, criminally forgetful, or dishonest, we will expose
them." 188 In 1830 the Albany Microscope was reported to have produced an especially
gruesome black list, confined to a dark "Bastille looking" comer of the page and
illustrated with the image of a disgraced man in stocks. "The artist has taxed his
utmost skill in pourtraying [sic] around the pilloried figure a due proportion of dead
cats, bones, mud, eggs that had seen better days ... and the various et ceteras with
which those who are called to the unenvied distinction of the pillory are wont to be
saluted." 189 This practice continued throughout the nineteenth century as desperate
publishers struggled to stay afloat. "WeU, ain't you a pretty set?" a Pennsylvania
newspaper mocked its delinquent subscribers in 1869. "Sorry to put you on the Black

°

List, but pay up." 19 For all of the satisfaction that might have been gained by exacting
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such humiliation, the black list was hardly a thoroughgoing mechanism of credit
control. As chronicles of the damned, they were reactionary and punitive rather than
preemptive and predictive.
The affirmative-negative system, by contrast, operated on an entirely different
principle. Instead of singling out and excluding known dead beats, it sought to identify
and track the financial habits of entire populations of individuals, whether at the level
of city, county, state, or nation. This was the system pioneered by Lewis Tappan in the
1840s and ascendant in the commercial sphere. The advantage of such totalizing,
continually updated surveillance was that it permitted creditors to make much finer
distinctions between classes of borrowers. Instead of noting only derogatmy items
such as financial distress, disreputable dealings, or vices such as gambling,
philandering, or drinking, the affirmative-negative system also recorded evidence of
an individual's honesty, financial assets, and history of prompt payment. Simple black
lists failed to register the difference between the slow payer who, though perhaps
aggravating, eventually settled their obligations and the professional deadbeat who
never had any intention of making good. While the true deadbeat represented only a
small fraction of all credit customers, slow payers represented a significant element of
the retail credit business. Thus, to summarily damn such customers was to
unnecessarily drain the pool of potential customers. The affirmative-negative system
monitored all information pertaining to an individual's payment habits and credit
standing, both positive and negative, in an effort to gauge the limit of their

1869, 3; and "Business Principles Applied to Newspapers," Wells borough (PA) Agitator, 10 July 1872,
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creditworthiness. By calculating this limit-the maximum amount of credit that an
individual could reasonably be expected to repay-those selling on credit hedged
against the future in the hope of maximizing sales and profits. Each consumer was
treated as a unique case, one that could be isolated, classified, and analyzed separately.
When during the late nineteenth century the affirmative-negative system was adopted
by retail credit reporting organizations, the concept of financial identity, previously
relegated to business owners and the self-employed, began to extend into the general
population. Laborers, journeymen, mechanics, clerks, and a whole host of wageearning employees-all formerly invisible to the commercial credit reporting
regime-suddenly acquired a second self in the form of financial identity. More
importantly, the affirmative-negative system was believed to be capable of exerting a
powerful disciplinary force, as it had in the commercial sphere. While the black list
could perform a similar function-the mere suggestion that merchants were compiling
a black list would frighten at least some delinquents into settling their bills-the fact
that they tended to be irregularly compiled, updated, and enforced diminished their
effect. The affirmative-negative system, on the other hand, kept all consumers under
perpetual surveillance, thus encouraging them to pay their debts with regularity and
promptness in order to maintain local credit privileges.

Early organization
Unlike the history of commercial credit reporting, which is well preserved
thanks to the self-aggrandizing endeavors of Dun & Bradstreet, the early development
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of its consumer counterpart is far more difficult to reconstruct with precision. The first
retail credit reporting operations were either too short-lived or insignificant to produce
institutional archives, making the order and pattern of their diffusion difficult to track.
A pamphlet published by McKillop and Sprague, a New York commercial credit
reporting agency, described the disorganization of retail credit reporting with mocking
derision in 1874. "Two or three unsuccessful attempts have been made to carry the
system down to the retail trade, and one or two to improve the system, but these have
been so feeble as to render further allusion to them unnecessary." 191 Still, by the mid1880s the presence of such organizations in major U.S. cities was well established.
These nascent information-sharing organizations sprang up throughout the U.S. in a
striking variety of forms. Some were private agencies modeled directly on the
mercantile agencies, some were non-profit associations organized along trade lines,
and still others were dubious offshoots of collection and detective agencies. All of
these varied considerably in their methods of reporting as well, from the compilation
of simple black lists to comprehensive reference books based upon the affirmativenegative system. Since there was little or no coordination among retailers in different
cities, each new association emerged sui generis, seemingly oblivious to the success or
failure of other credit reporting ventures. Each was a veritable island unto itself, and
the impression of so many organizations coming and going is that of so many
individuals reinventing the wheel.
Despite such confusion, it is likely that the first credit reporting organization
devoted specifically to consumers was established in Brooklyn in 1869. This date and
191
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place of origin is provided in a 1927 textbook on retail credit bureaus in which the
author, an early twentieth-century expert on the subject, attributes priority to Herman
T. and Conrad E. Selss. 192 That the first retail credit reporting organization would
emerge in Brooklyn is not surprising. One of fastest growing and most populous
American cities during the late nineteenth century, Brooklyn jumped from the seventh
largest U.S. city in 1850 to third largest in 1860 (behind New York and Philadelphia),
a ranking it retained until its incorporation as a borough of New York in 1898. A
Brooklyn directory confirms that Conrad Selss operated a mercantile agency in 1878,
and four years later a local newspaper reported that "Mr. C.E. Selss, of the Mercantile
Agency" was elected president of the Brooklyn Board ofTrade. 191 But beyond this no
records of the Selss enterprise seem to exist. A curious volume found in the New York
Public Library may offer an additional clue. This slim credit rating book, published by
the "Retail Mercantile Agency" for the years 1874-1875 and placed in Brooklyn by an
early pencil notation, may have been the work of the Selsses. The volume contains the
names and addresses of more than 4000 individuals, each with "confidential" ratings
corresponding to the following key:
"B" denotes a person who pays cash; "A"--0ne who pays promptly; "C"one, who, through carelessness, allows his or her account to remain unpaid
when due, though perfectly responsible; "K"---one who is unfortunate and
cannot pay when accounts become due, or who seems indifferent about them,
but responsible; "&"-will not be rated; inquiry must be made at the-office~ we
••.
do this injustice to all concemed. 194
192
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While the priority of the Selss agency cannot be corroborated, it can still be
said with certainty that one of the earliest, if not the first, retail credit reporting agency
in the U.S. was established in Brooklyn in 1869. The Dealers' Mutual Protective
Agency, a for-profit firm unconnected ~vith the Selsses, offered a range of business
servi~es, including credit reporting, bill collection, accounting, and detective work.
The ag~ncy's "preventative department," according to an advertisement, existed "for
the purpose of protecting the trade against a certain class of customers who are
continually requesting credit but never intend to pay. This class is composed of a
genteel appearing set of swindlers, male and female, who, with their oily tongues,
insinuating manners and great show of bogus wealth, always succeed in victimizing
the trade. They move from locality to locality, remaining long enough in each to run
up bills with the grocer, butcher, baker, and all others willing to trust." The agency
boasted that retailers-as well also hotels, boarding houses, and landlords-could
"save hundreds, yes, thousands of dollars each year" through its 'services. And in
addition to investigating retail customers and prospective tenants, the agency's
detective department also doubled as an employee screening program "It is of utmost
importance to the Trade to discover who among their employees are honest and who
are dishonest. . . We assert that of ten Retail Dealers, eight are being victimized by
their employees, and ofthose eight six are ignorant of the fact." 195
By its second year the agency had compiled a list or'some 8430 "contumacious
debtors" in Brooklyn alone. These "dead beats," according to a news article, consisted
195
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of many with the means to pay, including "the gentry who live in brown stone
houses," but who evaded their financial obligations through legal loopholes or by
placing their property in another's name. 196 The difficulty of exacting payment from
such crafty debtors prompted the agency to hold an open meeting in March 1870,
during which the organization's general superintendent, C.H. Baxter, oversaw the
drafting of a legislative proposal to submit to the state assembly in Albany. 197 The
meeting, it seems, was sparsely attended and nothing came of it. However, one of
Baxter's proposals, a call for wage liens against retail debtors, drew harsh criticism in
the local press. 198 The next year the Dealers' Mutual Protective Agency apparently
folded. During a summer lull in 1872 a reporter for the Brooklyn Eagle sought to do a
story on the agency and learned from an informant that the agency had made "a
splendid run" but ultimately failed to make good on its promise to collect difficult
bills.

199

It is not clear whether this agency published a reference book or how credit

information was ascertained. The emphasis on delinquents suggests that the agency's
credit reporting endeavors consisted of little more than compiling black lists from their
subscriber's collection requests.
But just as this Brooklyn agency quietly closed its doors, another firm, the
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until 1931, when bankruptcy finally sunk it. 200 Though the RDPA apparently left
behind no archival repository, the prefatory letters in its annual reference books
provide much information concerning its history, development, and operation. 201 The
first edition of its Commercial Register, published in 1872, contained the names of
50,000 individuals living or working in New York and Brooklyn. Modeled on the
mercantile agency system in its use of the affirmative-negative system and annual
publication of coded reference books, the RDP A communicated the creditworthiness
of individuals through the use of a rating key:
1. Undoubtedly responsible.
2. Pays punctually.
C. Reported as habitually paying cash, and deemed responsible.
3. Regarded as responsible, but does not always pay punctually.
Individuals who received contradictory reports or whose credit was so poor as to be
ranked below 3 were given an asterisk, indicating that the subscriber should make an
inquiry at the agency office for more information. By 1880 the RDPA was answering
up to 20,000 special inquiries per year. 202 The simplicity and stability of the RDPA's
rating key was viewed as a selling point. Except for the elimination of the "C" rating
in 1887, it remained essentially the same for more than a half century.
While adopting the system of the commercial credit reporting agencies, the
RDPA introduced a key innovation: the use of direct ledger experience. Ledger
experience-a retailer's own record of his or her customers' payment history-
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represented a running transcript of each individual's financial behavior. When pooled
with the records of other retailers, it offered a medium through which an individual's
pattern of promptness, struggle, or indifference in meeting credit obligations might be
discerned. Compared with the use of distant correspondents and in-house
investigators, both of which could never be more than imperfect intermediaries, the
information recorded in the firsthand experiences of merchants was considered far
superior. As a prefatory letter in the RDPA's first edition explained, "The ratings are
not mere opinions, but the recorded experience of business men who have had
dealings with the persons reported, and fairly express their knowledge of them." 203
According to the agency, the individual ratings in the second edition were based on
reports submitted by as many as twenty different retailers. 204 To summarize this
info1mation and calibrate ratings, the reference books included three columns in which
the highest, lowest, and average rating of an individual could be listed (though in
many cases individuals received only a single rating).
The use of ledger experience signaled a major development in the history of
American credit reporting, one that set retail credit reporting organizations apart from
those monitoring credit in the commercial sphere. The 1874-1875 ratmg book
published by the Retail Mercantile Agency in Brooklyn seems to have similarly
incorporated the use of ledger experience. 205 Retailers had long known that knowledge
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accrued through their own interactions with customers was far more valuable than any
information culled by second-hand investigators, but the problem had always been to
get them to share such information with each other. The RDPA encouraged wary
retailers to contribute their ledger experience by offering a fifty percent discount to
subscribers who provided "full co-operation." Such cooperation involved providing
the agency with "a full list of their customers with their addresses and business, as far
as known, and rating them as per instructions on the blanks furnished by the
association," and providing revisions and corrections as requested. 206 In its annual
reports, the RDP A went to great lengths to impress upon retailers the merits of its
ratings and its impartiality as an institution. Distinguishing itself from the mercantile
agency system, the RDP A asserted, "This Association does not interview for
information, and does not accept statements or opinions as a basis for credit, but gives
you the experience of the dealers who previously sold the party, with such other facts
as are necessary to enable you to form a correctjudgment.''207
Ledger experience also had the happy effect of inoculating credit reporting
agencies such as the RDPA against charges of bias or injustice in their ratings. As
mere compilers of information submitted by the community of retailers, they argued,
the agency did not manufacture facts but distilled their essence for the use of its
membership. Responding to those who angrily protested their rating, the RDPA
206
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countered, "To all such as these we have but one reply: 'We do not rate anyone. "'208
Moreover, the blame for incomplete or erroneous ratings was placed squarely on the
retailers themselves, who were said to have introduced error by failing to report new
information or by refusing to participate altogether. But in holding the retailers
responsible, no one in particular was accountable, thus giving the ratings an aura of
objectivity and truth that emanated from outside of the reporting agency. 209 In this
way, the agency presented itself to the public as a neutral medium of communication
that received and transmitted the collective wisdom of unnamed retailers in a given
locality. Ratings, in other words, were merely a neutral quantitative record of the
individual's own financial behavior, for which they alone were responsible. Since
reports were provided to the agency in strict confidence, a disgruntled customer could
only guess at the source of his or her poor rating. And like the mercantile agency
system in the commercial sphere, the RDPA touted its disciplinary effect on both
retailers and their customers. "It is a well established fact that the publications and
working of this Association has had the double effect of making the retail dealer, who
is a member, more careful in giving credit, and his customer more anxious to make a
good record by meeting his bills promptly."210 The RDPA took pride in the discomfort
it caused the inveterate dead beat. "There is a great deal more known about a man than
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he fancies," the agency asserted. "Then let everybody so conduct himself that nothing
can be known about him of which he will have any reason to be ashamed." 2 II
The RDPA repeatedly described itself as a "conservative" institution and took
every opportunity to remind its subscribers that its ratings were not infallible and that
any unjust rating would be promptly rectified. "We employ a large corps of
experienced and intelligent reporters and clerks in collecting and recording such
information," the RDPA explained in 1881. "The facts which come into our
possession are carefully sifted and analyzed, and as we have no possible interest in the
individuals reported on, the conclusions which we present are free from all bias of
personal interest of prejudice."212 As proof of its legitimacy, the RDPA boasted that
the organization had been in operation for more than a decade and no legal action had
ever been brought against it. "It would be a miracle if in all the past twelve years no
mistakes had been made, but it is none the less remarkable that during that time we
have escaped all litigation." Noting that few commercial credit reporting firms could
claim as much, the RDP A added, "we cannot but think that we have been peculiarly
fortunate, or else that our system is better than that of the others."213 If the RDPA was
not harried by litigants, however, it did have to contend with the unauthorized use of
its proprietary information. Like the mercantile agency ofR.G. Dun, the RDPA could
hardly control the dissemination of its reports and ratings once placed in the hands of
subscribers. In 1886 the RDPA was reduced to scolding its members for sharing
information with non-subscribers, a "growing evil" that stymied the enlargement of
211
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the association's membership. "It is a matter of every-day occurrence when
canvassing to be told by a dealer that he does not need to subscribe because he gets the
information from a friend who does without charge."214 And like the leading
commercial credit reporting agencies, the RDPA also had to contend with imitators
bred of its own success. In 1883, for example, a firm calling itself the Retail Dealers'
Protective Association issued a reference book for the city of Chicago. 215 Though this
ephemeral venture-which, it turns out, was also a swindle-posed no direct
competition to the New York RDPA, others closer to home did, thus prompting the
RDPA to warn its members against "irresponsible parties" that regularly set up cutrate operations under similar sounding names. 216
The RDPA was the most successful for-profit retail credit reporting firm in
existence during the 1870s and 1880s, but others soon emerged on the scene. The
American Mercantile Union was founded in 1876 and over the next two years
published reference books for at least two cities, Springfield, Ohio, and Lowell,
Massachusetts. According to the firm's 1886 reference book for San Francisco and
Oakland, a "branch agency" of the American Mercantile Union existed "in every city
of note throughout the United States."217 while the American Mercantile Union
displayed national aspirations, many others, such as the Retail Dealers' Mutual Benefit
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Protective AssociationofNashville, Tennessee, were local intheir orientation. 218 In
1881 an organization called the Mercantile Union published a referenc.e book in
Philadelphia. The proprietors, Ammet R. Clarke and J.H. Culbertson, seem.to have
been eager to emulate the RDPA-so eager, in fact, that the preface to their book
plagiarized directly from that of the RDPA's latest edition. While employing the
affirmative-negative system and compiling ratings at least nominally based upon
ledger experience, however, the Mercantile Union's rating key~ with its fourteen
different classifications, had none of the RDPA's parsimony. Clarke and Culberston, it
seems, were an unscrupulous pair. During a trial in which three duped subscribers
were sued for nonpayment, one of the defendants loudly denounced the Mercantile
Union's proprietors as "swindlers."219 There was truth in this angry outburst. Two
years later Clarke and Culberston established another agency, the RDPA in Chicago,
and absconded with the subscription fees after publishing a single reference book.

220

Protective associations
During the 1870s and 1880s a growing number of retailers began to form their
own "protective" associations. These associations-typically established along trade
lines and limited to a specific town or city-sought to regulate prices, credentialing,
and the quality of their respective products and services. But foremost among their
purposes was the policing of credit relationships. In 1871, for example, at least three
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new trade organizations, one representing milk dealers, tailors, and retail coal dealers,
were formed in Philadelphia. In the case of the milk and coal dealers, members agreed
to provide the association with a list of their delinquent customers for the purpose of
keeping a black list. The tailors, evincing their desire to replicate the system of the
"General Information Society of London," promised to protect its members through
"the diffusion of information in regard to delinquent and doubtful customers."221 In
Chicago, the national financial crisis of 1873 spurred at least a hundred of the city's
retail grocers to meet for the purpose of forming a protective association. The
organization, dubbed the Grocers', Butchers', and Marketmens' Exchange, was to
center upon the compilation of a shared black list. 222 Though such associations usually
reflected a guild-like homogeneity, in some cases they brought together a motley
assortment of interests, as was the case in St. Louis, where grocers, real estate agents
specializing in boarding houses, and physicians organized in 1878 for the purpose of
devising a cooperative black list. 223
Among these various trade groups, retail grocers were the most active. As
providers of basic provisions, they dealt with the greatest number and variety of
customers. And positioned on the frontline of the swelling consumer credit economy,
they suffered worse than others from delinquent customers. During the late nineteenth
century medium to large cities were served by thousands of local grocers. In the early
1880s, for example, a New York newspaper placed the number of grocers in New
221
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York and Brooklyn at 10,000, an estimate that may have been imprecise but is not
improbable. 224 These neighborhood retailers often performed an unwanted social
service role. Where no family help or charitable safety net existed, distressed local
people depended upon trusting retailers for the necessities of life. "Men who are out of
work; men who do work, but are unable to collect their pay,-must live. Having no
money, they go to the store, and ask for credit until they can obtain their wages. The
merchant lets them have what they want, thinking that he will some time get his pay,
and trusting to the men's honesty and ability to collect what is due them for work." 225
At the inaugural meeting of the Chicago Grocers', Butchers', and Marketmens'
Exchange, a fracas erupted when one grocer read a rambling diatribe against the credit
system and proposed its immediate abolition. Another merchant rejected this "foolish
proposition," noting that he served many "honest people" and "could not do such a
cruel thing to them on such short notice." Citing the hardships wrought by the current
financial panic, he added, "In this time of financial stringency, when people of
ordinary means had not the currency wherewith to pay their running expenses, it
would be an act of meanness to shut down credit."226
While offering the public a welcome degree of convenience and in some cases
a lifeline, credit sales were the source of much hardship for local merchants with
razor-thin profit margins. As' a defender of such retailers noted, the workingman might
"imagine that the grocer, the dry-goods merchant, the dealer in meats and poultry, are
making such large profits," but in reality they often scrapped along and struggled to
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make ends meet. 227 In particular, they found themselves at the whim of fickle debtors
and, unhappily, in a perpetual battle to collect small sums spread throughout the
neighborhood. Some complained that the credit system forced them into "public
slaves," as they were too desperate to deny credit and perpetually abused by
delinquent customers. "We may ask," a Chicago grocer wrote in 1873, "Why in the
world do we trust? There is no reason why, only our own anxiety to do business and
grasp at trade." And adding insult to injury, as this writer observed, the credit standing
of local grocers and butchers suffered in the eyes of the greater business world as a
result. "I find, upon looking through the commercial reports, that the retail grocers of
Chicago are the poorest, and have the smallest amount of credit of any class of
business men in the city."228
Worse still, the grocer's generosity was not always appreciated. Open book
accounts encouraged more liberal spending, and grocers (as well as other retailers)
were accused of preying upon the vanity of their customers in offering to trust them.
"[A]n open, running, unsettled account with some merchant, is about the worst
calamity that can possibly happen to a farmer, laboring man, or mechanic, in moderate
circumstances," one writer declaimed. "You feel quite flattered when the merchant
tells you smilingly: 'No matter about the money, take the goods along; we'll make that
all right sometime.' You feel like hugging the generous man for his kindness as you
carry away the bundle of goods which you have purchased on credit, and which he
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would have sold 25 per cent. cheaper for cash."229 Others viewed the extension of
credit as a quiet conspiracy hatched by lazy and unscrupulous retailers. "Grocers,
butchers, and other storekeepers who supply families with the daily necessities of life,
encourage and sometime literally compel their regular customers to let their accounts
stand for a month or more at a time," a Brooklyn editorialist complained. The
preference among storekeepers for monthly and quarterly payments, according to the
writer, allowed them to bury phantom charges in lengthy invoices and to abet
dishonest housekeepers who slipped items in for themselves. 230 And, as usual, the
tolerance if not outright promotion of credit sales among retailers was also blamed for
driving up prices. Such complaints, whether launched by disgruntled merchants or
customers, typically concluded with calls for the imposition of a cash-only policy.
By the mid 1880s grocers' associations were established in many Eastern cities
and as far west as California, where the Los Angeles Grocers' Protective Association
was formed in 1879. 231 One of the largest of these associations was that of the New
England retail grocers', which brought together local groups from throughout
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Maine, Established
in 1882 (and renamed the Central Retail Grocers' Association in 1884), it had
approximately 1100 members by its second year of existence. 232 At the same time or
shortly thereafter associations were formed in Chicago, New York, Brooklyn, St.
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Louis, Richmond, Syracuse, Rochester, Buffalo, and Philadelphia.233 These
associations, especially in Boston and New York, came together in massive annual
celebrations attended by parades, brass bands, and family festivals. When the 800
predo!Jlinately German members of the New York Retail Grocers' Association
convened in 1884, they "enjoyed themselves as only Germans can" and extended their
beer-swilling conviviality to a delegation of Massachusetts grocers, whose arrival was
enthusiastically greeted "with a roar of artillery." 234 Though grocers' associations were
the most visible and numerous, allied trade groups developed similar protective
societies. In Charlotte, North Carolina, for example, the butchers banded together in
1889-three years ahead of the city's grocers-to compile a black list for their
protection against "trusting parties who will not pay their bills. " 235
Softening the cut-throat competition within the local trade, these associations
fostered a cooperative spirit that was key to the development of e~fective credit
reporting networks. Indeed, chief among their objectives-in addition to regulating
prices, business hours, the adulteration of food, and resisting the incursions of
wholesalers and peddlers-was the protection of the trade from delinqu~nt customers.

In nearly every case this was achieved by compiling a black list for the exclusive use
of its members. When the retail grocers of Aberdeen, South Dakota (a newly
incorporated town with fewer than 5000 people) organized in 1888, for example, they
233
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promptly compiled a "list of delinquents who prey upon the trade" in an effort to
prevent its members from unwittingly offering credit to "Mr. Bad Pay."236 These black
lists took the form of printed handouts that were distributed directly to members, thus
accounting for their apparent rarity (I have yet to locate one), or a single master ledger
maintained by the association. The latter was the system in use among the Protective
Association of Grocers in Long Island City, New York, which kept "a fair-sized
account-book, with a mourning-border, containing the list of names" of delinquent
customers. 237
There were exceptions to such fixed or limited circulation black lists. One
example, attributed to the merchants of Oshkosh, Wisconsin, was a black list
published around 1872. This slim thirty-page volume contained the names of some
500 individuals and their respective debts, each of which was listed on a separate line
so that the number of outstanding debts, rather than simply their sum, could be
ascertained by the reader. While most individuals were listed with only one or two
unpaid debts, some had as many as nine, from which degrees of financial neglect and
abuse might be inferred. 238 An even more noteworthy exception is M'Cready's Credit

Register, a reference book published in Boston during the 1880s by John C.
M'Cready. As a representative of the New England Retail Grocers' Association,
M'Cready capitalized on his affiliation with the organization and his role as traveling
representative for its official publication, the New England Grocer. His Credit
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Register, which was produced under the association's aegis for the use of "retail
dealers and country store merchants," contained the names of individuals (listed
alphabetically by New England town) and the amount of their outstanding debts, along
with a code number (1, 2, or 3) and in some cases an asterisk. The meaning of the
cipher is indecipherable without access to the key, but the inclusion of debts strongly
suggests that the register was essentially an elaborate black list, and that the codes
referred to the individual's circumstances and disposition toward paying. 239
M'Cready's retitled reference book, the Commercial Reporter, and his self-styled
"Credit Register and Collector System" lasted until at least 1887 240
If grocers and butchers were at the forefront of retail credit reporting systems,

physicians were equally hard pressed. Doctors were among the earliest adopters of
consumer credit reporting, perhaps even preceding the organized efforts of grocers and
neighborhood retailers. These professionals had long suffered at the hands of patients
who took their solicitude for granted and failed to compensate them. Even more than
grocers, who incurred losses by feeding the destitute, physicians abided by moral
obligations that prohibited them from denying their services to anyone. Complaining
of the penmy into which American physicians were sunk as a result of uncollected
bills, a Boston editorialist noted in 1840 that "the medical practitioner goes
everywhere, at every hour, night or day, without knowing even the character of this

219

M'Cready 's Credit Register, for Retail Dealers, and Country Store Merchants, 2nd ed. (Hoston:
Alfred Mudge & Son, 1884). This rare volume ,sin the general collection at the Umversity of Delaware
Library. M'Cready, served as the traveling representative of the New England Retail Grocers'
Association and oversaw the publication of its official organ, the New England Grocer.
240
"Local Lines," Boston Globe, 27 May 1885, 2.

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

patient, and much less anything about his ability to pay for medical services."

241

Nineteenth-century physicians were resigned to the fact that some under their care
might be too poor to ever pay them, but they resented those who took advantage of
their charity, particularly those who put them off with endless excuses while attending
to other financial obligations and even "family superfluities."242
The dilemma that physicians faced, as one editorialist noted in 1872, was that
of differentiating between the "real delinquents," those who were truly indigent, and
the "doctor-swindlers."243 "The butcher, the grocer, or the baker may, without
incurring ill will, refuse to give credit to persons who ask an accommodation. In like
manner all other business men may refuse to adopt the credit system," a correspondent
to the Brooklyn Eagle observed in 1873. "But the doctor, Ah! the doctor! What a
'cruel, heartless man,' he would be, if he asks for his pay as soon as his services are
rendered." 244 The "dishonest class," as this writer noted, was not those in dire financial
straits but former patients who frequented the opera and frittered away their money on
luxuries instead of settling with their doctor. "The physicians should devise some plan
for self protection in such cases. The members of the medical societies should hand in
the names of these dishonest delinquents to be recorded in a book for the purpose, at a
monthly meeting, so that the members could draw off the names of such as are
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notoriously dishonest, that they may be made to appreciate the value of medical
attendance when next in need of it. " 245
In fact, the physicians of Millville, a small town in southern New Jersey, had
already done this in 1869. Employing a collection agent to enforce payment, the
physicians pledged to record the names of patients who were six months overdue "on
a Black List, of which each Physician shall have a copy." Individuals added to the list
were not to be removed until they settled their bill or unless they w~re exempted by
"an order from an overseer of the poor."246 Several years later the Manhattan
Collecting Company, a for-profit venture in New York, published a reference book for
the use of "Physicians, Dentists & Retail Dealers." 247 Though the book included a
rating key, which gave the impression of an affirmative-negative reporting system, it
was little more than a modified black list. Of the more than 1300 individuals listed in
the main reference and its supplement, only seventeen were given a positive rating of
"Paying up," and none was listed as "Paid up." Instead, the entire reference was
devoted to three categories of delinquency: those who had apparently moved away;
those deemed able, but unwilling to pay; and those considered too poor to pay. As
medical professionals began to organize during the 1870s, they adopted the black list
as their medium of choice.
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Bureaucratic nightmares and cash-only dreams
Though information-sharing networks run by fellow merchants were the most
promising, particularly in their incorporation of direct ledger experience, they also
proved the most difficult to maintain. This was the case for several reasons. First,
retailers remained deeply mistrustful of one another. Even facing throngs of unknown
customers, many retailers preferred to suffer their debtors quietly and alone rather than
share information with their competitors. Such hard-headed isolationism gave way
over time, but retailers instinctively bristled at the notion of cooperation, an idea that
must have seemed especially counterintuitive in an environment of tightening
competition. Additionally, some retailers apparently resisted the idea of credit
reporting out of fear of alienating their customers. As a Nashville, Tennessee,
reporting agency noted in 1885, "Some retail dealers object to this mode of selfprotection, because, forsooth, their customers may become offended if their habits of
non-paying their debts are made so public." This logic, the agency argued, was
invalidated by the fact that many trusting retailers had "brought themselves to
bankruptcy, and their wives and their children from a comparative state of affluence to
abject poverty," as a result of their heedless goodwill. 248
At a strictly administrative level, credit reporting organizations were extremely
time- and labor-intensive enterprises. The task of collecting, compiling, and regularly
updating and distributing credit information was no mean feat. To give a sense of the
stupendous effort involved, the preparation of a single reference book published by the
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RDPA in 1880 involved the deletion of 20,000 names, the addition of 20,000 new
names, and changes to 45,000 existing ratings and addresses. "The 70,000 names
contained in the register," the RDPA reported, "must be carefully copied and
compared with all the latest directories, household and business addresses corrected,
errors in spelling and alphabetical arrangement of names made right, old ratings erased
or changed, and new ones inserted, all to be done in a very limited time."

249

Even in a

city a third the size of New York, the effort needed to operate an effective affirmativenegative reporting system was daunting. Thus it is no surprise that most early
cooperative credit reporting organizations consisted of simple black lists, the least
burdensome system of information sharing.
These obstacles were compounded by the laxity with which many merchants
administered their business records. "No man can know too much about his business,
and the majority of men don't know enough," a representative of the Sioux City
Bureau of Credits complained in 1898.250 Small retailers earned special repute for their
managerial ineptitude, a problem that became evident, ironically, as commercial credit
reporting firms moved to require business owners to submit signed financial
statements attesting to their capital and assets. Many retailers kept only skeletal
records of their transactions and understandably resisted such efforts, as these
statements were legally binding documents that could be used against them as
evidence of fraud if they subsequently failed. Noting the "astonishingly universal"
ignorance of double-entry bookkeeping among American businessmen, Samuel Terry
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pleaded that any form of coherent recordkeeping-"whether it be notched sticks, chalk
scores, pencil memorandums, or 'single entry' books"-was far better than nothing. 251
Informality bred omission and loss. Sales records '1/ere easily forgotten when busy
clerks allowed familiar customers to walk off with "a hoe, or a scythe, or a shovel, or
some such article" with only verbal instructions to charge the item to their account. 252
Attesting to the inevitability of such errors, one long-time retailer reminisced, "Why,
when a man's busy and customers waiting for him, it's the most natural thing in the
world for him to forget to charge a sale. The more anxious he is to hustle and wait on
customers, the more apt he is to forget." 253 Many small retailers were unable or
unwilling to commit themselves to careful bookkeeping and some had not taken stock
of their merchandise in years, as horrified creditors came to realize. In 1897 New Y'ork
banker James G. Cannon delivered an influential speech on the subject of "individual
credits" in which he summed up the state of retail credit procedure at the end of the
nineteenth century. "I believe that very few retail merchants, if called upon for an
opinion as to the basis of their credits, could give a specific or intelligent answer,"
Cannon scoffed. "He will often 'size up' a man on the spot and sell him a bill of goods
without even knowing the party's full name, or, relying, perhaps on his supposed
ability to judge something of his means or affairs because he is an acquaintance, he
will trust him without any investigation as to his financial worth." 254
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But at a deeper level, and perhaps more significantly, many small retailers
harbored a lingering desire to impose a strict cash-only policy, one that would banish
troublesome credit for good. Experience could not have given them much hope.
Merchants who put their foot down and insisted on running a cash business found it a
Sisyphean task. "[T]he day always comes," a Chicago journalist explained, when the
established cash customer "either left their money at home or change for a $20 bill
cannot be made, resulting in a charge being made upon the books, and then-well, its
is always the same story: the charges commence to accumulate, and-as he dresses
well, is a clever talker, and has always paid cash in the past-the retailer thinks he is
making a solid customer by his chivalry, and when the account becomes due and is
presented the debtor says: 'All right, I'll send this in tomorrow or the next day."' 255
Even after advocating a strict cash-only policy to free the shopkeeper from the tyranny
of slow credits, a frustrated Chicago grocer admitted, "I must say that I have not got
the nerve to do it. I cannot stand by and see my good customers walk over to my
neighbor just for the reason that I will not accommodate them with a little credit, and
he will."256 In this way many merchants, especially small independent retailers, felt
compelled to offer credit terms though they were ill equipped to handle the
administrative responsibilities that such transactions required. One of the great
drawbacks of credit selling was the additional labor, both physical and mental, that it
entailed. Credit sales burdened the retailer's mind with "the agitation and exciting
questions of the responsibility of customers" and the problem of collections, all of
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which distracted him from the more important business of buying and selling goods.
Citing the anxiety and emotional "wear and tear" wrought by credit, one retailer
reflected in 1898, "Would I not be happier and in better condition financially, _as well
as physically, if I should cut off the credit part of my business entirely?"2_57
In 1876 a group ofretail grocers in Atlanta conspired to ban credit sales for an
entire year in reaction to legislation that prohibited them from _garnishing the wages of
laborers, mechanics, and journeymen. 258 Another attempt to curtail credit was reported
in Boston, where that city's grocers were said to have defied naysayers and cultivated
a cash-only policy of"enormous" proportions by 1885.259 An informal survey of
Chicago retailers revealed nearly unanimous support for cash-only policies. "The
credit business is the old flint lock of our forefathers," one merchant argued; cash was
the truly progressive medium of the technological age, "the rapid-firing repeating rifle
of modern mercantile warfare." 260 Apocryphal stories of credit resistance also
circulated in local papers throughout the nation. One related a California grocer's
novel way of illustrating the additional cost of credit for the benefit of his customers.
He divided his stock in half and sold goods for cash prices on one side and credit on
the other; thus the customer was "made to realize the value ofready money." 261
Another described a barber's technique of intimidating credit seekers. When asked by
a "suspicious-looking transient customer," if he offered credit terms, the Nevada
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barber explained that dead beats had induced him to adopt a "new system'' of
bookkeeping. "Whenever I shaved one of these standbys I put a little nick in his nose
with my razor and kept tally that way. They got so they didn't want to run bills."262
Here the problem of accounting and financial identity was solved in one fell swoop, to
the delight of resentful merchants.
The erratic development of consumer credit reporting thus reflected not only
significant administrative obstacles and deeply engrained distrust among retailers, but
also conflicting attitudes toward the legitimacy of consumer credit itself. Ultimately
cash-only policies proved untenable over any period of time in either commercial or
retail business. "While it is true that on a strictly cash basis a business ca.Tl be run at
lower prices and quicker profits," a banker conceded in 1897, "it is also true that the
class of customer who can pay cash for everything they need either for doniestic and
personal use or for business purposes, is a comparatively small one. " 263 But the
emotional appeal of cash seems to have prevented at least some retailers from fully
embracing any system of credit reporting, for to do so would have signaled surrender
to the credit system and the permanent dashing of their cash-only drea1ns. The
underlying popular longing for a cash-only utopia invariably came to the surface
during the many financial crises of the nineteenth century and persisted well into the
twentieth century. During the 1920s cash-only policies were still adhered to by some
merchants. Arguing the benefits of retail credit to an audience of skeptical Colorado
grocers and butchers, a representative of a Colorado Springs credit bureau noted that
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"Credit ties up trade. It makes regular customers."264 Even more, credit customers
bought more and were inclined to develop personal loyalty, whether bred of
convenience or good will, to the store where they were granted credit. The credit
purchases of regular credit customers also reduced fluctuations in the retailer's
income. Credit encouraged greater spending by reducing the customer's "sales
resistance," as a Hollywood, California, retailer unabashedly noted. 265
By the end of the nineteenth century many retailers had come to terms with the
necessity of the credit system and turned instead to the systematic management of its
ever-present risks. In the closing years of the century, two of the three leading
consumer credit reporting agencies of the late twentieth century were born: The
Chilton Company, founded in Dallas by J.E.R. Chilton in 1894, which became
TransUnion; and the Retail Credit Company, founded by in Atlanta by Cator
Woolford in 1899, which went on to become Equifax. 266 "The word credit in the retail
business is a sign to a dangerous road that has led many a merchant to disaster, but a
road which must be traveled," Chilton remarked in 1904.267
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CHAPTER 3: Professionalization and the National Credit Infrastructure
By the late 1890s formalized systems for evaluating the credit risk of
individual consumers existed in metropolitan centers throughout the U.S, from New
York to Chicago and Los Angeles, and in many smaller cities in the American
northeast, mid-Atlantic, and Midwest. "The method of doing business by retailers has
changed considerably during the last decade," a Chicago journalist observed in 1886.
"Organizations have been perfected by which every grocer is in honor bound to
furnish a list of all delinquents or dead-beats who seek to swindle him out of his just
dues, and in every locality where there are a sufficient number of retailers to form an
association for mutual protection against dishonest credit customers these
organizations are springing into existence."268 With few exceptions, including several
attempts to build multi-state franchises, these organizations were private commercial
agencies and merchant-run protective associations that worked independently and
precariously in their respective home cities.
The disorganized and isolated character of retail credit reporting changed
dramatically between 1890 and 1920. Two developments in particular, the
professionalization of credit management and the founding of a national retail cr~dit
association, provided the foundation upon which the modem consumer credit bureau
was built. The designation of credit manager emerged out of a broader movement
toward professionalization during the late nineteenth century, one that included the
creation of national associations representing three closely aligned occupations:
banking (1875; American Bankers Association), law (1878; American Bar
268
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Association), and accounting (1887; America Institute of Public Accountants). The
credit reporting agency was an influential arbiter of creditworthiness, but the real
gatekeeper to the world of credit was the individual credit manager, whose job it was
to personally interview credit customers and to keep perpetual watch over the store's
existing credit accounts. This was a monumental task, one that required superior
organizational skills and an ability to keep abreast of rapidly changing circumstances
at the individual level and in the larger world of commerce. Though the
professionalization of credit management was initiated by commercial creditorswholesaling and manufacturing firms rather than retailers-retail credit experts soon
followed. By the 1920s the credit department was a commonplace feature of
department stores and installment houses, and national public relations campaigns
urged American consumers to "guard their credit as a sacred trust."

The credit man and the science of credits

During the last decade of the nineteenth century a shadowy new figure
emerged on the American business scene: the credit man. These "ten-talent men," as
one contemporary described them, were experts in the nascent "science" of credits, a
specialization that encompassed the entire range of credit management-from risk
assessment to bookkeeping, law, and collections.269 Credit men, and the credit
departments they inhabited, grew out of the increasing volume and complexity of
credit relationships in the commercial sphere, particularly in larger wholesaling and
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manufacturing firms where one of the owners or a trusted clerk began to specialize in
the handling of credit management. Though this division of labor had long existed
informally-Lewis Tappan, for example, played the untitled role of credit manager in
his brother's company before founding the Mercantile Agency in 1841--it was during
the 1880s that such credit experts began to receive formal recognition. By then the
profitability of many commercial houses depended heavily upon credit sales, making
the work of a skilled credit man indispensable. Credit managers at some of the largest
firms handled tens of thousands of individual credit accounts and commanded
impressive salaries-as much as five to ten thousand dollars a year--for their efforts.
In 1883 a Chicago reporter inquired about these new business experts. "They're pretty
sharp fellows, ain't they?" he ventured. "Sharp! Well I should say so," a man familiar
with their work replied. "Why, he has the whole responsibility of selling millions of
dollars worth of goods out all over the empire on credit!"270
As gatekeeper to the world of credit, the credit man wielded enormous power
over the lives and fortunes of individuals. From his desk in one of the firm's back
offices he single-handedly determined the creditworthiness of all customers and
continuously tracked their accounts. While seeking to please his employer and the
company's commissioned salesmen with large receipts, he was simultaneously
constrained by the specter of defaulted bills and financial loss, all of which fell
directly at his feet A competent credit man was generally expected to keep losses at or
below one percent of the firm's annual credit sales. Thus he was forced to steer an
anxious course between reckless generosity and stultifying conservatism. Neither
270
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extreme was profitable; either too many good customers were turned away or too
many bad risks accepted. "The Credit-man's position is beyond questio11 the most
unpopular one in the house," one writer noted. "He is between three fires. The.
customer wants long credit, the salesman wants all the orders he takes filled, and the
house wants no losses. " 271 The credit man's dilemma was summarized in a
Shakespearean parody that made the rounds in the trade press during the 1890s:
To sell or not to sell;
That is the question.
Whether 'tis better to sell the goods
And take the risk of doubtful payment,
Or, make sure of what is in possession,
And, by declining, hold them.
To sell; to ship; perchance to loseAye, there's the rub;
For when the goods are gone,
What charm can win them back
From slippery debtors. 272
By the late nineteenth centurYthe subject of credit was treated in a voluminous
body of writing by business leaders, scholars, politicians, and social critics. Yet amid
this cacophony of condemnation, approval, and equivocation, the merchant could find
little practical instruction. Credit ethics and the importance of character figured
prominently in many popular compilations of maxims for aspiring men of business, a
genre of mercantile pedagogy pioneered in America by Benjamin Franklin, but none
treated credit and its day-to-day regulation as a topic unto itself. 273
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In 1890 this gap was filled by Peter R. Earling, a credit manager for the
Chicago household goods manufacturer L. Gould and Co. Earling' s 300-page treatise,

Whom to Trust, was the first comprehensive guide to credit management. Citing "the
total absence of literature and lack of information on a topic of such vital importance,"
Earling promised to share the fruit of his special knowledge with a broad audience,
one that included wholesale merchants and manufacturers as well as bookkeepers,
accountants, cashiers, bankers, lawyers, and traveling salesmen. While noting the
obvious significance of his book for those working in a formal "Credit Department"which, he added, are "found only in the larger houses"-the omission of "credit men"
from Earling's long list of prospective readers, and its rarity as a descriptive term in
the text itself, suggests the ill-defined nature of the occupation at the time of his
writing. Like other early advocates of systematic credit analysis, Earling argued that
most commercial losses were the result of poor management and imprudence, and thus
preventable through the application of sound principles of analysis. "It is not expected
that this volume will be all-sufficient in itself," Earling conceded, "but it will at least
furnish the fundamental principles, and the processes of reasoning employed in
determining questions of credit."
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Earling's book seems to have galvanized interest in the development of
rational credit management, and in 1892 a new periodical, The Lawyer and the Credit

Man, was launched to address their specific interests. The link between credit
professionals and attorneys was a natural one, as the obverse of credit was collections,
an activity that often involved legal intervention-or its threat. Three years after the
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publication of Whom to Trust, Earling helped organize the first formal meeting of
bankers and business men devoted to the subject of credits. The Congress of
Mercantile Credits held at the 1893 World's Fair in Chicago proved to be a
momentous event. The onset of a severe national financial crisis a month prior to the
congress only reinforced its urgency and significance. If the panic of 183 7 prompted
the development of systematic credit reporting, the financial crisis of 1893 provided
the impetus for professionalized credit management. Reflecting on the depression of
the 1890s, one reporter noted, "The average credit man felt as if the weight of the
world was upon his shoulders, and, so far as his employers were concerned, it often
was." 275 Even the president of the Chicago exposition, Harlow N. Higinbotham, a
respected credit manager at Marshall Field, attended. The congress's three sessions
included papers bearing on various aspects of credit management, but one theme
dominated: the need for mutual cooperation among creditors. Though the afternoon
proceedings of June 24 coincided with a much anticipated high-stakes horse race, a
burning commitment to credit reform prevailed. "Considering the Derby's attractions
the mercantile men had cause for elation in the considerable audience attending
yesterday's session." The addresses, which "were among the best yet heard" according
to a contemporary report, "were nearly all on the question of cooperation among
business-men to secure a better credit system and to diminish the causes of
failures." 276 At the conclusion of the evening session, resolutions for the formation of
an official organization of mercantile credit professionals were adopted and a
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committee was appointed to begin drafting its constitution and bylaws. "In this
congress," a credit professional later reflected, "there was a germ of a great movement
and we look upon it as the seed which later eventuated into an organization of great
importance to the country's economic welfare." This organization was the National
Association of Credit Men (NACM).
Founded in 1896, the NACM quickly became the driving force behind the
professionalization of credit management. At the inaugural meeting held in Toledo,
Ohio, some 150 business men convened to espouse the principles of cooperation and
mutual trust. They hailed from fourteen states, predominantly in the northeast and
Midwest (with the exception of Louisiana, the South was unrepresented) and included
delegates from at least nine local credit men's associations already established in New
York, Cincinnati, Detroit, Minneapolis, Sioux City, Kansas City, St. Louis, St. Joseph
(Missouri), and New Orleans. Amid much fanfare the mayor of Toledo welcomed the
delegates and A.O. Kittredge, editor of Business magazine. presented the assembly
with an honorary gavel engraved with the scales of justice holding "character" and
"capital" in its baianced pans.277 The primary 'obstacle in organizing was an
entrenched competitive hostility among creditors. "We have been afraid to trust the
credit man next door, thinking he would notbe honest in giving us information
concerning our applicant for credit," convention chainnan W H. Preston admitted,
reassuring the delegates that even the most wary would come to realize that his
competitor was "a pretty good fellow" after spending some t!me together. Indeed,
277
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companionship ensued "as soon as delegates' badges had been pinned to their coats,"
according to one account. 278 The importance of forging personal relationships among
themselves was also stressed by Earling, who was in attendance. At the end of the
convention's first day he chafed at the formality of the proceedings and interjected that
the convention's primary object should be to facilitate personal interactions among its
members. "While I have been here seven or eight hours today, I have become
acquainted with very few." 279
Despite Earling's grumbling the convention was a huge success. 280 The NACM
quickly attracted wide support and a large membership.

281

Eighteen local associations

were founded during its first seven months of existence. 282 By 1899 the NACM's
mission seemed to touch upon all aspects of commercial activity. "In dealing with the
subject of credit and its infinite ramifications, we have boundless jurisdiction," an
association official marveled. "There is hardly any phase of merchandising and trade
intercourse that does not bear a striking relation to credit. The great difficulty,
therefore, is not how much we can do, but how little."283 In their mission to impose ·
order on the chaos of credit, the apostles of systematic credit management embraced a
new ethos of standardization and method in their work. Looking back on the financial
spasms of the nineteenth century, the associated credit men took it upon themselves to
modernize, and presumably stabilize, the American credit system through the
278
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application of rational administration. System, method, organization, cooperationthese were the watchwords of the movement's progressive aspirations. The "practical
realization of intelligent theories," an NACM official promised a gathering of
hardware dealers in 1897, would replace the "miasmic swamp of irregularity and
deceit" that had long characterized credit relationships. 284 As another association
member told an audience in Rochester, New York, "There never was a time when
concerted action of credit men against studied deception, fraud and dishonesty was so
imperative as it is to-day." 285 During its first decade the NACM advocated for national
bankruptcy legislation, pressed mercantile agencies such as R.G. Dun and Bradstreet
to improve the quality of their credit reports, advocated for the use of signed financial
statements, and codified the organizational structure and protocols of the modem
credit office. By 1923 the NACM had a national membership well over 31,000
individuals, dwarfing that of the American Bar Association with its 19,500 members
in the same year. 286 Though formed to serve the interests of commercial credit
grantors-wholesalers, manufacturers, and bankers-the NACM's membership
included retailers and credit managers whose firms worked in both commercial and
retail sales.
Few issues preoccupied the newly professionalized credit manager as much as
their own qualifications. The first self-proclaimed credit men emerged from the
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accounting and cashier's departments of their respective firms, where they became
proficient bookkeepers and developed a broad knowledge of business finance. "When
in 1875 I obtained my first position in commercial life," one credit manager quipped,
recalling his unwitting entrance into the profession, "I was expected to be everything
from a Bookkeeper to a Porter, and incidentally also a Credit Man."287 Guided by
practical experience and working in isolation from each other until the mid 1890s,
these pioneering autodidacts turned their focus from the narrow confines of the iedger
book to the full-time problem of estimating individual creditworthiness. As graduated
clerks, the new credit expert was well attuned to the firm's daily operations and, more
significantly, intimately acquainted with the payment habits and behaviors of its
various customers. It was typically in the crucible of the counting room that the credit
man learned the fundamental principles of credit. Yet, the credit manager's work was
so varied and all-encompassing that some found it impossible to summarize. As one
credit man explained in 1900, "We have no catechism, doctrine ordination; no code of
administration or practice-no license or charter.... Whoever hires us, tells us his
rules, and we are prima facie credit men." The same speaker admitted that he had once
been mistakenly apprehended by a group of plainclothes patrolmen and, interrogated
as to his occupation, could only hand the skeptical deputies his business card and
suggest that they stop by his office to see him in action. "I could not tell them what I
did, and couldn't now," he conceded. 288
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The credit man's work was difficult to explain not only because it was
relatively new and unfamiliar to the general public (ironically, the patrolmen mistook
the credit man for a confidence man), but because it brought together so many
disparate domains of knowledge, from accounting and law to agriculture, retailing,
manufacturing, and banking. In short, the credit man was expected to have a grasp of
all spheres of activity with even the slightest bearing on the future financial condition
of his customers, from local weather conditions to national monetary policy. News of
a poor growing season might prompt a credit manager to tighten credit limits for the
firm's rural customers, while knowledge of retailing might sharpen his assessmentof a
shopkeeper's aptitude, and thus his ability to make good on a debt. Such broad
practical training, Higinbotham opined, was best gained through "a boyhood on a
farm, a few years in the typical ·general store' of the average village,' a period of
service in the country bank and a thorough drill in the cashier's department of a
wholesale house."289 To speakof the early credit man as a specialist, in this regard, is
misleading. He was actually a preeminent generalist. "The credit man," one writer
remarked, "ought to be the most practical all-around man in the business."290 In their
limitless search for clues to guide them, the credit man was an "inveterate fact hunter"
with a voracious appetite for information. 291
Yet the qualifications of the ideal credit man, as laid down in countless
disquisitions on the subject in early trade periodicals and textbcoks, reveahhat the
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credit specialist was no mere scientist or bureaucrat, no "lightning calculator" or
"mathematical prodigy."292 In fact, while systematic credit management touted the
superiority of standardization and organizational efficiency, the ideal credit man stood
out more than anything for his unique personality. He was uniformly described as
judicious, temperate, naturally inquisitive, thorough, decisive, and polite. With so
much information coming from conversations-with customers as well as sales
representatives, who in their interactions with customers often gleaned useful personal
details-he was eminently tactful. ''The credit man has often to ask and do many
things which are unpleasant and embarrassing both to himself and to the debtor," one
writer explained. "Ifhe can do these things in such a way as to keep the customer's
good will and even make himself the latter's confidant and advisor, so that the
customer will voluntarily keep him informed of his condition--that is tact."293 In
addition to putting credit customers at ease while asking probing questions about their
family finances, the credit man needed to exercise great diplomacy when rejecting a
credit applicant. "The ideal credit man of my mind's eye," one writer shared, "is a
genial fellow with pleasant voice and smile, with a bearing and manner that take none
of the decision, but all of the sting, out of that harsh word 'No,' and thus savesmany a
cash order for his house. " 294 Likewise, in dealing with sales personnel who ofte:ti
regarded the credit man as an adversary for denying credit requests and killing their
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commissions, he bridged such differences and enlisted them in common cause through
overtures of friendliness and respect.
But while a pleasing personality could perhaps be cultivated by anyone, the
best credit men, as often noted, were possessed of innate qualities of mind and
intuition that defied imitation. One of these gifts was a prodigious memory. As
information professionals who managed thousands of individual accounts and sought
significance in the most trifling details of everyday life, the credit man with a
capacious memory was at a distinct advantage. Even while advocating for systematic
recordkeeping, James G. Cannon, one of the leading figures of the NACM, remarked
that "a trained and accurate memory" was the credit man's "main qualification."295
The credit man's legendary feats ofrecall provided many amusing anecdotes,
including one involving an Irish merchant from Kansas who forsook his usual
suppliers in Chicago and St. Louis to purchase stock in New York. After introducing
himself to the credit man of a New York house, the Irishman, who presumed himself a
stranger, was instantly judged creditworthy.
"All right," said the credit-man, "get what you want. I know you well enough."
"But d'ye you know anything good about me," asked the Irishman. "O, yes;
you're all right. You pay your bills promptly, and you've got considerable
property." And, seeing that his man could bear a little humor, he added: "You
take your regular sour-mash, and can draw it pretty fine in a bargain, but you
pull for business, and get there." "Begad," said the Irishman to me afterward,
"he soized me up like a book, but domme ifl wouldn't like to know how he
caught on."
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The credit man, it turns out, had once read a credit report on the Irishman and
"remembered it."296 Other stories recounted spectacular acts of detection. For
example, one longtime credit manager with a natural gift for recalling faces described
how during an interview with a new credit applicant he recognized the man as a
former customer who had defaulted and skipped town. "Looking him squarely in the
face I said in quiet tones: 'Your name is not Smith; it is Jacob Blank. You ran away
from Clark Street twelve years ago.' Instantly the face of the man turned ashen, his
legs began to shake under him, and before any of us could reach him he fell to the
floor in a state of absolute collapse."297 A good memory not only vanquished frauds, it
also served as a valuable humanizing trait when drawn upon to enhance the personal
dimension of business relationships. Memory, after all, was an element of tact. "The
man of tact must have a good memory," one writer explained, "otherwise he will make
errors and blunders; he must remember peoples weaknesses and their sensitive spots,
in order to avoid them; he must remember their interests and hobbies, in order to
fraternize with them; he must remember their strength and their pride, in order to
appeal to their vanity."298 For those without an inborn talent for memorizing their
accounts, it was a skill whose development was encouraged. "Become so well
acquainted with your new customer that when his name is mentioned, all the important
facts surrounding his case come instantly to mind," one writer recommended. 299
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But above all the ideal credit man was a keen judge of human nature. Even as
credit analysis moved in the direction of textual abstraction and quantification, tbe
information that the credit man trusted most was that acquired through direct
consultations with his customers. "His main task," one writer noted, "is to recognize
artificial and superficial and false appearances when he meets them-and the average
credit man meets plenty ofthem!"300 Well into the twentieth century the personal
interview remained the preferred mode of credit investigation. This was particularly
true among retailers who unlike commercial creditors did not have recourse to
financial statements in making credit decisions about individual consumers. During
these face-to-face encounters, described in the next chapter, the credit man relied upon
his interpersonal skills to lay bear the credit customer's true character. "The ideal
credit mar1," one expert noted, "deals largely with character, and should therefore be
preeminently a safe and sane judge of human nature."301 What is especially striking
about the development of rational credit mariagement is its tensi,~n between science
and subjectivity. This was nowhere more apparent than in the seemingly contradictory
qualifications of the credit professional himself. It Wi:\S in the specialized work of the
credit man that the underlying tensions of credit management-.textual versus
interpersonal knowledge, system versus discretion, reason versus intuition---were
dramatized most tellingly.
The successful credit manager did not simply rubberstamp orders that ·checked
out with official sources; he :tbided by his instincts even in cases where, contrary to
300
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trusted endorsements or favorable credit reports, he had "a feeling-perhaps rather
vague and indefinable-that the man is not what he claims and that his request for
credit should be denied."302 This was the crucial moment when the credit man was
forced to choose between facts and impressions. The credit man's ability to judge
human nature was supreme, surpassing all of the institutional and technological
advantages of modem credit reporting at the tum of the century. As one expert
asserted, "The compilers of the books, the collectors of information, the phone and all
cannot save you-it's Judgment."303 Many experienced credit men claimed to have
developed a reliable sixth sense, or "credit sense." The credit man's sixth sense was an
internal voice that "feels what may not be tangible or visible; that warns him of danger
when all would appear to be smooth sailing; and yet again that whispers, 'This is your
man-Trust him.' " 304 Rationalizing the mental logic behind such s1:ap judgments, the
author of an early credit text noted that gut feelings were not capricious, but the
culmination of numerous unconscious observations, rapidly weighed and considered.
Mere physical appearances were often enough to convince a creditor one way or the
other. "Every face is either 'a history or a prophesy,'" one writer instructed, "and we
are reasonably justified, therefore, in paying heed, in the matter of estimating credit, to
what we call our 'intuitions.'"305 Even Higinbotham endorsed the intuition as "a kind
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of subconscious reasoning." 306 Earling concurred: "After all, our impressions of men
and things seldom proceed from logical deductions. They are intuitional-and an
ounce of intuition is worth a pound of logic when we come to reckon with human
nature and its manifold ramifications."307
As the newly organized credit managers began to assert their professional
legitimacy during the early twentieth century, a new qualification emerged: executive
ability. Many business owners, still unsure of the credit man's role, allowed office
managers and accountants to undermine their authority. Seeking to silence such
"BACK SEAT DRIVERS," the credit manager of a San Francisco shoe store
complained, "If you have a good credit manager in charge of your credit machine,
then, in the name of common sense, in the name of good business, in the name of all
that makes for efficiency, SHUT UP!"308 To overcome such interference and to
convince their employers of their value, credit managers worked hard to transform
their status from that of gloried clerk to "high class executive."309 Executive ability
thus involved proving one's mettle as a trusted and decisive leader. Contrasting the
"wishy-washy" credit man of old with the new credit executive, one writer noted, "We
like to look upon the Credit Manager as a 'He-man,' clothed with full authority to say
Yes or No, which will give him confidence in himself, make his handclasp more
firm-his decision in Credit matters arbitrary."310 Among retailers the prejudice
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against credit managers stemmed from a view of their work as a necessary but
fundamentally unproductive and costly expense. This attitude changed, however,
when the value of customer information collected in credit departments was applied to
target marketing during the 1920s and 1930s, as described in Chapter Five. Credit
managers sometimes earned a reputation for assuming an off-putting air of selfimportance. "One impression that frequently finds its way into the brain of the creditman, and which places him in a dangerous position, is the impression that he knows it
all."311 Self-confidence, it was suggested, was to be tempered with appropriate

humility in the face of the welter of information that credit professionals daily
contended with. The credit manager wielded considerable power over the lives of
others, and this power might go to his head.
Still, beneath the optimism and _can-do spirit and of these new credit
professionals, a distinct note of melancholy lingered. "His days are days of tribulation
and trouble, and his nights are nights of unrest," a credit manager in Sioux City, Iowa,
lamented. "He is imposed upon by the unscrupulous, the rascal, and the dishonest, and
there are none to extend him sympathy, and when, by chance or exercise of good
judgment and untiring zeal, he succeeds in foiling his wily foe, there are not to
applaud him."

312

If this was not demoralizing enough, the credit manager was actively

disliked for his significant power as judge and jury. "In every line of business the
Credit Man is always the target for abuse and condemnation," one writer noted, "and it
is he who is so often pointed at with the familiar words, 'See that hyena? He's the
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meanest man in the world,' by someone on whom his duty has compelled him to pass
sentence. He may be the kindest-hearted man in the world, yet the duties of his
position have placed him at the head of the list of' scoundrels,' in the estimation of his
friends-the enemy."313 Under such circumstances many credit professionals were
prone to wariness and a gloomy outlook.

The retail credit man
During the late 1880s and early 1890s credit specialists began to emerge in
retail establishments, particularly in large dry goods stores, installment and mail order
houses, and most importantly department stores. Grocers and butchers m;;iy have been
the earliest to combine for retail credit protection, but it was in the large new
department stores that consumer credit assessment first achieved systemization on a
mass scale. Indeed, the development of retail credit management is intimately
connected to the rise of the department store at the tum of the centwy. 314 Since the
success of these spectacular emporia hinged upon the rapid turnover of large volumes
of merchandise, liberal credit policies were often offered to attract customers and
promote sales. When Louis Stem, proprietor of one of the most prosperous department
stores in New York. was asked by a local reporter in 1889 if his firm.offered credit, he
was quizzical. "'Certainly, we give credit,' he said, 'And we are only too glad to have
313
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the custom. Every big house has to do it. "'315 Such universality was not really true;
major New York dealers such as A.T. Stewart and R.H. Macy famously maintained
cash-only policies, as did retail chain stores such as F.W. Woolworth, J.G. McCrory,
S.S. Kresge (the future Kmart), and J.C. Penney that proliferated at the turn of the
twentieth century. 316 But despite these important exceptions, credit sales were
increasingly commonplace in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. At
Chicago's Marshall Field, for instance, annual retail credit sales exceeded cash sales
for the first time in 1880, and by a margin that grew ever wider over the next
decade. 317
While local grocers and butchers were overwhelmed by unknown buyers in
their cramped store fronts, sprawling multi-storied department stores like Stern
Brothers and Marshall Field literally invited crowds of strangers into their
establishments. During the 1890s department stores began to develop fmmal credit
departments and systems for approving and tracking the charge accounts of their
customers. In 1889 a New York reporter found that "the credit system practiced by the
big houses" was "nearly a perfect science." This system of "lightening inquiries"
relied upon the work of an unidentified "uptown retail commercial agency" (possibly
the RDPA), which listed and rated "the names of thousands of persons in this city and
the suburbs" in its annual reference books. Thus, when the unknown "Mrs.
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Moneypenny" asked to have her goods charged, the store's superintendent took down
her name and references. "[W]hile a new customer is telling the superintendent or
head of the firm about herself or her references, the house will have obtained her
whole pedigree from a business standpoint without her knowledge, and before she
leaves the store." If her name did not appear in the agency's rating book, then a quiet
investigation was rapidly set into motion. "While she is talking a swift footed
messenger, or perhaps the telephone, is put into play, and within a few minutes after
Mrs. Moneypenny has announced herself an employe of the agency is hustling around
all the dry goods stores to find out if Mrs. Moneypenny is known in any ofthern."318
Other department stores employed their own investigators, or "runners," to check up
on the background and reputation of their credit applicants. Recalling his start as a
credit man for the New York department store H. O'Neill in 1885, a long-time credit
manager at Bamberger's remarked that the runners worked together on friendly terms
in contrast to the bitter rivalries of the store owners. 319

It was also in large department stores that many consumers first became aware
of their new status as economic subjects during the late nineteenth century. The
experience of encountering such financial investigation for the first time is recorded in
the following anecdote. Upon moving from Chicago to New York, a woman sought to
open a credit account at a local dry goods dealer. The dealer, after politely asking the
woman her name and address and reviewing her references, asked her to wait a
moment while he mvestigated her references:
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"The woman was not at all satisfied, and was inclined to be indignant. 'It
seems to me,' she said, 'that there is a lot of fuss and red tape about this. I
never had any such trouble in Chicago. Here are my bank book and check
book. They ought to be sufficient to prove my trustworthiness.' 'My dear
madam,' said the superintendent, 'I have not the slightest doubt that you are
entirely trustworthy, and that we shall be very glad to give you credit. At the
same time you must realize that we have to go about this business in a
systematic way, and even while we are morally assured that a customer is
entirely satisfactory we cannot omit the usual precautions. If we did we would
slip up, and we could not afford to sell our goods as cheaply as we do. "'320
At the same time liberal credit policies were typical among installment houses,
where costly durable goods such as furniture, household appliances, and musical
instruments were moved into the eager hands of cash-poor buyers. "Gradually," an
installment dealer recalled in 1887, "a different class of purchasers appeared," one
very unlike the "shady characters" and risky boarding-house tenets who sought to
purchase goods on time. "They were honest young mechanics, clerks, and
bookkeepers who wanted to marry and have homes of their own, but who could not
raise the required cash to furnish a house." 321 Deferred payment plans were not
altogether new-land and housing were sold on such terms throughout the nineteenth
century-but it became increasingly common during the 1860s after a national
campaign initiated by the Singer Sewing Machine Company demonstrated its
efficacy. 322 Technically speaking, installment sales differed from open book or charge
accounts in that a modest down payment was required and, under the terms of a chattel
mortgage, or hire purchase. The goods taken home by the customer were legally
320
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owned by the installment dealer until the final payment was received ..Armed with
iron-clad contracts and the right of repossession, installment dealers were in a better
position than many retailers who sold on credit. Unfortunately, these contracts were
also the source of abuse. Predatory furniture dealers and "sewing-machine dens" lured
the poor into impossible obligations and happily repossessed their merchandise when,
inevitably, they missed a payment. Such schemes incited public outrage and colored
installment selling with a tinge of disrepute during the late nineteenth century. 323 But
for legitimate dealers who hoped to win the goodwill of their customers, confiscation
hardly inspired community favor. These installment dealers, like other retailers,
formed their own protective associations in cities such as Boston and New York and
began to employ credit specialists to manage their accounts. 324
The principles of sound credit management may have been universal, as
representatives of the NACM often suggested, but retail credit specialists, in selling to
the general public, faced challenges that those in the commercial sphere did not.
Commenting on the lack of coordinated credit information among retailers, one
business writer noted, "how much more difficult must be the task of the retail creditman and financial manager, who, to a certain extent, must rely upon the general
reputation of the applicant for credit, his appearance, his act.ion, and his dress." 325
Indeed, in 1898 a Los Angeles retailer noted the difference between commercial and
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retail creditors: "Wholesale merchants can get such information from proper agencies,
and it saves many a good sum to be able to get such information. Why not do the same
with the retail trade?"326

National credit reporting infrastructure: 1900-1940
During the first two decades of the twentieth century both retail credit
reporting (outside agencies that recorded and compiled credit information) and retail
credit managers (in-house professionals who oversaw the allocation of credit to the
store's customers) formed national associations to represent their interests. Though the
credit managers would ultimately exert a far more important influence, the first
stirrings toward a national consumer credit infrastructure came from the proprietors of
privately-run retail credit reporting firms. In February 1906, a decade after the
founding of the NACM, a handful of agency ovvners gathered in a New York City
hotel to discuss the formation of a national association through which to exchange
ideas and promote their collective interests. Six months later the inaugural meeting the
National Association of Retail Credit Agencies was held in New York and its twelve
attendees elected William H. Burr, an attorney and head 'of th¢ Commercial Record
Company in Rochester, New York, as its first president. In his address Burr cited
individual honesty as the ftu1damental basis of retail credit, making a point of
differentiating the work of the retail credit reporting agency from its counterpart in the
commercial sphere. Whereas firms such as Dun and Bradstreet sought to peg the "the
net worth of this or that concern,'' Burr observed, the retail credit reporting firm asked
326
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"what is his reputation and record and does he pay his bills promptly or slowly or does
he not pay them at all."327 In short, retail credit reporting was almost entirely based
upon an assessment of the borrower's character and financial behavior. The next year
the organization's name was changed to the National Association of Mercantile
Agencies (NAMA) to eliminate confusion with other credit men's associations.328
The main difficulty that early retail credit reporting agencies faced, as
discussed in the previous chapter, was soliciting enough membership to reach a critical
mass to sustain itself. The success of such agencies, whether privately owned or run
by merchants, depended upon the organizer's ability to convince enough local
merchants to subscribe to the service and, more crucially, to contribute confidential
information about their own customers for their collective benefit. In the absence of
broad support, the organization was doomed to fail. This, in fact, was the fate of many
credit reporting enterprises during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
"The rocks are strewn with the wrecks of retail mercantile agencies," Burr noted
ominously. In addition to fostering inter-agency cooperation, fe1reting out "fake"
agencies, and working to standardize retail credit reports, NAMA devoted much
attention to the problem of currying favor in the business community and, relatedly,
managing agency expenses so that their reports were generally affordable. This was a
constant struggle; the overhead and labor-intensive work of collecting and compiling
such information was difficult to economize. "Let me set it down as axiomatic," one
writer declaimed, "that cheap reports are impossible, they cannot be thorough and
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reliable."329 Shoddy reports merely drove away subscribers and eroded an agency's
chance at success still further.
Though originally devoted to the problems of retail credit reporting, many of
NAMA's members (never numbering more than two hundred) dabbled in commercial
credit reporting to supplement their incomes. Prosperous commercial reporting firms
such as Dun and Bradstreet were kept aloft by the subscriptions of large wholesalers
and manufacturers, but retail reporting service was out of reach for many small-time
storekeepers. In 1909 a NAMA leader who operated an agency in Richmond, Virginia,
noted that his retail business was only a fraction of his commercial reporting activities,
and a third less profitable. Retail credit reporting, he summarized, was "Skimmed
Milk" compared to the "Double Cream" of commercial reporting. 330 This created
something of an identity crisis for the organization, and it foundered during its fifteenyear existence. But while NAMA failed to win broad support among retailers-the
cooperative spirit evinced by profit-motivated agencies seems to have rung hollow-it
spawned an organization that did: the Retail Credit Men's National Association
(RCMNA).
At the 1912 NAMA convention in Spokane, Washington, a splinter group of
retail credit managers formed the RCMNA to represent their own professional
interests. Its founding father and first president, Sherman L. Gilfillan, worked as a
credit manager for L.S. Donaldson's department store in Minneapolis and was active
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in that city's retail credit association (formed in 1904). 331 Striking upon the idea of a
national association for retail creditors after attending the 1911 NACM convention in
Minneapolis, he arrived in Spokane the next year to realize his vision with fellow
delegates from Minneapolis and St. Paul, Rochester, New York, and Boston.

332

The

RCMNA's primary objectives, as laid down in its original constitution, were to
support the organization of local retail credit men's associations, to promote ,
cooperation between retail credit managers and credit reporting agencies, and to
facilitate the interchange of ideas and knowledge among retail credit professionals. 333
Annual membership was set at three dollars and included a subscription to its official
journal, Credit World, which began publication immediately. Over the next several
years the RCMNA and NAMA held joint annual conventions, but the former soon
eclipsed the later. Citing the NACM rather than NAMA as its model, Gilfillan
proclaimed, "Let us be to the retail world what the wholesale creditmen are to the
wholesale world."

334

In 1919 the RCMNA established a permanent headquarters in.St.

Louis.
Like all prior ventures to form cooperative credit information networks, the
RCMNA faced the daunting task of coaxing retailers out of isolation. Beginning with
fewer than forty members at its inaugural meeting in 1912, the association grewto
nearly 1000 members in 1916 and more than 10,000 by 1921. 335 Its success is a'
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testament to the indefatigable boosting of its early leadership. During its formative
years one official wrote some 800 letters to rally support, and another embarked on a
19,000-mile cross-country odyssey at the height of the 1918 influenza epidemic,
visiting cities in eighteen states in the nmiheast, mid-Atlantic, mid-West, and most of
the South to rally the formation of local RCMNA affiliates. 336 Member& were urged to
wear association lapel buttons and to hang framed certificates in their stores,
advertising their solidarity to their peers while communicating to their customers that
they were conducting business under the watchful eye of the credit manager's
fraternity. "Now, brother creditmen, get together," a Los Angeles representative
implored. "Call on your brother creditmen, form an association. Meet once a month or
oftener. Make friends with one another.... You will soon be able to call your brother
creditman and say 'Bill, what do you know about Mrs. B., she wants credit here."'337
By 1918 the RCMNA had members in forty states and 230 cities throughout the
U.S. 338 Though many worked for large retail firms, the association sought to bring
together creditors from all walks of the retail trade. "This is not a department store or a
dry goods organization," a Credit World advertisement insisted, "it is for every man in
the country who extends retail credit."339
From the outset the RCMNA sought to distinguish itself from the NACM, to
!

which many retail credit managers, including the RCMNA leadership, already
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belonged. "Don't forget to emphasize the word RETAIL in our name," one
representative reminded. "Many persons confuse us with the JOBBERS' or
WHOLESALERS' Association."340 Despite the official deference displayed towa,rd
their "big brother," some retail credit men resented the NACM. There was a natural
antagonism between the two organizations, as, in fact, one of the primary activities of
the NACM was to compile credit reports on retailers who bought from wholesalers
and jobbers. Noting that the wholesalers association offered little of educational value
or material assistance to retailers, a credit manager for the New York department store
Best & Company complained that its leadership had "very little interest in a retailer"
except as a prompt paying customer. 341 Commenting on the disparity between the two
organizations, one writer snapped, "Why is it that the Retail Credlt Man or Woman
has not been considered as important as the wholesale credit men? Why? ... Are the
duties and responsibilities of the retail credit grantor any less than those of the
wholesaler? Does he require less ability or tact? I think not." 342 However, praising the
work of the NACM, Gilfillan simply noted fundamental differences in their work.
"The qualifications, machinery and requirements of the retail credit man differ so
materially from those of his brother in the wholesale field, that a separate organization
devoted to his own particular needs seems indispensable."343 The two associations
maintained amicable relations and in 1919 held a joint convention in New York City,
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where they pledged mutual support and discussed their common interests and
objectives. 344
The RCMNA played a key role in the professionalization of retail credit
management during the early decades of the twentieth century, but more importantly it
laid the groundwork for a national consumer credit reporting network in the U.S. As
already noted, retail credit reporting operations at the turn of the century were entirely
disorganized and varied in their methods, with very few succeeding over any period.
While entrepreneurial private agencies typically failed to win the cooperation and
support of paying subscribers, voluntary merchant-run protective associations, such as
those initiated by grocers during the 1870s and 1880s, usually petered out as
dedication waned and suspicion resurfaced. Local merchant associations, a private
agency upstart scoffed in 1891, "were organized with a hurrah!" but could never
sustain enough interest or funding to survive. 345 There was ample evidence to justify
this view. But a dismal record among both merchants associations and private
agencies hardly deterred new efforts. Some fifty reporting organizations were formed
nationwide between 1890 and 1900, primarily in urban centers. 346 Though retail credit
reporting was born in metropolitan New York, it seems to have flourished in the
344
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Midwest before 1900, particularly in states such as Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin,
Minnesota, Iowa, and Missouri. Prior to the development of merchants associations,
retailers relied upon private agencies, most of which, according to a San Francisco
credit manager, "had their inception in the early nineties. "

347

The diffusion of late-

nineteenth-century retail credit reporting is not only difficult to track, but difficult to
explain. For example, Philadelphia, the third most populous American city in the
1890s with over a million people, did not have a well-established retail credit
reporting infrastructure at the turn of the twentieth century, while Lincoln, Nebraska, a
city with 55,000 inhabitants, apparently did.

348

As a California bureau manager

recalled, retail reporting during the early 191 Os was still a "nightmare of confusion,
distrust, lack of cohesion, understanding, or cooperation in all but a few of the most
progressive and highly systematized communities."349
The national credit reporting infrastructure established by the RCMNA hinged
on its ability to organize and bring together hundreds of local associations throughout
the U.S. During the first decade of the twentieth century merchant associations began
to emerge independently and in significant numbers. "Necessity is a force that makes
strange bedfellows," the author of a 1904 credit textbook remarked, "and retailers are
gradually realizing that it is the worst sort of folly to keep their losses to themselves
and to permit the bad credit risk to prey on the trade generalJy."350 In some places
these associations took root over the course of many years, as in Madison, Wisconsin,
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where a number ofretailers began meeting informally during the early 1890s.351 A
national directory of "retail credit rating agencies and associations" issued in 1912 by
Denver publisher E.E. Seaman offers a rare glimpse into existing conditions just as the
RCMNA was formed. Of the more than 700 organizations listed, over half are
identified as merchants, retailers, or businessmen's associations. Private agencies
dominated in populous Eastern states such as New York and Massachusetts, but the
extent to which local associations proliferated in the West is striking, especially in
Texas~ California, Oklahoma, and Colorado. In Texas, more than ninety percent of the
state's 121 credit reporting organizations were local associations. 352 The organization
of Texas owed much to J.E.R. Chilton, an influential NAMA leader a.'1d founder of the
Dallas retail credit association that would become TransUnion, But in many places,
the credit bureau consisted of little more than a box of index cards kept at the local
chamber of commerce.
Despite such examples, the desire to form local associations and bureaus was
often wanting in less populated regions. "Merchants in small towns have little
conception of the benefits of a modem credit bureau," a credit manager in rural
northern Colorado complained. 353 While the relative isolation of many small towns

and rural territories had once offered some protection, the proliferation of automobiles
during the 1920s greatly expanded the radius of consumer activity. In rural districts it
was often more effective to organize along county lines, rather by-town, and to
351
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consolidate the duties of a credit bureau, chamber of commerce, and detective agency.
The credit bureau of Weld County, Colorado, for example, maintained credit files but
also investigated bankrupts, campaigned against forgers, fraudulent check writers,
rogue salesmen and false advertisers, and ran a publicity campaign to educate credit
customers. 354 But the RCMNA was also ignored in some urban centers. Philadelphia
was perhaps the most prominent example. "For a long time, I have wondered what is
wrong with Philadelphia," the association's president mused in 1919, suggesting,
moreover, that the city's failure to organize was the result of obstruction by an
unnamed retail leader. 355 In arguing the merits of a national association, RCMNA
representatives often warned that those slow to organize were a magnet for deadbeats.
Not only was a city without an active association "simply a dumping ground for
undesirables," it was "an illuminated invitation for the undesirables to come and settle
down, but never settle up. " 356 By painting such unaffiliated cities as outposts of
degeneracy, the organization underscored the progressive and, indeed, civilizing effect
of credit organization.
During the RCMNA's first five years, newly-formed local associations in St.
Louis and Los Angeles were brought into its fold, along with others in Duluth,
Nashville, Denver, Memphis, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and New York. "The sufferings
of the retail credit men of this city-and throughout the country, for that matter-at
the hands of Mrs. S. Low Paye and Mrs. D. Ed Beete are about to end," the New York
354
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Times announced in 1917, reporting the formation of an RCMNA affiliate in
Gotham. 357 By 1920 the RCMNA included ninety-four local associations in cities
throughout the U.S. 358 Regional associations were soon formed to coordinate the
activities of growing local associations in the Northwest, Midwest, and New England,
and in 1920 the retail credit mangers of California org~ized the first state conference,
a milestone important enough to feature a personal appearance by Will Rogers. 359
With 15,000 members by the mid 1920s, the association had become so large that it
began to cater to the interests of diverse specializations within its ranks. At the 1926
annual convention delegates broke off into group sessions devoted to the specific
credit management concerns of department stores, men's and women's clothing,
shoes, furniture, jewelry, public utilities, automotive sales, and banking. 360 National
department store chains such as the May Company used the national association as a
adjunct training program, requiring the credit managers from each from its six
locations-St. Louis, Cleveland, Denver, Baltimore, Los Angeles, and Akron, Ohio-to attend the 1928 convention. 361
At the same time the role of "credit women" gained increasing recognition
within the profession. "I want it to be clearly understood that in speaking of Retail
Credit Men, I refer equally to Retail Credit Ladies," a national spokesperson told the
delegates at the first California conference. "I presume," he deadpanned, that it was
well known that the California retail credit men "that it has become a well-recognized
357
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fact in retail credit circles at least that in California the men embrace the women. "362
Despite the association's sexist name, women had long worked for credit departments
and credit bureaus, not only as clerks and secretaries but also as managers. In 1913
Miss E.M. Fleming, a retail credit manager in Kewanee, Illinois, became the first
female member of the RCMNA and, the next year, the first woman to attend the
national convention. 363 Five years later a Women's Wear columnist was struck by the
"unusual number of women" at the national convention. 364 Indeed, by the time Credit

World began running classified advertisements in the mid 1920s job-seeking wom~n
were among them, including one "Southern woman" with more than a decade of
experience who was qualified to "take entire charge of [a] small office." 365 As a
(female) representative of the local association in Davenport, Iowa, reported, "We
have more credit women in Davenport than credit men. They are employed in all our
largest department stores and in all our ladies' ready-to-wear stores and one men's
ready-to-wear store and shops of various kinds." 366 Women not only ma..11.aged credit
departments and bureaus, they also established local associations. When an association
in Fort Smith, Arkansas, was formed in 1920, its mostly male members referred to the
group as a "credit manager's association," rather than the conventional "credit men's"
moniker, out of respect for the woman who presided over its organization. 367
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A shortage of male labor during the First World War had brought women into
credit work, but the vast expansion of retail credit during the 1920s opened even more
doors. During the 1930s credit women in cities throughout the nation formed local
"breakfast clubs," the first of which was established in Portland, Oregon. By 1937
there were more than sixty women's clubs in the U.S. and Canada, with total
membership reaching nearly 3000. That year a new organization, the Credit Women's
Breakfast Clubs of North America, was officially recognized as a division of the
national association. 368 But a more momentous affirmation had already come a decade
earlier when in 1927 the national association voted unanimously to drop "men" from
its name. As the editor of Credit World explained, ''the masculine note in our name is
resented, and justly so, by many capable women credit managers."3 69 Thenceforward,
the association was known as the National Retail Credit Association. 370 In 1934 a
national women's magazine ran a feature on credit bureau work, calling it a
"wonderful field for women."371
During the 1920s and 1930s, a true national credit reporting infrastructure
began to take shape. In communities without a credit bureau, newly formed local
~ssociations often established their own. Conflicts arose, however, when existing
private agencies failed to cooperate with the merchants association or, more often,
they were incompetent. For good reason the proprietors of private agencies were
368
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concerned that retailer's bureaus would drive them out of business. As the owner of a
Memphis mercantile agency admitted, "When the Retail Credit Men's Association
was first formed, I was, frankly speaking, afraid of it; I thought perhaps my bread and
butter might be at stake, and I did not favor the growth of the movement."372 The fact
that the private reporting agencies-the very institutions that initially supported and
gave impetus to the development of retailers associations-were either "obliterated or
absorbed by the Merchant-owned Bureau" was, as the manager of the San Francisco
association remarked, "a strange paradox."373 In 1918 a truce was arranged with
NAMA to arbitrate disputes and to prevent the incursion of retailer's bureaus where
existing private agencies were satisfactory. Yet difficulties persisted; the concept of
free interchange was problematic for profit-seeking agencies and too many simply
offered inferior service. As one experienced credit manager quipped, "To err is
human, to forgive, divine. Mercantile agencies are human. They must be forgiven a
whole lot. " 374 In 1921 NAMA was finally absorbed by the retail credit association,
surrendering its own name and reorganized as the Credit Service Exchange Division
of the latter organization. By 1926 the service division included 800 bureaus, which
together made nine million reports per year with its collective fifty million credit
records.
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Credit bureaus typically offered two basic types of reports: trade clearances
and antecedent reports. The former, sometimes referred to as trade inquiries,
clearances, or "in file" reports, were the least expensive and most prevalent of the two.
Based upon the ledger experience of the bureau's members, trade clearances provided
a summary of an individual's paying habits (whether they took thirty, sixty, or ninety
days to settle their bills), how long the individual had been a customer, their maximum
credit limit, outstanding balances, and sometimes a record of their merchandise
returns. (The "returned goods evil" was a perennial frustration for early mass
retailers.) The individual's aggregate credit rating was usually conveyed as a summary
rating, such as "pays prompt," "cash only," or the dreaded "no good." Antecedent
reports, on the other hand, probed much more deeply. Sometimes referred to as "full"
or "investigative" reports, they provided the individual's home addresses, record of
employment, income, bank account balances, legal history, age, marital status, family
size, and additional details concerning their personal circumstances and reputation.
Antecedent reports, due to their depth of specificity, were more expensive than trade
clearances and usually reserved for newcomers or otherwise suspect individuals. Both
types of reports could be requested as "revisions," whereby bureau workers updated
and verified information in the files at additional cost. Furthermore, price was
determined by the mode of delivery; verbal reports provided over the telephone were
the least expensive, while written reports, mailed or hand delivered, cost more. By the
1910s the telephone reports was in wide use among credit bureaus. A 1922 Chamber
bureau service; see G.C. Morrison, "Report of the Service Department Committee," Credit World 18,
no. IO (June 1930): 32.
376
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of Commerce study of privately~run credit reporting organizations found that sixty~
eight percent provided information primarily via telephone, while only four percent
relied mainly on written reports. 377
To overcome the problem of obtaining updated ledger experience from its
members, credit bureaus provided local merchants with blank forms on which to
transcribe the names of all their customers and their respective payment habits,
balances, and credit limits. Codes for credit ratings were used to speed the process and
standardize the responses. Statements like "pays prompt," however, were subject to
different regional interpretations and increasingly discouraged. A country merchant
might consider a farmer prompt if he paid within ninety days, whereas a city retailer
would regard this as slow or delinquent. The style and complexity of these codes
varied among bureaus, but typically resembled the following textbook example:
"P" = Prompt Pays 30 days or as agreed.
"F" = Fair. Pays 60 days.
"S" =Slow.Pays ·90 days.
"X" =Unsatisfactory.Would require cash. 378
An association's contractual terms usually stipulated that its members submit updated

lists at designated intervals, often every three or six months but in some cases .
annually. Bureau managers learned from experience that the expectation of regular
updates helped condition its members to the practice. Infonnation pertaining to new or
defaulted credit accounts was to be reported immediately. Standardized forms also
guided the association's mem~ers in the basic protocols of info~ation gathering.

377
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As the ledger reports were received the bureau secretary collated and updated
the master cards. To protect the identities of those submitting reports, each merchant
was assigned a secret code number. To prevent against fraud and misuse, members
calling in to request or report information were required to identify themselves with
their code. Member codes were often grouped in ranges by trade designation. For
example, grocers might receive a code number between 1 and 20, department stores
between 21 and 30, and tailors between 31 and 40, and so forth. This allowed bureau
officials quickly identify the source of credit reports when providing summaries to
other members.
As a national network began to emerge, the interchange of information
between bureaus in distant cities was problematic. In addition to variations in quality,
pricing discrepancies led to disputes, especially when "foreign" reports were requested
between bureaus in different cities or regions. The development of coupon systems,
whereby associated bureaus used pre-purchased tickets to pay for services, helped to
standardize fee structures and smooth exchanges. 379 But even as inter~bureau reporting
became more efficient, some merchants circumvented the bureau altogether,
particularly when seeking information concerning credit applicants who were out-oftown visitors or newly relocated, and thus did not have established credit records in
the community. Direct inquiries may have been expedient for individual credit
managers, but they burdened other merchants with multiple requests for the same
credit information. Department stores and large specialty houses often accommodated
such requests, particularly among themselves, but came to resent them when they
379

Ibid., 158.

158

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

suspected smaller retailers of pillaging the information in their expensive credit
departments. 380 Direct inquiries were condemned because they offered a dangerously
selective portrait of an individual's credit history. Most credit applicants could provide
one or two favorable references; what they withheld of course were the names of
merchants they neglected or abused. Direct inquiries thus revealed good information
without the bad, a problem that credit bureaus ostensibly solved by compiling the
ledger experience of all local merchants. But the real sin of the "direct inquiry evil"
was that freelancing credit managers gained an unfair competitive advantage, either in
saved time or private information, ignoring the principles of mutual cooperation and
full disclosure that credit associations espoused. 381 In 1927 the official code of ethics
of the national association explicitly advised against the practice. 382
During the 1930s the national association sought to consolidate its network of
bureaus, which by then numbered more than 1000. Though credit associations first
emerged to serve local merchants, a national market for credit reports was growing,
particularly among automobile, finance, petroleum, and direct sales companies selling
to consumers throughout the country. To secure this business, the National Consumer
Credit Reporting Corporation was established as a subsidiary of the national
association in 1932. This new entity, which assigned the bureaus to exclusive
territories and implemented standardized reports and pricing, immediately attracted
attention from the Department of Justice. In 1933 the United States District Court in

380
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St. Louis filed a petition against the national association for violating federal anti-trust
regulations. The monopolistic design of credit reporting presented an interesting
problem. After all, competition among multiple bureaus in a single location was
entirely counterproductive; it duplicated the effort of each retailer to make reports and,
even worse, divided retailers against themselves where loyalties were split among two
or more reporting organizations. During the 1920s credit reporting associations
devoted to a specific business-lumber, coal, hardware, furniture dealers, physicians,
or industrial loan banks, for example-operated alongside retail credit associations
and were condemned by the national association. "Because of the very needs and
conditions it must serve," one credit manager argued, "a credit bureau is a natural
monopoly; more than one credit bureau in a city is of as much nuisance as more than
one telephone system, and a greater financial menace, because of the incompleteness
of reports each must render." 383 The anti-trust charge denied this public utility
argument, but was even more remarkable for treating credit reports-mere
information-as a commodity. Observing that the association's "1,200-odd affiliated
bureaus sell nothing but credit reports," a service rather than a good or process,

Business Week remarked on the unprecedented nature of the case. 384 Since the early
days of the mercantile agency, the primary legal challenge facing credit reporting
organizations was slander and libel. In effect, the anti-trust case acknowledged
formally what credit reporting had done since the 1840s: commodify personal identity.
Though agreeing to a consent decree, whereby the designation of exclusive territories
383
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384
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and denial of service to nonmembers were prohibited, in 1935 the national associati<)n
was charged with violating its terms and fined. Two years later the inter-bureau
reporting services of the NCCRC were turned over to a new organization, the
Associated Credit Bureaus of America. 385
Despite these setbacks and the hardships of the Depression a national ,credit
reporting infrastructure was well established and functional by 1940. It was not an
airtight surveillance network, to be sure. Indeed, the number ofretailers thatcontinued
to grant credit on the basis of an honest face or personal reference continued to vex
advocates of systematic credit management. Additionally, mar1y retail creditors did not
have their own credit departments or full-time credit managers. In 1938 Barron's
reported that only ten percent of small business owners employed a credit manager,
though ninety-one percent offered credit terms to their customers. 386
The extent to which credit bureaus were used was revealed in the 1930
National Retail Credit Survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 387
This nationwide survey based upon lists of retail concerns provided by more than 1000
local bureaus of the National Retail Credit Association was not a true statistical
sample. Nevertheless, the reports from more than 12,000 retailers that granted open
book or installment credit (or some combination of both) provides much valuable data.
According to the survey, more than 70 percent of American retail businesses relied
upon credit bureaus for information (see Table 1). Though a smaller percentage
385
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depended entirely upon credit bureau information-among department stores, for
example, 32.7 percent used only credit bureau information, while 52.9 percent used
credit bureaus to supplement their own investigations-the credit bureau had clearly
become a vital source of credit information by the time of the survey. "Think for a
moment of the depressing condition of business generally, if there were no reporting
agencies in this country," the chairman of the national association's Credit Service
Exchange Division remarked in 1928. "The undesirable credit risk would run rampant
through the country. The credit system would deteriorate and gradually collapse."388
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Table 1. Credit Bureau Use by Type of Retail Business, 1930
Type ofbusiness*t
Department stores
n=597(614)
Women's, children's, infant's wear
n=328(406)
Men's and boy's clothing
n=535(548)
Boot, shoe, other footwear
n=228(240)
Automobile dealers
n=552(569)
General clothing
n=330(340)
Automobile accessory stores
n=482(514)
Radio stores
n=84(85)
Furniture stores
n=629(692)
Electric appliance
n=303(615)
Fur goods
n=82(84)
Hardware
n=521(534)
Musical instruments stores
n=107(127)
Jewelry
n=233(244)
Misc. retail establishments
n=l807(1928)
Optical goods
n=58(62)
Independent grocery stores
n=I633(1675)
Drug stores
n=228(252)
N=l 0,648(12,036)
I

Avera~e

Credit bureau used

Not used

85.8

14.2

84.1

15.9

77.7

22.3

77.6

22.4

77.0

23.0

72.1

27.9

76.3

23.7

76.2

23.8

73.9

26.1

73.9

26.1

73.2

26.8

73.1

26.9

72.0

28.0

71.7

28.3

67.8

32.2

67.2

32.8

61.0

39.0

58.0

42.0

72.57

27.43

* n = number ofretailers reporting on the subject of credit bureau usage; parenthetical sums
indicate total credit-granting retailers that submitted reports in each category.

t Some business categories are omitted from this table, including building, fuel, and
agricultural suppliers, which often used their own trade-specific credit reporting services.
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CHAPTER 4: The Credit Gauntlet, 1900-1940
During the early twentieth century millions of Americans came under the
watchful gaze of newly formed credit bureaus. Such bureaus, however, were only one
arm of the emergent consumer credit apparatus. Their counterpart was the credit
department of individual stores, where credit managers interviewed, documented~ and
tracked their customers for their own benefit and that of the local bureau. "The
obscure credit department of yesterday, is a big one today-a recognized unit and one
of the organized thirty-five thousand strong throughout the country," a credit manager
for L.S. Ayres, Indianapolis's leading department store, observed. 389 Credit
departments and credit bureaus operated separately and with fundamental
differences-namely, credit departments actually made credit-granting decisions while
credit bureaus merely compiled information for consultation. Together, they formed
complementary systems of risk management. "[T]he bureau is in reality but a branch
of the credit department and the workers therein his colleagues," a Worcester,
Massachusetts, credit manager explained. 390 Though specialized credit departments
were the province of larger retail establishments, particularly department stores,
specialty shops, and installment houses, small-time merchants were encouraged to
adopt the same administrative principles and protocols to manage their credit
customers. Within this interlocking system, the concept of financial identity was the
primary unit of analysis.
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The pursuit of efficient records management was central to the development of
credit reporting and authorizations systems during the early twentieth century. "It is
not long ago," the credit manager of Manhattan's Franklin Simon department store
remarked in 1920, "when not much attention was given to the systematic filing of
records, but not so now." 391 The sheer volume and anonymity of credit customers
worked against embodied and interpersonal knowledge, encouraging credit managers
to rely more heavily on filing systems to recall individual cases and to make decisions.
As the credit manager of San Francisco's Emporium department store observed,
"Mass supervision of credits and collections has developed a machinery which is
impersonal in its mechanism but is so devised and maintained as to have all the
appearance to the customer of intimate personal contact."392 Thus credit examination
was to be converted into a neutral instrumentality while retaining the appearance of
the personal touch. A fine-grained account of this process reveals the difficulty with
which credit professionals reconciied embodied and textual ways of knowing.' ·

The credit department

While credit bureaus served as repositories of a community's collective credit
data, it was in the store credit department that consumers opened accounts and
divulged the intimate details of their financial circumstances. There. the individu~l
was subjected to the scrutiny of prying credit ma.11agers who evaluated and recorded
their financial performance, producing the raw material for their financial identity in

391
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the local credit bureau. Individual credit accounts were typically opened in one of two
ways. Either the customer applied directly for a credit account or, upon checkout, he
or she requested that the items be charged. In both cases the sales clerk referred the
customer to the credit manager (or, in stores without credit departments, the office
manager or proprietor) for consideration. Here, the social nature of credit reached a
moment of high drama. Credit, after all, is a measure of social trust. Thus to have
one's creditworthiness subjected to judgment is no small matter; it is a referendum on
one's morality and social standing. To be refused implies that one is undeserving,
deficient, suspect. "'Touch the question of credit with one ofyom customers and you
have drilled into the most sensitive nerve in his body' is the summing up of the credit
situation in the department house," a Chicago journalist reported in 1908. 393 The
stakes of a direct request were great for all involved. Both parties stood toe to toe with
much to lose depending on the content and delicacy of the answer. To avoid such
confrontations, customers often requested credit through indirection--for example, by
claiming at the point of sale that they didn't have the correct change or that they were
in too much of a hurry to settle immediately. Even in large depari:ment stores accounts
were often initiated when a customer asked that the merchandise be delivered to his or
her home with an invoice for future payment, which constituted a de facto credit
agreement.
Working under the assumption that most people pay their first bill, many
retailers approved new applicants quickly and with little scrutiny. Unlike the
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wholesaler or manufacturer who by the early twentieth century could demand full
financial statements, the retailer felt compelled to treat his or her credit customers with
kid gloves. "Obtain all the information you can at the first interview," one expert
advised, "but carefully avoid offending the customer!"394 Prospective charge
customers were often approved after providing only their name, address, employment
information, and references concerning existing credit accounts. As "one of the bestkriown department store credit men" in New York confirmed, "This is about all the
direct investigating that we do, but the impression made on the credit man by the
personal appearance and manner of the applicant goes a good way in determining
whether the account shall be opened. " 395 If it was determined that a questionable
customer should be subjected to further investigation, the credit manager subsequently
consulted a credit reporting firm, whose business it was to "sound the butcher, the
baker, and the candlestick maker of the neighborhood to see how the applicant pays
his bills in that direction."

396

A customer at the point of purchase was not to be ruffled

with intrusive personal questions. Summary judgments flattered the credit applicant
and, it was hoped, inspired loyalty to the store. Hesitation, on the other hand, signaled
mistrust and gave offense. Time was of the essence because an a11xious or impatient
customer, given pause to reconsider, might simply walk out empty handed or, worse
still, go next door to a competitor. Observing that most customers were reliable over
the short term, the general manager of Detroit's preeminent department store, J.L.
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Hudson, admitted that in his store requests for credit amounting to less than five
dollars were immediately authorized "without looking at 'em."397
Installment dealers were even less rigorous. Compared to department stores,
which accommodated the middle and upper segments of the socioeconomic spectrum,
installment dealers sold primarily to those at the lower end. People who bought
furniture, musical instruments, sewing machines, or household goods at such stores
did so not for the convenience of a monthly charge account, but often because they
could not afford to purchase such items except over time. This, however, did not mean
that such customers were unworthy of credit. Most steady wage workers, as
installment sellers realized, could be counted on to make their payments. "There is no
man or woman so proud and sensitive as the 'poor but honest,'" a furniture dealer
noted, "and it is largely with this class of people that instalment house deals."398 Amid
fierce competition, price was only one factor in the installment trade; service,
including the severity of credit inquiries, was another that discriminating customers
took into consideration. As a representative for Spiegel's House Furnishing explained,
"accounts must be opened almost on the spur of the moment, with little investigation,
without giving offense or annoyance to the customer, who is probably standing at the
credit man's elbow while he is deciding on the advisability of extending credit."399
Though quick to grant credit, the installment dealer's loose methods on the sales floor
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were often supported by surreptitious investigations as soon as the customer departe~l.
The interval between the sale and delivery was an opportunity to verify key
information and, if warranted, reverse a credit approval before letting go of the goods.
A strong prejudice against installment buying meant that creditors could not simply
contact a customer's employer to corroborate this information. Subterfuge was thus
resorted to. One technique, described by a musical instrument dealer, was to call the
customer at his or her stated place of employment. If no such person was. said to work
there, the buyer's sham was exposed. On the other hand, if the operator put the
anonymous caller on hold while the customer was retrieved, the caller "quietly hangs
up the receiver" having "obtained the infom1ation he sought."

400

This practice, later

referred to as "pretexting," was a favorite tactic of credit investigators well into the
twentieth century.

Interviews· Character inspection
Though credit reporting had done much to disembody and depersonalize
financial reputation, personal character was widely regarded as the most useful
.

.

.

predictor of credit risk. This view was nearly a..."Xiomatic a..."llong both commercial and
retail creditors well into the twentieth century. 401 Financier John Pierpont Morgan
affirmed this in his widely reported (and quoted) congressional testimony before a
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As Olegario has observed, the persistence of character as the key criterion of creditworthiness gives

the development of nineteenth-century credit assessment a remarkable sense of uniformity. "Analyzing
the credit reports and business literature from the 1830s to the end of the century leaves one with a
striking impression of continuity: a merchant in 1830 would have had little trouble graspi.."lg the method
for assessing risk that credit manuals began to formalized and codify only toward the end of the
century" (A Culture Credit, 7).
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money trust inquest in 1912. Asked whether credit was "based primarily upon money
or property," Morgan corrected, "No, sir; the first thing is character."

402

The questions

that early-twentieth-century retailers asked in determining a customer's
creditworthiness were the same as those posed in the 1880s: "Does the buyer live
within his income and pay his bills promptly; or will he incur obligations without the
means to meet them? Is he honest? Is his family extravagant? Did he leave a good
record behind him when he moved? If unfortunate enough to lose his present position
will he pay up old scores when he can?"403 Character, a prominent retail credit expert
declared in 1927, was "the greatest of all assets."

404

Where credit was liberal and the

recovery of debts difficult, it was the borrower's honesty and morality-his or her
character-that mattered above all. "The average credit-man," one writer attested, "is
not so solicitous about a customer's wealth in property as he is of his wealth in
morals." 405 Influenced by the pseudoscientific precepts of physiognomy and
phrenology, many conceived of character as a fixed quasi-biological trait. 406
Even the staunchest advocates of rational credit management cited character as
the sine qua non of creditworthiness. When James G. Cannon, a New York banker and
one of the most respected proponents of credit reform, spoke before an audience of
young men and women at Packard's Business College in 1898, he presented an
402
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orthodox explication of character that emphasized its uniqueness and authenticity as a
marker of identity. "You can not jump into a character as you would into a suit of
clothes, unless it be an assumed character. The man with an assumed character is a
hypocrite, whom we all despise."407 Character, a Los Angeles pastor explained for the
benefit of the retail credit men, was a perfect transcription of the individual's mind and
motives. "The soul that God has placed in the human body is a machine a million
times more sensitive than any record Edison ever invented. Every thought, word,
action and experience makes its impress upon the soul. The final result of all those
impressions is a 'record.' That record is character."408 But to the untrained eye
character was a nebulous and easily concealed quality, one that required new
technologies-or a skilled credit manager-to decipher. Instead of abandoning
character as a hopelessly elusive trait, retail credit managers looked for it in the speech
and body language of their customers. As Cannon instructed the Packard students,
"Turn the X-rays on your characters to-day and see what they reveal."409 Those
lacking character might pay up eventually-in this sense, they were not necessarily
criminal-but the effort necessary to compel them to do so was a hardship to be
avoided. By the 1920s a more nuanced understanding of character emerged, one that
distinguished between reputation (what others thought of a person) and character (a
person's authentic self); the two did not necessarily match. As one writer put it,

407
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"reputation is a glove, but character is the hand within the glove."

410

In this way,

financial reputation was further stripped of its social context and economic virtue
more deeply insinuated as a marker of inherent goodness and self worth. Financial
identity was thus deliberately desocialized and re-embedded in specific institutional
contexts.
To penetrate the mysteries of the financial self the modem credit manager
relied upon a wide array of textual sources, from personal correspondence and credit
reports to newspapers, local and national business forecasts, references, and
information provided by applicants. Yet textual sources did not supplant face-to-face
meetings with prospective customers. The personal interview, in fact, remained a
privileged investigatory technique long into the twentieth century. For all of their
insistence on textual protocols, few credit managers trusted credit reports over their
own powers of direct observation. Consequently, twentieth-century consumer credit
management maintained a distinct interpersonal dimension even while moving in the
direction oftextualization. It was in the body of the borrower, more than credit reports
or financial statements, that the credit managers augured the creditworthiness of
individuals. While commercial creditors lamented the diminishing frequency with
which they saw their distant customers, retail credit managers, especially those in
large department stores and installment houses, were almost always in a position to
meet with credit applicants in person. Comparing the screening process of retailers to
that of commercial creditors, a New York credit manager explained, "In the retail end

410
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the personal element is a much more important factor."

411

What is striking about

development of rational credit management is the degree to which face-to-face
conversation continued to inform its textualization.
The credit interview was not only an administrative ritual during which
customers offered up their basic personal and financial information, it was also an
opportunity for the credit manager to take in the general appearance and disposition of
the applicant. In looking for physical markers of deceit, credit managers, like poker
players, looked for their adversary's tell. To be creditable was to be credible.
Acknowledging that "the 'shifting glance' of the old time fictionary villain" had been
debunked (apparently it could be confused with the "nervous shyness" of the honest),
one credit expert argued that "the direct, open gaze of the man taken by surprise" was
definitive. 412 An astonished writer for American Magazine recmmted how a credit
manager quickly appraised the trustworthiness of a "well-dressed young man" as he
filled out an application card. "After looking at the man and the card, the credit man
can guess that the man doesn't own a home, is living somewhat beyond his means, is
selfish, therefore not well-balanced-inclined to please himself at the expense of
somebody else-and should not be trusted to far."

413

Describing the work ofthe credit

manager in almost erotic terms, one professional explained, "The credit man comes
into more mtimate contact with the customers of a house than any other man, his
relations are most delicate, he touches a man where he is most sensitive--on the
411
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question of his character and his ability. He must be pre-eminently a man who can
handle people, who can reach their real selves."414 It was only through direct
interaction that the credit man could probe beneath the surface of mere facts and
figures to discern the true character of the individual. "In versatility they rank with the
diplomat," one writer boasted of the credit manager, ''and their keen perception in
judging human nature excites admiration and makes Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes
look like a miserable four-flusher." 415
Yet judging by appearances cut both ways. The early trade literature is dotted
with cautionary tales to prove this point. "A customer may reside in an elegant
mansion in which he has not a single dollar of equity," one writer warned, and he
"may be the loudest-voiced individual in church service, and yet be wearing the livery
of the Lord only to serve the devil." 416 For precisely this reason some credit experts
discouraged interviews. As critics noted, they ran counter to the depersonalized
objectivity of rational credit assessment. Interviews gave silver-tongued rogues the
opportunity to bamboozle the credit manager, who might be the less clever of the two.
Commenting on the relative merits of interviews and credit reports, Earling came
down on the side of the latter in his foundational 1890 text. "[W]hen we have coldblooded facts to deal with," he reasoned, "at least we accept them as facts and our cool
reasoning faculties and judgment alone are exercised, and our sympc:thies are in no

414
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wise appealed to our endangered."417 After all, a Los Angeles retail credit manager
reminded, "A pleasing personality may cover a multitude of sins."418 May the credit
man beware. Vigilance, on the other hand, was rewarded. In one case a diligent El
Paso merchant requested a report on a customer who seemed entirely trustworthy only
to learn that, contrary to his own impressions, the man was "a bum of the worst type,
an embezzler" who had "left his wife and children destitute."419

If the written credit report compressed social reputations into text, the credit
interview was designed to compress a lifetime of social interactions into a brief,
unnatural encounter with a single individual. The credit manager's office was often
described as the "sweat box," suggesting the panic that these dreaded ordeals induced
among applicants. "I have seen worthy applicants for credit trembling with fear on
being introduced to an austere, sour-faced credit man who acts as though he were

°

conducting a trial by jury," a San Francisco credit manager remarked. 42 Financial
modesty was deeply ingrained and many customers, particulariy those who had never
been subjected to commercial credit reporting, did not understand the new norms.of
credit assessment. "Women especially have such a terror of these interviews," one
writer noted, so much so that some refused to open accounts. "They think that all their
private history and personal secrets will be brutally exposed to the examination of a
cold-blooded person who will delight in prying into their personal affairs. "421 In one

417
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case a woman who sought to purchase.a "Chinese rug" complained to her husband,
"Why, a young man in the credit office asked me the most personal questions, all
about you, our children, and positively insulted me," resulting in her boycott of the
store. 422 Not surprisingly, credit managers inspired fear and resentment among
customers of both sexes. "The credit man," a Denver attorney remarked with wry
humor, "is described, by some people, to be a cold-blooded heartless creature,
possessing some of the characteristics of the porcupine and the pole-cat-hard to skin,
very offensive when thoroughly aroused; usually found secured in huge cages in
down-town department stores. " 423
Indeed, the location of early credit departments in dingy basements and attics
hardly inspired confidence. One writer was "astonished beyond measure to see some
of the dens and caves of the early days in which credit men are housed, which carry
the misnomer-credit office, and to which the public are invited."424 One indication
that credit managers had gained professional legitimacy was their relocation to more
spacious and well-lit offices with private rooms in which to meet customers.
"Interviewing customers at a railcounter or window has long ago been eliminated by
the most modern Retailers," one expert attested in 1929.425 Still, closed-door
interviews were not standard for all applicants. In some stores customers were
assigned to consultation rooms with varying degrees of privacy, from open to
secluded, depending upon their desirability. Those making large purchases at one
422
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Denver furniture company, for example, were escorted into an "overstuffed livingroom suite" to rest and recover before beginning to "discuss the credit angle of the
transaction." 426 Noting that applicants "at ease physically" were "more at ease
mentally," the credit manager of Cleveland's May Company instructed interviewers to
be sure that the customer "does not stand up, but is comfortably seated."427 The decor
of the room was also taken into consideration. "The walls are a restful color scheme,"
the authors of one textbook recommended, "and the decorations, while interesting,
arouse confidence-photographs of the family, a fishing scene, a college diploma." 428
Commenting on the impact of a pleasing office, the credit manager of San Francisco's
Emporium observed, "A great deal depends on its dignified set-up in producing an
impression on the customer, which will lessen the opportunity for friction." 429 It was
imperative that credit managers pacify their customers, not out of empathy but to
lower their defenses in the interest of extracting as much information as possible.
In taking an application from a prospective cm:tomer, the credit manager
discussed personal matters that many found disconcerting. Those who spoke
intimately with fawning sales clerks often clammed up when set before the credit
manager. While questions about a husband's occupation embarrassed women of
middling or lesser means, they insulted "the dowager or society matron"
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considered the source of her spouse's income beneath discussion. 430 When a new
account was opened by a married woman, as was often the case, many retailers sent a
letter of confirmation to both the home residence and the husband's office, a practice
that, a St. Louis credit manager attested, saved the store the "grief' of dealing with a
sneaky wife or a controlling husband. 431 Ascertaining an applicant's wages or salary
~as complicated not only by the resentment it might stir in the applicant, but by their
employer's unwillingness to divulge the sums that they paid their employees. Even the
seemingly innocuous matter of recording the applicant's full name risked effrontery.
Credit and sales clerks often accepted applications with only the customer's first
initials to avoid the least hint of invasiveness, a practice that caused confusion and
error. Even experienced credit managers quick to make a sale were gmlty of this
cardinal offense. One writer recalled watching in astonishment as "the dean of credit
managers in one of our largest eastern citiesn approved a new credit customer with
only his first initials.

432

Acknowledging that "a great many people use only one· initial

and, unless handled diplomatically, might take offense it the salesperson becomes
insistent," a credit manager in Grand Rapids. Michigan suggested indirection. "For
example, the customer gives the name J. Smith, the salesperson inquires, ~John?' and
immediately the customer will not assent or say, no, 'Joseph,' or speak the correct
name, as the case may be."433
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Tact and a winning personality were the most effective tools in the credit
manager's repertoire. A negative or vindictive attitude, easily acquired through daily
interacti9ns with dead beats and irate sales clerks, was to be resisted at all cost.
Smiling, on the other hand, was strongly encouraged. "The 'bigger' the smile," a
Pennsylvania credit manager promised, "the easier it will be for you to get the
complete confidence of the applicant." 434 Commenting on the importance of a
cheerful, friendly disposition, a Missouri credit woman explained, "Make yourself a
'comfortable' sort of person-that is, cause people to be at ease and happy in your
presence."435 Conceding that the credit man of old was often a "grouch," a "new
generation" of "cheerful and optimistic" credit managers was welcomed in the early
1940s.436 In dealing with a broad range of social and professional groups, the
successful credit manager was a dynamic personality who mixed easily with people
from all walks oflife. Unlike commercial credit reporting, which was relegated to
business owners, consumer credit reporting tracked anyone who sought retail credit,
from the millionaire industrialist to the earnest young shop girl. Though in principle
each credit application was a mere transcription of facts, in practice the credit
interview was tailored to meet the social expectations of different clientele. As one
credit manager observed, "it is asinine to use the same procedure in conversing with,
say a lady of social standing, whose husband is an executive in a well known firm, and
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a problematic stenographer, who resides in the apartment house district."

437

Ironically,

to access the inner character of their customers, credit managers relied upon the same
superficial charms deployed by the worst swindlers. In the transition from a
nineteenth-century culture of character to a twentieth-century culture of personality, a
distinction identified by historian Warren Susman, the credit manager played a
paradoxical role, one that pitted vying norms of authenticity and self presentation.
against one another. 438 There were significant parallels between credit assessment and
sales. Frederick B. Goddard, author of one of the earliest credit textbooks (second only
to Earling's), had previously published a guide to salesmanship. 439 By the end of the
1920s credit managers embraced their role as business builders, as described in the
next chapter.
While taking the application, the credit manager sought to engage his
customers in self-revelatory dialogue. Disarming conversation, rather than "point
blank questions," was by all accounts the most productive way to obtain information
from the applicant. "Anyone can get information of a certain kind by asking direct
questions in a direct way and putting them down in a cold, unfeeling manner, with an
'I know-you're-dishonest-anyway' attitude-working the customer up to such a
murderous frame of mind that the least he can do is to refuse to buy if he does get
credit," one writer attested. "But the man who can talk to a customer pleasantly and
437
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interestedly about his affairs and circumstances, getting a fact here and an admission
there, until he has all the information he wants, without a direct question, will secure
more complete and reliable facts than those obtained by a brutal, straightforward
examination, and will add a friend and perhaps a customer to the house."440 Illustrating
the point, one writer recalled how an exasperated credit assistant, unable ,to get a
female credit applicant to divulge even her name, turned to his superior for help. The
more experienced manager stepped in and, throwing aside the application blank, was
able to extract all of the necessary infomiation by simply engaging the woman in
conversation. 441
Through casual talk credit managers were able to ascertain valuable details
bearing on the applicant's financial obligations, such as the number of childten or
adult dependents in the family and whether they owned (or were paying off) an
automobile, a question with new significance during the 1920s. Equally important,
though a more delicate matter, the credit manager might learn the names of the
applicant's relatives and friends, who could b~ harried if the customer left town
without settling his or her account. Credit experts repeatedly stressed the importance
of getting this information at the time of the application. Easy to obtain while· the
customer was sitting in a position of supplication~ it would not' be forthcoming once
the goods were out the door. Some credit managers also recorded a physical
description--"such as build, height,' compiexion"---and comments about the
applicant's personality, which were kept "for use in identification ai. some later
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date."

442

To maintain an easygoing appearance, many credit managers, including "all

the credit men of New York's big concerns," declined to take notes during the
interview itself, relying instead upon their skill as stenographers to record the details
of the meeting as soon as it was over. 443 While acknowledging that sensitive questions
should never be dodged, a May Company credit manager posited the "three 'B's"' as a
guiding maxim to conducting the credit interview: "Be Brief, Brother."444 H9wever,
for extroverted credit managers, leisurely conversation could be its own reward. A San
Francisco credit manager, for one, recalled a stimulating discussion with a female
sociology professor while taking her application. Not only did he secure all of the
necessary information in the interview but it included "a delightful five minutes'
entertainment on social questions thrown in. " 445
As women entered credit department work in growing numbers during the
1910s, they began to conduct interviews as well. Female credit managers were thought
to be especially adept in dealing with certain constituencies, particularly "young
unmarried girls employed in offices and shops down town, who have decided
tendencies to live beyond their means." The problematic "working girl," one writer
suggested, could be turned into a responsible and profitable credit customer through
the "grandmotherly" counsel of a credit woman. 446 Pandering to the prejudices of the
male credit establishment, some women suggested that their natural sociability and
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weakness for gossip gave them a distinct advantage in such work.

447

While female

credit managers had gained legitimacy in the eyes of their male colleagues, their
a~thority was challenged at times by chauvinistic customers who demanded to speak
with a male superior. In one such case, a derisive male customer ejected, "What kind
of a d----d High School business is this, etc.?," when a credit woman attempted to
question him. 448 Credit women, even more than their newly professionalized male
colleagues, relied upon their employers for support, whether motivated by a sense of
egalitarianism or, more likely, an interest in cheap labor. The female credit manager of
a Milwaukee shoe store scoffed at the suggestion that she would be mistreated
"because I am not a great big MAN." A self-professed suffragist and "feminist," she
argued instead that women, with their special capacity for "tact and diplomacy," were
at a distinct advantage over a "mere man in this position. " 449
If tact was essential to cajole applicants to lay bare their financial
circumstance, it was even more important when credit privileges were denied.
Rejecting an applicant was a minor art in itself. Those who were turned away for
credit were still desired as cash customers, and no retailer wanted to send an angry
applicant into the community to spread tales of injustice and ill will. Not infrequently
credit managers found themselves embroiled in marital battles that tested their powers
of diplomacy. When vindictive husbands shut down charge accounts to embarrass
their wives or profligate women ran up accounts to spite their husbands, it fell to the
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credit manager to deliver the unhappy news to the abused party. In refusing a credit
account, the credit manager's greatest difficulty was providing a satisfactory
explanation. Customers who were declined due to a poor payment history in that
particular store could simply be shown their ledger card as evidence, but when
decisions were based on reports made through the credit bureau this became
problematic. The retailer often did not know the source of the unfavorable information
(credit bureaus used codes to protect the identity ofretailers) and, ifhe or she did, was
unable to tell the declined customer without implicating another merchant who
assumed his or her reports to be confidential. Under such circumstances, a declined
customer could only be referred to the credit bureau to resolve the matter. One of the
conveniences of credit bureaus was that they kept the credit manager's inquiries
secret, preserving the illusion that his (or her) approval was a matter of kindness and
personal trust. The alternative, by which individual merchants called in a "reporter" to
investigate a credit applicant, immediately alerted the customer to the credit manager's
skepticism and threatened to embitter the customer. Yet, declines, even properly
handled, could place retailers in an uncomfortable position. As a San Francisco bureau
manger noted, "an indignant customer, particularly if it be a woman, will visit each
store in an effort to determine which one made the derogatory report, creating
commotion and embarrassment."450
While an expertly staged and performed interview yielded valuable
information and good will, one that was poorly conducted could do actual harm.
Inexperienced or inept junior assistants alienated credit customers with their lack of
450
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tact. As was often noted, merchants that relied upon low-paid and ill-prepared staff,
including "girls without experience in handling such affairs," were asking for
trouble, 451 So important was interviewing that the retailer's association of Los Angeles
hosted an educational seminar on the subject for its members. It featured a series of
role playing scenarios, in which expert credit men demonstrated their methods for
handling a variety of applicants (played by a confederate), including a single man, an
employed young woman, a divorcee, a two-income married couple, a widow from the
East, a newly arrived couple. 452 Even when novices did not offend the applicant
directly, their haste and inattention introduced errors into the credit files, cau~ing
future frustration for customers in the fom1 of authorization delays and billing
mistakes. For this reason, credit managers were urged to take applications themselves
rather than leave this work to underlings. At the other extreme, overly "apologetical"
credit workers succeeded in annoying applicants with their torturous courtesy. 453 For
some members of the public, such as E.C. Riegel, a firebrand consumer advocate and
monetary theorist, the interview process was nothing more than a grotesque charade.
Before a meeting of New York credit managers in 1926, he lambasted their
transparent duplicity:
[The credit manager] tries to disguise his searching inquiries with pleasant
conversation. He is the house detective trying to act like a host. He fools no
one. Every lady who approaches him knows that her character is in doubt until
a certain process has been gone through with . ... The amenities completed, the
smiling Dr. Jekyl retires behind the curtain and Mr. Hyde begins his work. You
may make all the gestures you wish, you may employ all the fines_se atyour
451
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command, but you can not destroy the impression to the customer that she has
been on the carpet. You can not make contact with you anything but a chilling
experience, an ordeal through which the credit applicant must pass."454
By the late 1920s credit managers were urged to dispense with the artifice of treating
credit applicants as if they were the beneficiaries of a royal privilege. "The time was,"
a Philadelphia publisher recalled, "when to say: 'I have a charge account at
Wannamak:er's, or at Strawbridge and Clothiers, or McCreery's,' might have.been a
mark of distinction," but with so many thousands it1 possession of ".a collection of
coins or means of identification by which they can walk into one store or another and
charge merchandise," this privilege had lost is aura of exclusivity. 455 In this new
environment of virtual entitlement, the retail credit manager was a service
professional, and an unfriendly or heavy-handed credit interview was simply_insulting.
Though the American public went largely unaware of (or untroubled by) the
information infrastructure that facilitated their credit purchases, the credit man was its
most conspicuous representative and in many cases the only visible instrument of its
operation.

Credit files and the new visibility
While personal encounters remained an important channel cf credit evaluation
during the first half of the twentieth, the information recorded during these
interactions--along with ledger reports, public records, and newspaper clippings
454
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compiled by credit bureaus-all served to textualize (and thereby depersonalize) credit
relationships. "We once could watch our credit as it browsed about in Tom, Dick &
Harry, or on the backs of those individuals, much as a good shepherd watches his
sheep," a Dallas credit manager noted recalled in 1921. "But today the pasture is too
big .... There are a great many more sheep to the square inch than once there
were."456 It was a rare credit manager who would turn down the opportunity to size up
an applicant in person, but textual records became increasingly important to track the
identities, personal circumstances, and financial behavior of consumers in dense urban
centers and porous outlying towns alike. Where the storied credit man of old relied
upon his superior powers of memory and intuition, the new credit professional turned
unabashedly to his files. "A good credit man cannot remember each name on his
ledgers, when they contain thirty-five to forty thousand in number," a St. Louis credit
manager acknowledged in 1915, "hence he relies more or less upon his records, and
feels very secure in knowing that they have not been kept in a hap-hazzard [sic]
manner." 457 The transcript of an individual's personal and financial information,
housed in the files of credit departments and credit bureaus, came to replace the living
person as an embodied index of trustworthiness. Touting the objectivity of the national
association's sixty million shared credit files in 1930, one writer marveled, "Their
faces are not there-only their records."458
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During the early twentieth century, credit departments and credit bureaus
adopted state-of-the art filing and recordkeeping technologies to reconstitute and
control the disappearing consumer body. The development of office filing equipment
underwent dramatic changes at the turn of the twentieth century. Until this time
business records were preserved in ledger books, pigeonholes, spike files, and assorted
boxes, all of which were limited in their capacity to compile, combine, and retrieve
information. Records contained in ledger books, for example, were entered
chronologically as the volume filled, thus requiring supplementary indices to locate
information scattered throughout multiple volumes (illustrated by the internal
operation of the mercantile agency system, described previously). Likewise,
documents housed in pigeonholes or bundled in boxes required time-consuming
unpacking and rifling whenever information was needed. The introduction of card file
systems during the late 1870s (pioneered by librarian Melvil Dewey) and vertical
filing during the 1890s permitted more flexible and efficient recordkeeping with farreaching implications. The resulting "filing revolution," as business historian JoAnne
Yates has explained, not only accommodated the growing demands of business
correspondence and corporate management, but also opened up vast reservoirs of
underutilized or forgotten information within organizations. And, as will be illustrated,
it permitted organizations to accumulate new forms of sales and marketing
intelligence. 459 These new filing systems, as Yates suggests, revolutionized the idea of
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information as something easily stored, handled, located, and useful in contexts
previously too cumbersome or expensive to exploit.
One of these contexts was consumer credit reporting. Advances in filing
technology permitted retailers and credit bureaus to document the identities and
activities of large populations with greater ease and precision. By the 1910s card file
systems were standard in both credit departments and credit bureaus. Within such
systems', individual consumers were represented by a single master card, on which
their full personal and financial information was transcribed. Though the format of
such cards varied considerably among credit departments and credit bureaus, all
contained fields for the subject's name, address, occupation, and income. Additional
information, such as the individual's marital status, age, length of time at his or her
current residence and occupation, status as a renter or homeowner, names and
addresses of references, bank accounts, lists of credit accounts and balances with other
merchants, and notes regarding the individual's character or appearance, was also
recorded. Credit bureaus files, unlike those of credit departments, also included codes
to indicate the individual's overall credit rating and payment habits at various stores.
The greater flexibility of card files, coupled with the widespread use of the telephone
at the turn of the twentieth century, pushed the credit rating book toward obsolescence.
"The method using the rating book is the oldest," one writer noted in 1915, but was
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"fast becoming the most unpopular method."

460

By the 1920s rating books were

increasingly uncommon. 461
At the same time, card filing systems were perfectly suited for the use of credit
limits in store credit departments. Merchants had of course always imposed mental
limits beyond which they would not extend credit to an individual. But the concept of
formalized systems for ascribing exact parameters was new at the turn of the twentieth
century. By assigning each customer a maximum allowance for credit purchases, a
sum based upon information gathered in the credit application and noted on the master
card, store credit could be rapidly approved as long as the customer remained below
their limit.462 Each credit purchase was authorized by clerks in the credit department
who simply referred to the credit limit as indicated on the individual's file card. "Now,
when the account reaches the limit placed upon it by the credit man," a New York
credit manager explained, "some sort of code or signal is used to call attention to the
fact that the account has reached the danger mark. ,,4 63 Acting as an automatic silent
alarm, credit limits freed credit managers from the burden of personally appro~ing all
credit purchases, while allowing them to approve new accounts quickly and with littl~
risk by assigning nominal credit limits. More importantly, credit limits provided
retailers with a new technique for differentiating between their customers and tailoring
individual service. Limits were assigned without the customer's knowledge and could
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be strategically adjusted over time to accommodate the prompt paying, to discipline
the negligent, or to choke off the dishonest. As safeguards against overextension,
credit limits could function as blunt instruments or elaborate systems of fine-grained
distinction. At Wanamaker's in Philadelphia, for example, more than forty different
codes were used to identify various credit limits, exclusions, and exceptions among
the store's thousands of customers. These included limits for specific departments and
a "U" code to indicate that the customer and the store had arrived at an
"understanding. " 464 In cases where a customer sought to exceed his or her proscribed
limit, the credit manager was called in to reevaluate the account, which usually
involved a request for additional information concerning the customer's employment,
income, and ability to pay. 465
In addition to master card files, credit departments and credit bureaus often
maintained separate "watch dog" cabinets. These miscellanies housed snatches of
derogatory information--divorces, bankruptcies, law suits, accounts of irrespohsible
or immoral behavior-gleaned from newspapers, court records, and public notices. In
some places the watch dog cabinet was built directly into the primary filing system.
This was the case in Grand Rapids, Michigan, where the local bureau's 250,000
master cards included a concealed compartment in which news of legal trouble or
immorality (for example, "moonshine activities") was kept 466 Such "pick up"
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material, as a University of Kansas business researcher referred to it, included
"Building permits, marriages, births, deaths, suicides, divorces, and 'personals"'
clipped from newspapers by "alert" bureau secretaries. 467 This information might not
immediately·impact an individual's credit standing, but it was held as evidence for
future use, reflecting the obsessive, all-encompassing nature of credit investigation.
The proprietor of one credit bureau admitted to developing a "pet hobby" for
newspaper clippings, which he filed in specially made envelopes: Over time, he
collected so much negative information that individuals described in the files could be
evaluated without further consultation. 468 By the late 1930s the accumulated
newspaper clippings of some credit bureaus were touted as a valuable resource in their
own right. 469 "Every possible source of information is used to keep this great reference
library of personalities alive," the author of a 1938 article in Reader's Digest
explained. "The newspapers in your town are scanned. So are trade journals. Variety,
magazine of theatrical people, is a gold mine of data for New York and Los Angeles.
Every clipping, favorable or unfavorable, that might affect and individual's ability to
pay is cut out and pasted on a card."470
Like credit bureaus, credit departments also faced difficulties in keeping their
customer information up to date, particularly when a customer's account was inactive
over a length of time. Since it might cause suspicion or embarrassment to request
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updated information from such customers, one solution was to collect this information
through the guise of a "signature" card, which had blanks for all of the same
information used in a credit application. While a customer might become indignant if
called in to revise his or her account with this information, the credit manager of a
prominent Los Angeles furniture store that employed this system, reported the
remarkable willingness of customers to complete and return such fotms. 471
As the credit manager's gaze shifted away from the corporeal customer and
into the filing cabinet, "visualization" became the mantra of rational credit
management. The new principle of visibility was linked to the introduction of
"visible" card file technologies during the first two decades of the twentieth century.
Developed and marketed by the Rand Company (which merged with Kardex in 1925
and Remington in 1927), visible filing systems were designed to display file cards in
columns, held upright on rotary panels or laid flat in pull-out trays. 472 Each card
overlapped the next in the column and the names of customers or account numbers
appeared on the exposed margins. To access the full information on a given card, the
column of overlapping cards above it was simply flipped up. Compared to "blind"
card systems that required users to thumb through, extract, and replace cards, visible
systems allowed their users to quickly scan the margins for the desired card and to
view its contents without removing (and possibly misfiling) anything. Visible systems
also accommodated color coding schemes to quickly distinguish between classes of
471
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individuals. As was common, a Worcester, Massachusetts, department store indicated
individual credit limits with colored discs attached to each file: red for no credit, black
for $25, blue for $50, green for $100, and gold for $150 or more. 473 During the 1920s
Rand visible file systems were marketed with their own transparent celluloid tabs in
various colors for this purpose. The color coding of cards or ink could aiso be used to
mark poor performers. In one system all customer files were initially recorded on
white cards but switched to blue if the subject became problematic a,nd red if turned
over to collections. Significantly, files converted to blue or red were permanently
. d, never bemg
. returne d to wh"1te. 474
tamte

The impetus toward standardization also extended to the development of
uniform credit forms. Early trade publications and textbooks offered many examples
for emulation. In 1920 the national association established a Credit Literature
Department, which compiled albums of sample application banks and reference sheets
for the use of its membership. 475 While· serving as a guide to the collection of customer
information, standardized fonns were found to have unanticipated advantages.
Interestingly, credit managers reported that individuals who balked at disclosing their
financial condition verbally gave the same information willing when presented with a
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blank application form. 476 Standard forms bearing the local association's official seal
were also thought to exert a disciplinary effect on the applicant by giving the
impression of perfect efficiency and cooperation among a town's merchants. By using
forms of identical color and format, one writer claimed, customers beheld the credit
manager as "a wide awake progressive one, in touch with the other Credit Men in his
city and therefore in a position to get immediate verification," not one to provoke with
pointless bluffs or false statements. 477 While credit managers continued to scrutinize
their customers in personal interviews, these embodied interactions were increasingly
structured by the requirements of the forms themselves. Like the traveling salesman,
whose improvisational style was hemmed in by the boilerplate discourse of scientific
salesmanship and standardized mass circulation print advertisements during the early
twentieth century, credit managers were themselves circumscribed by the new
protocols of textualization. 478 For those who continued to regard credit assessment
primarily as an art, standard forms were an affront. "The mediocre credit man can hide
behind his form, and will soon lapse into a deadly formalism," thus hampering his
ability to coax information from his applicants, one writer argued. 479 In cases where an
applicant seemed to be a good risk but was especially reticent, the credit manager
might make a show of tossing aside the application blank and taking an informal
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approach, especially when the same information could be obtained elsewhere, through
public records, for instance.
While many credit experts contended that credit analysis was too complex to
ever be reduced to a science, the orderly accumulation of information in visible and
other new filing technologies suggested otherwise. Indeed, the standardization of
personal identity and financial performance on uniform blanks and file cards, with
their grid-like fields, multicolor signals, and coded credit limits and credit ratings,
gave the impression of mechanical precision. "It is only within late years that the
granting of credit has been placed upon what may properly be called a scientific
basis," a textbook author noted in 1915, "and though it may not yet have assumed the
dignity of a full-fledged science, it will be admitted that the work of a well-managed
credit department is now conducted with a thoroughness of method and a certainty of
results which characterize scientific processes in other lines of activity."480 As the
information used by credit professionals migrated from embodied memory to vast
textual repositories, the entire enterprise of credit analysis seemed to take on a new air
of facticity. "Intuition, that mythical sixth sense, has wrecked many a good business,"
one prominent writer noted, but "facts properly applied never have." 481 Visibilityclearly documented and systematized information-was touted as the antidote to
foggy ideas and vague hunches. "A science of credit control is being developed," a
writer for a company magazine published by Rand, manufacturer of visible filing
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equipment, asserted. "In short, executives are demanding and getting a complete
picture of activities as they occur. " 482
While the space limitations of card files encouraged the use of code numbers
and abbreviations, the narrative mode died hard. Most credit bureau cards included a
''Remarks" section where informaticn that escaped the proscribed fields could be
added. These notes were often derogatory, but in some cases they contextualized an
otherwise unsympathetic picture. "The remark column serves in many valuable ways,"
one writer noted, "but most especially to explain extenuating circumstances, such as
'been sick,' or 'lost crop in floods,' or 'spendthrift,' or 'chronic returner of goods,'
etc., which things help to expJain the ratings. " 483 Amid the drive to systernatize and
quantify credit information, some found these open-ended narrative spaces
confounding. Complaining that most reports were filled with the cross-reference "see
Remarks," one irritated member carped, "\Vhy not put the entire narrative in
remarks?" Here agam the ongoing tension between codification and qualification.
science and art, was dramatized. Defending the "Remarks" section---and humanity
itself-·-against standardization, one long-time credit manager responded, "When the
histories of men and movements, can be made interchangeable by the mere insertion
of a few figures or dates, then will 'personality' be dropped from the dictionary and
the names will all be 'robot.'"484
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Communication technologies
Whatever form the information stored in the master files took--narrative,
code, or clipping-it was only as useful as it was quickly accessible: To meet the timesensitive needs of their members, early twentieth-century credit bureaus evolved into
sophisticated communication command centers. By the 1910s the telephone was its
primary technology. Describing the mechanics of a "model credit bureau," one writer
explained, "The important matter of accessibility to the credit bureau means to a great
degree the telephone." 485 By the late 1920s many credit bureaus answered ninetypercent or more of their reports via telephone. 486 In addition to answering incoming
credit inquiries, credit information was collected and verified through direct calls to
employers, landlords, neighbors, local merchants, and utility companies. Many credit
bureaus used large detailed maps to locate and contact informants. Thus as the
manager of a Fresno, California, bureau explained, "if a member asks for a report on
John Blank, Rural Route F, Box 54, and we should have no card in our files, we can,
by the map, pick up the telephone number nearest to Box 54 on this route" and call the
applicant's neighbor for information. 487 During the 1920s many bureaus made
significant investments in telecommunication upgrades. The local bureau of Omaha,
Nebraska, for example, was equipped with ten in-bound telephone lines and twenty
direct lines to credit departments throughout the city, while a Washington, DC, bureau
installed fifty telephones to answer the 16,000 inquiries per month it was receiving by
485
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1926.488 By the mid 1920s city credit bureaus operated multi-line telephone stations
with direct lines to the credit departments of the city's major retailers. Similar systems
were common in credit bureaus throughout the nation. 489 The local bureau of
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, became one of the most advanced in 1928 when after six
months of study by Bell Telephone engineers it was specially equipped with 160
telephone lines, expandable to 300. 490 The credit bureau in Fort Worth, Texas,
answered more than 58,000 reports in 1925 at any average cost of 34.5 cents per
request. With a staff of sixteen, eleven of whom were women, reports were usually

answered within five minutes; those for individuals with an updated record on file
could be answered almost instantly, while new arrivals or out-of-town visitors might
take up to half an hour. 491
Technological innovation, however, did not remove the human element from
credit work. At the center of the credit bureau's filing and communication systems
were live operators who answered telephones, pulled master cards, and conveyed
information to the local merchants and credit departments. This work was largely
performed by women, whose hands and voices bridged the mechanical gulf between
the paper files and open lines. Women not only served as "switches," as historian
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Kenneth Lipartito has noted in reference to the early telephone industry, but also as the
motherboards of early data processing systems. 492 In a San Francisco bureau, for
example, two sets of files were positioned on either side of the operator so that "she
seldom needs to rise from her chair" with "many thousands of credit records" at her
fingertips. 493 Either standing or sitting (sometimes in wheeled chairs), operators in
many large bureaus wore headsets with long cords tethered to switchboards, allowing
them to move among the file cabinets to locate individual records as inquiries were
received. Operators were typically assigned to a limited range of the alphabet
(surnames beginning with A through D, for example), which distributed the work
among many sets of hands and permitted each to develop a degree of familiarity
within their domains. The following scenario-a response to an incoming call from a
local department store-illustrates the operator's work in a Milwaukee credit bureau:
"Hold the line a moment, please," responds the Credit Bureau girl, whereupon
she goes to the steel files, pulls out one of the many drawers, extracts the
desired card from a multiplicity of records, and returns to the telephone. She
answers, "XX-23," meaning that I. Shure Skinem is absolutely unworthy of
credit and that others are anxious to learn his whereabouts. "Thank you," says
the girl of the Wide Awake Department Store as she hangs up the receiver,
smiling, no doubt, because she has saved the boss from a poor credit
customer. 494
Just as credit departments sought to foster good will among their credit customers,
credit bureaus worked to impress their local members with the convenience and utility
of their reports, which presumably justified the time and expense of participation.
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Stressing the importance of courtesy when providing telephone reports, the manager
of the Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, credit bureau asserted that the "credit reporters"
working the phones "should be girls whose voices give off smiles."

495

Good help,

however, was apparently difficult to ;find. Noting that "barely one out of five girls"
was capable of succeeding as a station operator, one writer observed that "the
qualifications required of such an operator are not frequently combined in one person,
namely, alertness, accuracy, good eyesight, common sense, tact, composure, patience
and courtesy."496 One problem that even the most diligent operators faced was that of
misidentification when names were conveyed over the telephone. To reduce
confusion, retailers were encouraged to adopt the disambiguating technique used by
telephone companies when calling the local credit bureau. "It may sound foolish at
first," a Washington, DC, bureau representative explained, "but instruct your
employees to say, 'G a:s in George,' 'T as in Thomas' or 'Fas in Friday.~"497 Some
merchants required even more basic instruction m making proper inquiries ..An
ignorant clothier might request "a report on Smith, lives somewhere on Weber Street,"
a representative of a Colorado credit reporting firm noted, though "'Neher Street is
five miles long and the directory shows ten different families by the name of Smith
living on the street. ''498
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The introduction of telautograph and teletype machines during the late 191 Os
offered a new channel of rapid communication between credit bureaus and their
members. The former, patented by Elisha Gray in 1888 and a forerunner of the
modem facsimile machine, transmitted handwritten messages; the latter, developed
during the early twentieth century and adopted by the Associated Press in 1914, ·
transmitted typewritten messages. Both sped service by allowing operators to· read
incoming inquires rather than wait to have the names and addresses spelled out. They
could also be sent and received asynchronously so that time was not wasted waiting on
the telephone or by interruptions from incoming calls. 499 Additionally, they permitted
bureau operators to send reports or special bulletins simultaneously to a number of
different retailers instead of requiring eleven separate telephone calls. 500 A single
teletype report took one minute to send, compared to five on the telephone. Thus,
when sent simultaneously to eleven different stores, the bureau operator performed in
one minute what on the telephone would take nearly one hour. 501 Allaying concerns
about new technology's affect on its female operators, the manager of the Grand
Rapids credit bureau reassured, "We don't believe the girl is more tired working on
the telautograph than she might be on the telephone. " 502 Both systems also allowed
store credit managers to silently submit inquiries to the local bureau without offending
the customer, who might be standing nearby. However, one of the most compelling
selling points of these systems was that they dealt in written records rather than
499
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ephemeral, error-prone telephone conversations. As an advertisement for the
Telautograph Company proclaimed, "When the Human Element Fails the Handwritten
Record Will Fix Responsibility! !"503 Likewise, Teletype advertisements appealed to
similar concerns. "Figures and peculiar names and addresses are recorded so legibly
that misunderstandings are impossible," one informed. 504 By 1929 credit bureaus and
credit departments were adopting both systems in growing numbers.sos Pittsburgh's
modernized bureau included eleven teletype machines, for example, while Saks
department store in New York used a teletype system to communicate credit
authorizations between its Fifth Avenue and Thirty-fourth Street stores.s 06 In 1937
Telautograph claimed that thirty-six credit bureaus and 212 stores were using their
system.so7
Credit departments, like credit bureaus, also relied upon specialized
communication technologies to send and receive credit information. In addition to
outgoing lines that connected to the local credit bureau, many large retail
establishments maintained their own elaborate internal communication systems
between the store's credit department and its cashiers and managers on the selling
floor. Two different systems, the electrical and pneumatic, vied for supremacy during
the early twentieth century.
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The electrical system, produced by National Cash Register Company, was
essentially an in-house telephone system through which sales associates or
"inspectors" called operators in the credit department to authorize a waiting
customer's credit purchase. Authorizers in the credit department had ready access to
the store's credit files and, after quickly consulting a customer's record, either
approved or declined the request. By 1920 one Minneapolis department store had 120
telephone stations throughout the building. When a credit sale was requested, an
inspector pressed a button that produced a flashing signal in the credit department. If
approved, the credit operator pressed an "O.K. button" that automatically stamped the
charge slip. According to the credit manager of the Minneapolis store, ninety-five
percent of credit authorizations could be answered immediately and the remaining five
percent that required closer scrutiny were referred to the credit manager, taking on
average about two minutes to produce a decision. The electric system may have been
faster, but it was also considered riskier because information conveyed orally was
vulnerable to misunderstanding and error, particularly with similar sounding names
and addresses. According to an "error form" kept in one store, telephone operators
were hindered by the ineptitude of sales clerks and inspectors who spoke too quickly,
overly loud, "indistinctly," or even "unnecessarily."508 Stressing the importance of
employing only experienced operators as authorizers in the credit department, the
Minneapolis credit manager boasted that the "girls" in his store "can get the name and
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address and amount more accurately over the 'phone than they could if they were
looking at the ticket. " 509
By contrast, the pneumatic system, produced by the Lamson Company,
allowed credit requests to be physically sent to the credit department in carriers via
pressurized tubes. 510 Though slower than the electrical system, the pneumatic system
offered greater accuracy because authorizers were able to eye the original charge slip.
Touting the virtue of direct inspection, an advertisement for Lamson's "belt type
pneumatic tube desk" announced, "No sale is authorized unless the slip is legible in
every particular and agrees with the central credit record. " 511 Arguing for the
superiority of the pneumatic system, a St. Louis credit manager explained, "The whole
thing sums itself up in two words-Visible Authorization-you see the check you are
approving and keep it in your office." 512 If the charge slips were not physically sent to
the credit department at the time of purchase. as in the case of the electric system, then
they needed to be collected from the store's numerous departments at the end of the
day, further increasing the likelihood oflost or misplaced information (though by 1920
some telephones systems came equipped with a drawer into which the charge slips
were placed). Unable to compete with the lightning speed of electricity, the efficiency
of pneumatic systems was improved by the introductiori of "mechanical separators"
that enabled credit requests to be routed directly to the credit department instead of
509
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through multiple intervening stations. By installing baskets to receive the carriers
consecutively, the pneumatic system permitted authorizers to answer requests in the
order th"'t they were received, which, as proponents argued, stood in contrast to the
electric system's randomly blinking switchboards.
If the pneumatic system surrendered speed to accuracy against the electric

system, the waiting customer's time was compensated for with a modicum of privacy.
Unlike the electric system, which required that a sales clerk or inspector announce the
customer's name, address, and charge amount into the telephone receiver, the tube
system was entirely discrete. Illustrating the desirability of privacy-and the violation
caused by the electric system-a credit manager recalled, "One day one of the
wealthiest ladies in the city came to me and said: 'Mr. Jackson, I have been trading
here for a great· many years and I don't see why it is necessary to call my name out in
the presence of everyone every time I make a purchase. "'513 As another advertisement
proclaimed, "Customers Like the Quiet Dignity of LAMSON Authorizing."514
Additionally, as some credit managers noted, the electric system was open to a
rudimentary form of identity theft, as an unscrupulous person within earshot of the
sales clerk speaking into the telephone might hear the customer's name and go to
another department to make fraudulent purchases under that account.
Most retailers chose between the two systems, but some employed both. A
store in Birmingham, Alabama, for example, used a telephone system to authorize
charges for "take-with" sales (purchases that customers carried out of the store
513
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themselves rather than having delivered, and thus the most time sensitive) and a
pneumatic tube system for "send-out" sales (those purchases to be delivered to
customers). 515 By the late 1920s the telephone system had begun to overtake the
pneumatic system in popularity, though Lamson claimed to have installed its tube
system in more than 2000 stores during 1928 (proof, according to a company
advertisement, than "merchants everywhere ... want speed with sqfety"). 516 The
electric system was also preferable in sprawling department stores that included more
than one building, where a pneumatic system was not feasible, or firms with nearby
branch locations.
During the first half of the twentieth century the consumer credit gauntlet
involved an array of human and mechanical techniques to extract and manage credit
information. Together these diverse points of contact-personal interviews, filing
systems, standardized forms, telephones, and vacuum tubes-brought individuals into
networks of communication over which they had little control or knowledge. Those
who bought on credit were automatically entered into the credit rating system; it was
not optional. "No matter whether you know it or not, whether you approve or
disapprove," the manager of the Milwaukee retail credit bureau explained in 1922, all
those credit customers received a rating of "'prompt,' 'slow' or "never pay"' in the
bureau's 400,000 records. "Just which category you belong to, is dependent upon the
manner in which you discharge your obligations." 517
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CHAPTER 5: Discipline and Target
During the first half of the twentieth century professional credit managers
established an ambitious national credit reporting infrastructure that operated with
impressive efficiency. But the institutionalization of credit reportjng was more than
sum of its affiliated bureaus and information-processing technologies. It was not
enough for credit bureaus and credit departments to merely identify, track, and
quarantine slow payers and deadbeats. "[W]e must go further," the president of the
national association argued in 1918. "Let us preach the doctrine that credit is
character, and that a person who willfully abuses his credit and refuses to heed the
warning must become an outcast in the business and social world." 518 While working
to solve organizational and technical difficulties, credit managers evinced a more
profound role in American life as agents of moral instruction. As Herbert Marcus,
cofounder of the upscale Dallas department store Neiman-Marcus, remarked, "It is the
credit man who pricks the conscience of the public not to the realization that they are
false to others, but that they are not true to themselves." 519
From the beginning, credit reporting organizations sought to channel the
disciplinary effects of their surveillance. Commercial reporting firms such as R.G.
Dun and Bradstreet were hailed (and reviled) for their ability to coerce merchants into
abiding by business norms and practices that suited the interests of wholesalers and
jobbers. The disciplinary power of credit surveillance was equally seductive when
turned on consumers. "From a moral standpoint," the national association's
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educational director observed, "I know of no single thing, save the churches, whiph
has so splendid a moral influence in the community as does a properly organized and
effectively operated credit bureau." 520 Indeed the mere suggestion that a bureau was
operating could exert marvelous power, as illustrated in 1920 when the retailers of a
"fair-sized city not far from New York" cashed in with a well-executed ruse. By
advertising the formation of a local credit bureau, though none actually existed., they
received "a small flood" of payments from dilatory customers. 521 Such disciplinary
effects were nullified as long as the bureau's existence remained shrouded in mystery,
In contrast to reclusive twenty-first-century credit reporting firms, early credit bureaus
went to great lengths to publicize their work. By 1926 even the local association of
desolate Mesa County, Colorado, was "keeping their name constantly before the
public" with 100 eye-catching metal signs afiixed to telegraph poles. 522
At the same time, credit professionals sought to educate the Americar..,public to
the moral foundation of credit. ''The people understand issues such as disarmament,
child welfare, sanitation, biologic living, eugenics," the president of a California credit
association complained in 1928, "but it does not know that credit is a moral issue, at
least it does not conceive of it as such." 523 Ironically, as credit relationships became
institutionalized and impersonal, merchants found it necessary to remind their
customers of credit's basis in individual trust and confidence---in other words, its
social embeddedness. The message of credit morality, delivered via mass media and in
520
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countless private consultations throughout the country, equated credit and character in
explicit terms. Abandoning the notion that one's moral disposition was inborn, credit
professionals turned from nature to nurture to produce profitable cust.omers. "By the
proper use of credit machinery there is no doubt that stores can train customers into
new and better ways of buying, thus cultivating and maintaining their confidence and
good-will," the credit manager of Gimbel's asserted in an influential credit text. "This
should be the great object whenever credit is granted." 524
While seeking to direct consumer behavior through education, credit
department managers also explored new methods of statistical analysis to systematize
credit evaluation and to plumb new market niches. Beginning with crude
generalizations based on occupation, retailers developed increasingly sophisticated
techniques for analyzing the financial behavior of entire classes of customers. By the
1920s credit managers were no longer simply tracking customers and making
authorizations, but mining their rich repositories of customer information for the
purpose of targeted sales promotions. In this way, systematic credit management
began to develop into an instrument of social classification and control with broader
implications.

The democratization of credit and the discovery of honesty
Amid an explosion of credit spending during the 191 Os and 1920s, much of
which was attributed to the growth of installment buying, credit professionals looked
to prove their expertise and to silence critics who questioned the safety of spiraling
524
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consumer debt. Total outstanding U.S. consumer credit debt reached nearly $8 billion
dollars in 1929 and, after bottoming out below $4 billion in 1933, soared to more than
$10 billion in 1941.

525

As both champions and disciplinarians of credit, credit

professionals found themselves in a precarious position. Like modem beer companies
whose advertising celebrates immaturity while preaching responsibility in lame
disclaimers, credit managers authorized an orgy of consumer spending while
espousing the virtue of self-control. This dubious stance was maintained through a
double discourse that extolled the honesty of the American people as a whole, while
asserting the moral imperative of credit at the individual level. At the center of this
discourse was the idea that credit had been "democratized." The proliferation of
installment plans and charge accounts, as well as personal loan and finance companies
that emerged during the 1910s, liberalized credit and granted millions of Americans
unprecedented access to goods and services, all heralding a rising quality of life. The
democratization of credit was explained by its proponents as a world-historical
transformation. "With the gradual progress of civilization," the author of a 1917 credit
text portended, "men learned to trust each other; and out of this increasing confidence
of man in his fellow-man the use of credit was gradually developed." 526 Where credit
was once the preserve of wealth and hereditary privilege, according to this narrative,
the average American had emerged from the "creditless masses" and assumed his
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birthright as a fully enfranchised citizen-consumer. 527 As Morris R. Neifeld, a finance
company statistician and tireless booster of consumer credit, pronounced, "John
Smith, individual, is here; and just as his journey from nonentity to entity has been
through the democratization of rights and liberties, so his progress has more recently
called for the democratization of credit. " 528
If retailers found efficiency in trusting one another, they found prosperity in
trusting their customers. The democratization of credit rested largely upon the newly
"discovered" honesty of the American people. "The old adage, 'To Trust is to Bust,' is
now forgotten," a New Orleans credit association official remarked in 1930. "A new
mode ofliving is offered and enjoyed by everyone." 529 Noting that Americans "are
not only honest, but scrupulously so," a journalist observed at the turn of the twentieth
century, "The people as a whole are trusted as they never have been trusted before in
all the world's history." 530 A generous view of human nature, however, was often a
last resort. Backed against the wall by competition or sluggish sales, many
manufacturers and retailers simply took a leap of faith. "We have got to sell these
machines or quit," the general manager of Nineteen Hundred Washing Company (now
Whirlpool) recalled, explaining their decision to turn to credit sales. "I think that
nearly everyone is honest. Why not, then, show that we believe they are honest; then
perhaps they will believe we are, too." 531 Such magnanimity paid off. By the 1920s the
527
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near universal honesty of Americans was trumpeted in popular magazines and trade
publications. Trustworthy citizens, estimated at ninety-nine or ninety-eight percent of
the buying public (but as low as ninety-five percent), were hailed as the engine of
national prosperity. 532 In 1927 the chairman of General Motors' finance committee
effused, "How little opponents of consumers' credit appreciate the fact that inherent
honesty and character of our wage earners constitute the great foundation upon which
consumers' credit rests!" 533
As an ideological position, the democratization of credit ran parallel the
development of systematic credit evaluation. In principle, standardized checking
procedures obviated personal relationships in questions of credit granting. Like the
one-price system, which democratized mass retailing during the l 870s, universal
credit verification policies were democratic in that they eliminated preferential
treatment among different socioeconomic classes of customer. The individual citizenconsumer thus assumed equal rights under the law of objective credit reporting,
Whether or not a customer was rich or poor was far less important than whether he or
she honored financial obligations and made timely payments. As a Kansas City credit
manager instmcted, "all applicants for credit should be treated just as nt:arly alike as
possible," leaving no room for personal favoritisrn. 534 Interestingly, this p9sed a
special problem for retailers in s~all towns, where credit managers Ir.new nearly
532
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everyone, directly or through mutual connections, and felt unable to ask indiscrete
questions. "Joe may be slow as molasses with you, yet he goes up to the city, opens an
account in an impersonal and businesslike manner, and pays it when it is due," an
Atlantic City, New Jersey, credit bureau official explained. "The credit manager in the
big store asks Joe questions you wouldn't dream of asking, and Joe never turns a
hair." 535 Of course the blind justice of large impersonal stores co1;1ld also produ~e
absurdity. In 1913, for example, a conscientious young sales clerk in a Cincinnati
department store phoned the credit department to verify the account status of a man
she did not recognize. The customer, John D. Rockefeller, was in fact the richest man
in the world. Taking it in stride, Rockefeller excused the clerk with a smile and noted
that "her caution deserved approval by her employers. " 536

Credit propaganda and consumer education

The flourishing of retail credit management coincided with the First World
War, providing an opportunity for credit managers to join their message of credit
responsibility with that of civic duty and national allegiance. During the war the U.S.
government asked retailers to curtail credit sales in the interest of freeing the nation's
flow of capital for the war effort, and at the 1918 convention the national association
pledged its support. 537 While the message of thrift and conservation was no boon to
business, credit managers turned the patriotic call to their advantage, using the
opportunity to assert the civic duty of prompt payment from their credit customers.
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Retailers in Boston and other parts of the country sent letters to the charge customers
urging them to contribute to the war effort by paying promptly, and in New York the
retail credit men spoke directly to the public through the newspaper. 538 Commenting
on the credit manager's increased responsibilities during the war, Edward A. Filene,
head of the Filene's department store in Boston, told a gathering of his peers that in
"back of all the guns, back of all the military preparations, the winning of the war
depends upon the morale of men, and credit men understand men and know how to
influence them." 539 At the same time retailers also began working together to impose
community credit policies that established regular billing cycles, requiring customers
to settle balances in now familiar thirty-day intervals. Many credit customers,
accustomed to running open-ended accounts, had to be informed of these new
expectations. "In the majority of cases the merchant is dealing with customers having
little or no knowledge of business principles," a Cleveland retailer reminded his
colleagues in 1918.

540

Some customers apparently left balances because they assumed,

erroneously, that by settling in full their account was closed. "The war gave retailers
the long-sought for opportw1ity to stir up their delinquent accounts and to give a new
sense of responsibility to charge customers who disregarded the terms upon which the
accommodation was extended to them," an Indianapolis chamber of commerce journal
noted.
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As the First World War drew to a close, local credit associations launched a
new propaganda war on the home front. "Prompt pay" or "pay up" campaigns were
run in cities and towns throughout the nation to alert the public to the credit policies of
local merchants and the policing role of credit bureaus. 542 More importantly, prompt
pay campaigns impressed the moral obligations of credit and reminded the public that
individual credit ratings were entirely self-made. One's credit rating was not assigned
by local merchants or the credit bureau, they asserted, but represented a purely factual
direct transcription of one's own financial behavior. To possess a favorable credit
rating, as repeatedly explained, was entirely up to the individual consumer. "Being
trusted is a wonderful feeling," an advertisement published by a Nebraska reporting
organization read. "If you don't believe it, have some merchant refuse you credit, on
account of your credit rating, which you have made for yourself."543 While some
exhorted the freedom and pleasures of credit, others portrayed the frightful costs of
irresponsibility. "A person with bad credit is terribly handicapped all through life," a
Minneapolis advertisement warned. "Day after day he and his family are shamed by
the refusal of merchants to give him credit. Goods are delivered to his house C.O.D.,
for the neighbors to whisper about." 544 Though many campaigns consisted of little
more than a series of newspaper advertisements and didactic editorials, others were
multimedia extravaganzas. A 1919 "Pay-Up Time" campaign in Oklahoma City, for
example, included a 40,000 piece mass mailing, 900 "two-color cards" placed in local
542
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store windows, "colored slides" presented to movie theater audiences, posters affixed
to the dashes of the city's street cars, and fifteen billboards, including six that were
"painted and electrically lighted."545
Prompt pay campaigns quickly spread throughout the country and in 1920 the
first of several national "Pay Your Bills Promptly" campaigns was organized.546 These
campaigns addressed the following concerns, summarized by an Oklahoma credit
manager: "How are we, as credit men, going to impress on the minds of our customers
the high dignity of a charge privilege; the importance of this trust to them and the
consequent detriment to their credit standing if they should fail to carry out their trust
and permit their accounts to become delinquent?" 547 During 1927, 213 cities
participated in a weeklong national campaign involving some 2.6 million leaflets and
tens of thousands of store displays, which together delivered the message of credit
responsibility to an estimated forty million people. 548 Ironically, during thl'!se
campaigns dedicated to thrift and restraint some stores ran sales· promotions. 549 Over
.

'

the next decade the message shifted from the narrow issue of prompt payment to the
more expansive concept of "credit consciousness." In 1930 the national association
launched a $7 million media blitz to cultivate a "national consum~r credit
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conscience." 550 Retailers and credit bureaus also turned increasingly to radio to
broadcast their message. Regular programs such as "Creditime" in Philadelphia and
"Character Builders': in Houston were aired for mass audiences, and in 1939the
popular comedy duo Lum 'n' Abner were enlisted to take up the subject of credit in a
~eries of nationally syndicated episodes sponsored by General Foods. 551 Credit
associations also sponsored essay contests in public schools, with the winning
selections,juvenile paeans to credit morality, published in local papers. 552 According
to a 1930 survey of 412 credit bureaus, thirty~eight percent were running prompt
payment campaigns, while thirty percent of those who did not were interested in
starting one. 553 During the same year the credit bureau of Boston entered a float in the
city's tri-centennial parade that displayed the equipment of the "modem credit
bureau," including steel filing cabinets, a switchboard, and a desk. But the coup de
grace was a massive replica rating book placed atop a fifteen-foot-tall pedestal, on
which it was announced in gold letters, "Our files contain bill paying habits of over
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1,250,000 charge customers." 554 Surely some of the event's two million spectators
took note.
Some local credit bureaus advertised their legitimacy and importance by
'.

moving into more impressive office buildings. Such aesthetic improvements, like
those intended to elevate the work of store credit departments, were intended to
impress both retailers and consumers with their scale and displays of technological
prowess. During the late 1920s the Cleveland bureau, for example, moved into a 7000square-foot space with a palatial Spanish archway, broad halls, glass-enclosed offices,
and a well-appointed reception room. "Many an irate debtor coming to the Bureau in
search of a battle has lost most of his belligerence at this impressive, friendly entry,"
the bureau secretary noted. "The impressive view gives visiting debtors a new respect
for credit, and brings them into this or that Bureau executive prepared to respect and
trust whatever that executive as to tell them." 555
While appealing to the public through broad-based campaigns, credit managers
were also urged to turn their personal interactions with customers into learning
moments. The credit interview in particular was regarded as a key opportunity to press
home the morality of financial behavior. During the application process, the credit
manager laid out the terms of the account and discussed the consequences of neglected
payments. The importance of"doing some credit education in the interview," the
author of a 1941 credit text explained, was due to the fact that "the great mass of
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consumers are so abysmally ignorant of what constitutes a good credit rating." 556 Even
those who paid in cash were taken aside for counseling. In former times, they were
told, it might have been admirable to abstain from debt, but it was now an outmoded
and an ill-advised habit. Charge accounts, after all, were not simply a convenience,
they were necessary to establish a record of creditworthiness with local merchants.
Those without "a scratch of a pen in any credit department, or in the credit bureau"
would not be able to prove their reliability on some future day when an ·
accommodation was requested. 557 Noting the exclusion that cash payers faced, one
writer taunted, "It seems, you see, that the 'boob' who pays cash isn't known." 558
Education was viewed as a preventative measure as well as a form of
rehabilitation. Imaging themselves as pastors and physicians of the new consumer
credit economy, credit managers not only informed the public of credit norms but
tended to the morally deficient. Among the three primary causes of credit abuse,
overbuying, negligence, and "Pure cussedness," according to a St. Louis credit
manager, individuals in the first two categories might easily be "reclaimed" as viable
customers through a "good heart to heart talk."559 A declined credit request was an
especially opportune moment for intervention. By offering a full explanation, the
credit manager was in a position to disabuse the rejected customer of false notions and
to steer them in the right direction. Noting that those written off as "dead-beats" could
often be resurrected through "personal contact," a Nebraska credit manager observed,
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"When their bad reputation in the payment of their current bills was impressed UPOt'i
then, and their eyes were open to the value of a credit standing, there has been, within
my personal experience, many instances of genuine reformation." 560 Ultimately, of
course, the aim of such friendly guidance was to produce a grateful and loyal future
credit customer.
The message of credit morality was a peculiar form of counter-propaganda set
amid a sea of advertising designed to incite consumer desire. "Adve1tising on a
gigantic scale has made this a nation of automobile users, toothbrush followers, and
orange, lemon, and prune consumers," the authors of 1928 credit text not~d. Thus, it
followed, "Advertising can make the United States a nation where good credit habits
are a characteristic of the population mass."561 Not surprisingly, in communicating
their message credit professionals adopted the same strategies as those pushing
consumption-notably scare tactics that appealed to the social anxieties of aspirational
Americans. In 1930 a national ·association leader proposed adve1tising that would
"awaken and accentuate feelings of inadequacy and insecurity" among those inclined
to let their bills pile up, presenting prompt payers, in contrast, as "superior people." 562
Fear rather than reason would be necessary to teach credit responsibility. "The
delinquent must become infra dig, socially disapproved, tabooed." 563 By' then the
pedagogical force of shame was well recognized. Citing the example of Listerine ·
antiseptic mouthwash, whose advertisements so effectively dramatized halitosis-
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induced social death, credit professionals recommended similar tactics to change
consumer attitudes toward credit. "If Listerine produced a social consciousness that
changed the breath of a whole nation you can produce a credit consciousness that will
change the buying habits of your people, teach them to pay promptly, happily, and
systematically." 564 The danger of social stigma, long a staple of collection l~tters and
dunning notices, had by the 1930s developed into a veritable literary genre. 565 It was
also thoroughly exploited in prompt payment campaigns and in "Credit-Education
Inserts," enclosed in customer statements, with titles such as "You Are Judged by
Your Credit" and "Your Credit Follows You." 566 Another campaign introduced the
concept of "Q.C.," or questionable credit, as a source of humiliating gossip. A 1937
advertisement pictured a small group of women huddled in conversation with the
warning, "Friends Talk About 'Q.C.' Too!" 567
In the end, consumer credit education was hegemonic in the tenns attributed to
Italian communist Antonio Gramsci. 568 Credit professionals sought to win consent
through ideological inculcation rather than compulsion. "The positive credit man
realizes that the best results in business can only be obtained by 'consent,"' one
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admitted. "In this world we cannot 'compel people to do very much."569 Where the
force oflaw exerted only a superficial influence over individual behavior, credit
education functioned as an ideological discourse of self government or soul training as
suggested by Foucault. "No Nation can successfully legislate morality," a manager at
Boston's R.H. White department store argued in 1921. "There must be a training of
the mind and a development of the soul if the result is to be permanent. " 570 During the
same year the national association established a Credit Education department whose
sole purpose was to foster public awareness of credit behavior.

Credit as a business builder
Systematic credit management originated as a progressive movement to
quarantine poor credit risks. "By cutting off the unworthy from credit," Earling
observed with satisfaction in 1904, "we are in a position to extend it to the worthy
more than we ever could before. " 571 Retailers had of course long understood that all
debtors are not equal. In his 1869 manual, Samuel Terry identified eight "classes" of
individuals that could be trusted very little, if at all. Along with the usual suspectsthe lazy, extravagant, and immoral-these included the gravely ill, minors and married
women who were not legally responsible for their debts, single men without any
family attachments to keep them from fleeing, transient strangers, and the middle
aged, "say fifty years of age," who have no savings and had not made arrangements
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for retirement. 572 For Terry, writing just after the Civil War, the safest risks were
agricultural producers with harvests in hand. But by the turn of the twentieth century
things had changed. Retailers looked to the growing ranks of office workers,
managers, and civil servants with steady incom~s and a taste for modem amenities and
respectability. By the 1920s the safest credit prospect was no longer the farmer but the
salaried professional man, or his wife, with an established credit history and good
references.
While personal character was touted as the true coin of the consumer credit
realm, it was wealth-real, imagined, or pretended-to which merchants often
deferred in making credit decisions. But following the money trail was perilous.
Counter-intuitively, the wealthy were often the retailer's worst customer. The affluent
were notorious for running up large bills and delaying payment either out of
forgetfulness, indifference, or arrogance. Commenting favorably on the RDPA's credit
reporting system during the 1870s, a Long Island reporter observed, "The most
remarkable thing about the facts obtained by this new example of the organization of
modem life, is that wealth and credit do not always go together. Rich men, very rich
men, not infrequently are undesirable people to trust." 573 The difficulty of collecting
debts from wealthy customers was compounded by the merchant's fear of causing
offense, which might further prolong repayment and jeopardize future business. As
one credit expert noted, "I am told and I believe it is true, as a rule that the wealthy
class are the slowest pay, the most annoying, that they pay the least attention to their
572
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accounts, that their requests and demands are the most unreasonable and that they ar~
offended more quickly under the least provocation than any other class in proportion
to the extent of their business transactions." 574 Moreover, the wealthy could not be
relied upon to curtail their expenditures in hard times. An addiction to luxury, it was
argued, made such individuals incapable of honesty with themselves or their creditors,
thus prompting them to spend further into debt at the expense of the trusting merchant.
Even as credit reporting became more widely established, some retailers could not
resist the trappings of affluence. During the late 1920s a frustrated credit expert
recalled his encounter with a Chinese storeowner in Tucson, Arizona, who granted
credit to a known laggard after being bowled over by appearances. According to the
writer, the ignorant merchant protested, "She good. She come store every day in big
automobile. Catch 'em lots of money. Sell 'em lots of groceries." 575
The formalization of credit reporting encouraged merchants to classify their
customers with new specificity. By adopting affirmative-negative systems in which all
customers-the good, the bad, and middling-were rated, merchants were forced to
parse degrees of creditworthiness between the clear-cut extremes. This proved
enormously difficult. Credit rating cards filled with positive ratings inspired a "grand
and glorious feeling" among retailers, as one admitted, but it was the "mixed card"
that screwed up ·'the bland countenance of even the cheerful credit man." 576 Yet the
"mixed card" was not the exception, it was the rule. The vast middle ground between
the best and worst risks required constant decision making. It was inhabited by "slow
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payers" and "honest debtors" that failed to settle their accounts out of either
thoughtlessness or privation, or perhaps both. The difference was important; those
who dragged their feet for no good reason were a constant source of woe for retailers,
while those who were punctual but temporarily hard up might be counted on in the
long run. As James G. Cannon asserted, "It is the man who pretends to be good and is
not, who must be refused and avoided. " 577
Since wealth ensured nothing and character was a variable impossible to
isolate or measure systematically, credit professionals turned to other metrics to
predict trustworthiness. Occupation, with its connection to income both in terms of
quantity and regularity, attracted special interest. In 1925 a Bloomingdale's executive
offered the following hierarchy of credit customers in descending order of desirability:
"the salaried class; the wage-earning class with permanent positions; journeymen
laborers whose occupation is seasonal and whose employment changes frequently,
such as painters, carpenters, etc.; and last, the day laborer engaged in unskilled work
that is seasonal and where the employer changes frequently." 578 While such
impressionistic, commonsense distinctions had long been made by experienced
merchants, the relationship between occupation and risk began to receive systematic
analysis by the end ofthe 1920s. In 1929, for example, a Southern department store
classified its losses by occupational categories and was surprised to report that office
workers and merchants, two classes typically considered safe, were responsible for the
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largest percentage of annual losses. 579 The next year the Bureau of Business Research
at the University of Texas sponsored a detailed analysis of credit risk based upon
occupational categories. Using data gathered at twenty-three department stores in that
state, the report found, perhaps not surprisingly, that "business executives" received
the highest average sums of credit, while "railroad employees" received the least and
took longer than average to pay off the balance. 580 Though suggesting that the findings
might be useful in establishing credit limits, the author found occupation to .be an
unreliable variable in isolation. "The credit manager of a department store cannot
extend credit on the basis of occupation alone." 581
In 1931 Paul D. Converse, a University of Illinois business professor and
marketing scholar, headed the first of two studies that investigated the relationship
between occupation and credit ratings. Rather than examining correlations based upon
actual ledger data, however, he tested the perception of such correlations among credit
managers and credit bureau operators. Converse's first study polled 250 credit bureaus
and a number of department stores in the Midwest. While noting that the stability of
an individual's income, even more than the amount, was the most important factor in
determining credit ratings, the survey revealed that credit managers used occupation to
make inferences about individuals. Police and firemen often had steady incomes, for
example, but received "fair" credit ratings because in the eyes of credit managers
"they feel that the public is under obligation to them and· hence they take all the time
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they want to pay their debts." 582 Likewise, credit managers approved individuals
employed in lines of work that they regarded favorably. One such profession was
school teachers, whose salaries, albeit modest, were known and could be counted on.
"Teachers accounts have proven to be the best type of account to solicit," one credit
expert attested, citing the value of teacher's directories for locating new customers. 583
When referring to city directories for business, the same writer instructed, the
occupation listed for each individual could be used to "eliminate the classes you do
not wish to solicit."584
That many merchants used occupation as a guide for making credit decisions is
illustrated by a comprehensive list of "high skip risk" occupations published in a 1934
text co-authored by the president of the national association. This catalog, with its
emphasis on transient, marginal, and morally suspect work, is instructive:
Actors, acrobats, amusement park employees, aviators, barbers, bootleggers,
carpenters, constables, collectors, contractors, circus performers,
concessionaries, detectives, deputies, farm laborers, grain buyers, grain
elevator employees, fruit and vegetable peddlers, health-seekers, jockeys and
other race track workers, coal miners, hotel employees, insurance salesmen,
instalment house outside men (collectors and canvassers), labor union workers,
loan company officers and employees, club and lodge organizers, marines,
musicians, painters and paper hangers, persons 'in business for self,' post
office employees, pool room owners, road construction laborers, pawnbrokers,
petty business men in restaurant, cleaning and pressing, automotive and other
traders requiring little capital, powder employees, telegraph operators, civic
employees, prize fighters, sailors, boarding-house keepers, nurses (both sexes),
colored ministers, professional baseball players, salesmen on commission,
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section hands, soldiers, structural steel workers, truck drivers, brokerage house

employees, taxicab drivers, second-hand merchants, waitress. 585
Converse repeated his study a decade later with a larger national sample and
the cooperation of the Associated Credit Bureaus of America. Again confirming the
primacy of steady income in determining risk, he reported much anecdotal evidence to
illustrate the use of occupation in making moral inferences. "In some instances
occupation does indicate something of the character and sense of responsibility of
workers," he conceded. "For example, teachers, retail salespeople, nurses, doctors, and
ministers usually have a considerable sense of responsibility. On the other hand, this
sense seems to be developed to a relatively lower degree among workers in some
occupations-for example unskilled laborers, waiters, miners, barbers, janitors, and
painters." 586 While Converse was quick to add that exceptions always disproved the
rule, many credit managers, particularly those faced with thousands of accounts to
review, found such generalizations useful. At a retailer's convention in 1930 the
question arose as to whether all new credit accounts should be investigated through the
local credit bureau. According to one participant, occupational classifications were
used to screen applicants in his store without the use of credit reports. While school
teachers "as a class" were immediately approved-"Some of them are slO\v but none
of them are bad"-painters and laboring men were summarily refused "nine times out
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often" without even calling the credit bureau. 587 "A man's occupation, profession or
business, or his color, should neither bar him from credit nor render him eligible," a
1928 credit text instructed, but such information, the authors concluded, was not to be
ignored. 588
Another mechanism for screening applicants was geography. Individuals from
affluent neighborhoods received special consideration, despite the trouble that the well
to do so often caused. "Some houses take note of where purchases are sent," a dry
goods dealer admitted in the late 1880s, "and whenever a fashionable address appears
on their shipping books write the lady at that address offering to put her name on the
credit list." 589 This primitive method of targeting marketing was commonplace. The
same logic, unfortunately, also worked in reverse. The residents of entire buildihgs or
streets were denied credit privileges by some retailers. "Houses have bad credit
reputations as well as people," a Chicago reporter explained. "On a block with a dozen
apartment houses some will stand well in the neighborhood, some badly. They may all
'

look the same outwardly, and the rents may be the same, yet there will be a marked
difference." Unfortunately, those who bought or rented in "a 'wrong house'" soon
discovered that they could not find a local merchant willing to sell to them on
credit. 590 One credit text indicated that the "veteran credit m.an" should "possess a
complete and accurate mental map of his community" to recall "blacklisted
587
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neighborhoods and sections."591 In this way, individuals remained embedded in
distinct social geographies and might be punished for the collective sin (real or
imagined) of their neighbors. The practice of geographical exclusion, later referred to
as "redlining," became an insidious mechanism of racial discrimina,tion, particularly
among mortgage companies and banks, and was formally outlawed in the late
l960s. 592
Here it is essential to note that the development of retail credit reporting was
largely devoted to the world of white Americans and European immigrants. This is not
to suggest that African Americans were excluded from white credit networks, but to
note the normative assumption of whiteness among early credit professionals.
Historian Martha Olney has shown that African Americans did have access to retail
credit during the early twentieth century, but that they turned in greater numbers than
whites to installment purchases, securitized with heavy down payments and looming
threats of repossession. 593 The limited participation of African Americans in the white
credit economy may be inferred to some degree from the pages of early credit rating
books. There the names of African Americans are often parenthetically identified with
the designation "colored," suggesting their exceptional status. 594 During the first half
of the twentieth century, racial and ethnic prejudice was not only unproblematic for
591
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white credit managers, it was codified as standard operating procedure. "Negroes, East
Indians, or foreigners" were at the bottom of the hierarchy of credit risks, above only
"Men and women of questionable character" and "gamblers," according to a 1922 text
endorsed by the Associated Retail Credit Men's Association ofNew York City. 595
Significantly, a 1915 guide to credit bureau operation illustrated the fqrmat for a
derogatory credit report with this fictitious example: "Robt. M. Black ... colored
professional deadbeat." 596 Around the same time a plan to establish a credit reporting
service specifically for rating African Americans appeared in the Chicago Defender.
Justifying the need for the service, the anonymous author explained: "We as a race are
generally discredited when applying for favor, and in the loop district are turned down
without consideration. Why? Because the credit man cannot satisfy his house, having
no way to distinguish between the honest man and the crook." 597 The service seems
not to have come to fruition, but it underscores the racial segregation of American
credit relationships. 598 By 193 7 the national association's standard credit report
included space under the "identity" rubric to indicate an individual's "racial
extraction," suggesting that "white" did not go without saying in some markets. 599
Along with race, many retailers considered nationality a useful marker of
trustworthiness. In the mid-1920s an installment jeweler reported correlations between
credit risk and national origin. Examining 3000 accounts in his books, he determined
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that English, Canadian, and German customers were the most reliable (ahead of bona
fide "Americans"), and that Greeks, Russians, and Italians were the least trustworthy,
even less than "Colored" customers, a racist category of non-white Americans. 600
Inferences based upon national origin were not simply the hobby horse of an eccentric
merchant. A 1922 U.S. Chamber of Commerce guide to credit bureaus cited
nationality as a piece of circumstantial evidence to consider in determining an
individual's "responsibility."601 One of the reasons that the customer's full name was
requested on credit applications was "because the first name often reveals the
nationality of a person, and this is an important item of information to the credit
grantor," according to a credit text published the same year. 602 The precise use of such
information, however, must have been obvious to contemporaries because it was not
specified. Conflating nationality and race, a 1928 textbook indicated that "Negroes,
Mexicans, [and] East Indians" were "regarded as substaridardrisks."603 The racism of
twentieth century credit reporting is not surprising given the historical context, but
there is a certain sad irony given that systematic credit reporting was pioneered by a
Lewis Tappan, a staunch abolitionist who ignored death threats for his activis1n and
even had his own home ransacked by anti-Negro rioters.
As credit professionals cast about for reliable metrics, some even considered
intelligence. Citing the results of intelligence tests administered by French
psychologist Alfred Binet, a Credit World contributor alerted his colleagues to the
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horrifying implications-a full third of the general public were "in the lower
registers-feeble-minded, borderline and dull." The dimwitted and impaired, the
writer explained, could never be considered safe credit risks because they could hardly
manage their own affairs. 604 In a subsequent article the same writer reported the result
of intelligence tests administered to U.S. troops during the First World War that
distributed mental ability by occupation. Not surprisingly, the Anny tests confirmed
existing prejudices among credit professionals. Doctors and engineers appeared at the
top of the scale, while laborers, union workers, and tradesmen were at the bottom. 605 If
intelligence was any guide, it clearly suggested that individuals engaged in low skilled
and transient work were less capable credit customers.
Merchants also paid attention to the buying patterns of individuals. "Close
buying" customers who were attentive to prices and insistent upon receiving the full
weight of their meats and dry goods were viewed favorably as credit risks, even if they
were irritating to deal with. On the other hand, waste and mismanagement was viewed
with a jaundiced eye. "Thus," a journalist explained, "the woman who uses a 5 cent
telephone call to order a 5 cent article, or who sends in two telephone calls in rapid
succession, the second asking 'please hurry that butter,' for instance, is apt to begin to
get in that store's bad graces."606 Sudden changes in spending behavior were also
noted. If a man who only purchased necessities "suddenly begins to buy 'jimcracks,"'
then it was thought likely that he had fallen into a foolish courtship or has taken to
604
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abusing his credit privilege. In one case, the credit manager was skeptical of a young
man who used his mother's charge account to buy boots, outdoor wear, and hunting
supplies: Bringing the matter to the lad's parents, it was discovered that the boy was
preparing for "a fly-by-night trip to 'discover gold' and 'hunt Indians. "'607 In general,
early efforts to classify credit customers and to monitor spending behavior were
punitive, insofar that their primary purpose was to identify and exclude the worst risks.
During the 1920s, however, as retailers sought to expand and intensify their sales,
credit managers turned to customer behavior not only for warning signs but for sales
opportunities.

Customer control
Nineteenth-century mass retailers were wise to the fact that credit customers
spent more in their stores than cash customers. Cash customers, it was often pointed
out, flitted from store to store and were nobody's customer. Though some merchants
continued to resist credit, clinging to visions of a cash-only utopia, others embraced
the intimacy of the creditor-debtor relationship. The latter viewed charge accounts as a
means to insinuate themselves into the households of their customers, a position that if
handled adroitly fostered good will and bonds of loyalty, if not actual fealty, to the
store. While interviewing a New York retailer in 1889, an out-of-town journalist was
shocked not only by the lengths to which the proprietor went to accommodate his
fickle credit customers, but also his seemingly masochistic desire "to swell their
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number." When the incredulous visitor could not grasp the point of such solitude, the
retailer revealed his motive:
Mercy! what a greeny you are .... [A] lady who has a bill at our store spends
all the way from fifty per cent. to five hundred per cent. more than'if she
hadn't. Not only does she buy every thing she wants at this store where she has
a bill, passing all the rest every day, but she buys things she does not always
want and can not always afford. You need not laugh; men do the same thing.
·
We are glad to get men to run bills here as well as women. 608
Working for such retailers and installment houses, the credit manager-and the credit
reporting associations that many participated in forming-initially performed a
security function, interrogating applicants and scanning the information environment
for evidence of deceit. As early credit professionals continuously lamented, they were
viewed rather resentfully by their employers as a necessary evil, a costly and
unproductive expense that was merely tolerated as a preventative check. 609
Seeking to gain the respect of their employers, credit managers began to assert
their contributions as "business builders." This new identity, which began to
crystallize after the First World War, reflected their increasingly service oriented role,
taking credit applications and promoting the advantages of their establishment to new
customers. A sharp economic downturn in 1920-1921 was an additional spur. Faced
with contracting profits, credit managers were urged to "get the sales point of view"
and to adopt "constructive credit" policies that placed customer service at the
forefront.
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personal matters, the credit manager was in a unique position to cultivate grateful a,nd
loyal patronage. While such intimacy was also at the heart of the Pauline injunction to
"owe no man anything"--debt, after all, placed borrowers in a compromised and
weakened position--credit managers sought to turn this vice into a virtue. "The Credit
Department," a national association figure proclaimed, was "the tie that binds the
customer to the store." 611
As an agent of salesmanship, the credit manager's first responsibility was to
solicit new customers. Newspaper advertising and mass mailings were common, but a
more judicious approach involved direct mailing campaigns aimed at only the best
prospects. No stones were left unturned in compiling lists of potential customers.
Credit managers scoured city directories and telephone books, both of which could be
used to target individuals in desirable neighborhoods, as weli as birth and marriage
records, tax 11.sts, building permits, automobile registrations, hunting licenses, and
bank and college directories. The local newspaper was also a cheap and handy source
of business leads. "Watch the newspapers for live items such as; 'Mrs. Jones is going
to Europe'; 'John Smith elected to head Elks,' or 'Miss Evelyn Blank is home from
Vassar."' 612 Engagements, weddings, birth announcements. real estate transactions,
and news concerning the social, political, business, or church activities of prominent
community members were all eyed for angles to drun1 up new business. No
publication was too marginal or sacrosanct. Even the Congressional Record was
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poured over by credit managers looking to solicit new credit business. Some stores
also ran new customer contests among their employees to drum up new prospects.
Among these myriad sources, however, one was partic_ularly cherished: credit
rating books. The widespread adoption of telephones by credit bureau diminished the
prevalence of rating books by the 1920s (inquiries and reports were conveyed orally),
but where they existed merchants eagerly mined them. Credit managers compiled lists
of individuals with good credit ratings in the books and, like "pre-approved" credit
offers that flooded the credit card market in the 1970s, sent each a personally
addressed letter indicating that the store had opened a charge account in their name.
"Rating books issued by retail commercial agencies, if available, are especially
valuable in that the names of the desired class of customer may be segregated," a
Washington, DC, retailer explained. 613 Merchants recognized the sales potential of
credit rating books as soon as they appeared in the late 1850s; indeed, this "misuse" of
the books was one argument against their publication.
The transformation of credit information from an instrument of prevention to
one of promotion signaled a major development in the history of American business
practice. Retailers of course had long scanned their ledgers for useful information
about their existing customers. At Wanamaker's, for example, managers tracked the
activity of the store's credit customers by referring to the ledgers .at regular intervals;
This "plan," in place by 1902, was designed to identify credit customers who had
drifted away and who might be lured back to the store with a personalized appeal for
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their missed business. 614 During the early 1920s, a business consultant urged credit
managers to make their "ledgers talk" by analyzing the buying habits of the store's
customers and designing targeted promotions. 615 Mass credit policies, with their
generous customer service and elaborate authorization, billing, and collection
procedures, were expensive to maintain. But as this consultant anticipated and credit
managers soon discovered, the systematic recordkeeping necessitated by mass credit
was its own reward. Not only did credit customers spend more than cash customers,
they also produced vast reservoirs of valuable information in the process. For unlike
cash customers, who came and went anonymously, credit customers submitted their
entire personal and financial history to the credit manager in exchange for their trust.
New bookkeeping devices developed during the early 1920s also allowed credit
managers to track the financial behavior of individual customers with greater
specificity. The Elliott-Fisher bookkeeping machine, for example, enabled the "100%
informed credit manager" to itemize all of the store's transactions in detailed daily
reports. "You not only can tell when purchases are made," according to an
advertisement for the system, "but the character of the goods bought, and how and
when paid for-all without extra work.''616 "I think there is no place in a department
store where there is so much record of information that is of value as in the Credit
Department of the store," a Detroit sales executive noted in 1926. "It is sometimes
difficult to get that information out, but once you have analyzed it and once you have
614
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been able to get that information, itis illuminating."617 The task of extracting such
information took on new urgency with the economic crash of October 1929.
By early 1930 many credit managers began to turn to their accumulated files to
study the buying behavior of customers already on their books. This new practice of
systematic analysis became known as "customer control."618 The basic premise
underlying customer control was that a store's established credit customers were its
most valuable customers. Previously, credit promotions focused on attracting new
customers. But as many merchants came to realize, it was far more difficult and
expensive to secure new and unproven customers than it was to simply reclaim those it
already had. Mailing lists of the store's existing charge customers, the credit manager
of Neiman-Marcus remarked, were "almost invaluable," as they represented the "most
fertile channels" for direct advertising. 619 Credit managers thus scoured their files for
inactive accounts and sent these customers letters urging them to return to the store. In
some cases a special promotion was used as a pretense for the correspondence, but
more frequently retailers addressed the recipients as valuable customers who were
missed. A San Francisco men's clothing store sent its inactive customers the following
letter, which appealed simultaneously to the moral distinction and social leveling of
American credit:
Not all ofus have our names in the Social Register---
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All of us, whether of high or low estate, are catalogued in the records of the
merchants with whom we trade.
The merchant's faith in his customers is the life of his business....
You who have justified that faith have built for yourself a credit record of more
value than the Social Register can ever convey.
May we see you again-real soon?620
Letters of this kind could be remarkably effective. In 1929, for example, a
Minneapolis store drummed up $10,000 in business over four months simply by
sending letters to inactive charge customers, a handsome thirty-eight percent return on
the cost on the mailing. 621
One of the first firms to demonstrate the efficacy of customer control was
Chicago clothier Capper and Capper In 1929 the store's addressograph machine was
modified to classify the buying habits of its existing credit customers. A printed card
was attached to a name plate for each customer and the position of moveable tabs on
the frame used to indicate in which departments ( suits, coats, hats, ri1en' r, furnishings,
and sports apparel) the customer had made purchases and whether or not a purchase
had been made during the previous season. Additional colored tabs indicated whether
the customer lived within the store's delivery range, bought expensive items, made
purchases at any of the store's seven branch locations, or purchased during sales.
Female customers were classified separated by marital status and the departments
(men's or women's) in which they made purchases.
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that she might be persuaded to buy for herself as well in the women's department;
conversely, if only buying for herself, she might be persuaded to make purchases for
her husband as well. Using this system to mail personalized letters to different classes
of customers, Capper and Capper revived some 3500 inactive accounts and more than
doubled the number of its customers making purchases in more than one of the store's
departments during the first year that it was used. 623
As the Depression curtailed consumer buying power, retailers looked to
customer control as a way to extract greater sales volume from their tried and trusted
customers. As a Bloomingdale's executive remarked in 1931, the credit manager was
moved into a "promotional rather than a critical capacity." 624 In 1932 business
publisher Dartnell conducted a survey of 415 retailers and found that "the vast
majority" had implemented a customer control system or were making plans to do
so. 625 According to the report, credit-granting stores were at the forefront of the
movement. A variety of customer control systems were put into use during the 1930s.
Some were manual, such as visible index or loose-leaf systems in which each
customer's sales activity was coded with check marks in small boxes on individual
cards or sheets. Each box represented a different field, typically one of the store's
departments or a month or season of the year. When a mailing campaign was planned,
clerks reviewed the coded cards or sheets and compiled a list of customers meeting the
selected criteria. Other systems, however, were mechanical. In addition to the
addressograph system used by Capper and Capper and others, sophisticated punch
623
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card systems were developed. Punch cards not only permitted more detailed and
elaborate classification schemes, but the retrieval process was generally faster and
more accurate than that of manual. systems. The punched holes reflected sales and
customer information transferred directly from the store's ledgers. The manufacturer
of one such system, Selectric, claimed that "an average office girl" could maintain
cards for 20,000 customers and produce an entire customer list in several hours. 626
Though customer control was initially embraced as a means to revive inactive
accounts, its broader applications were immediately apparent. While tracking the
purchasing patterns of their customers, retailers were surprised to learn that most
buyers concentrated their purchases in one or two of a store's departments, ignoring
the others altogether. Customer control was thus turned to the problem of getting
customers to spend both more heavily and more expansively. "The ideal system is to
have every charge customer trading in all of the major departments of the store," the
credit manager of Denver's Cottrell Clothing Company noted, "and the customer's
control system is an excellent guide to the purchasing habits of the customers."627
Customer control allowed retailers to identify departments that individual customers
neglected, and to design personalized letters encouraging them to visit these
"forgotten" departments. In this way, customers who regularly purchased hosiery from
the store but never bought shoes might be sent promotional materials directing them to
the advantages of the latter department. In one case, an unnamed Chicago department
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store sent promotional letters to charge customers who had purchased in the women's
ready-to-wear departments but had never bought a coat. "While apparently you have
never purchased coats from us, we would like to tell you about 'Shagmoor' coats.
These coats are ideal for spring wear-they are dust-proof, rain-proof, and wrinkleproof, making them particularly good for motoring." Following the majling, 300
customers from a list of more than 16,000 b~ught coats for the first time, amounting to
sales in excess of $21,000. 628 Information collected by customer control systems was
used to produce increasingly personalized entreaties. "We notice from our records that
you have made several purchases in our Clothing Department but have not visited our
Furnishings Department," a letter used by Cottrell Clothing Company read, adding,
"We are now showing some new numbers in Stetson hat which I am sure will look
well with that suit you bought from us recently."629 By encouraging their active
customers to buy in all of the store's departments, they hoped to wrestle money out of
the hands of competitors for the same customers.
Likewise, customer control systems allowed retailers to direct promotional
mailings to the primary buyer of the account, thus reaching more deeply into an entire
family of consumers. As already noted, many women did the majority of their family's
shopping, buying goods for themselves as well as their children and spouses.
However, direct mailing campaigns were typically addressed to the account holder,
often the woman's husband. This presented a missed opportunity on two counts; the
man to whom the mailing was addressed was not an active buyer, while the actual user
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of the account was ignored completely. Using customer control to classify each
account by gender and martial status, promotional campaigns could be designed to
reach husbands and wives as well as a faniily's children through appeals to their
mothers. 630
Customer control could also be used to gather useful feedback from inactive
customers. A list of such customers might be sent a letter that not only invited their
business, but also queried them as to the reason they had dropped off. In 1930, for
example, a California clothing chain mailed its inactive customers a letter that
provided an opportunity to indicate the reason for their absence. "You see, some
people think a Credit Man's worries are all about the people who owe money, but that
isn't true," the letter read. "His biggest worries are about the good customers who
don't use their credit accounts. That makes him scared. He wonders if something
could possibly have happened to offend them." 631 Indifference was usually the cause
of inactivity, followed by moves out of the area and price considerations, but in some
cases, as these letters revealed, an unresolved grievance kept an otherwise profitable
customer away.
By attending to such cases, customer control served an important public
relation function. But even satisfied customers were entreated to good will initiatives.
"After a credit department has made every safe and sane effort to get you on the books
it struggles valiantly to keep you there," the credit manager ofNew York's James
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McCreery department store told a reporter. 632 A fawning letter of appreciation sent to
the store's best customers could do more in the long run than the most closely tailored
promotional campaign. "You will probably be surprised to have a letter from our
Credit Department," one such letter opened. "Of course the reason a customer like you
does not hear from us is that your account is never past due." This congratulatory
letter, according to a Credit World contributor, was well received by the store's
customers. "John, what do you think of this bunk?," one woman reportedly said to her
husband upon reading the letter. Deeply impressed, the husband replied, "Well, from
now on buy all you can from the store and show them you appreciate the interest they
have shO\:vn in recognizing your prompt-pay record with them."633 Promotional
campaigns developed through customer control systems also enabled retailers.to
assess the success of their promotional campaigns with some degree of accuracy.
Changes in sales activity and volume immediately following a direct mailing were
noted and the purchasing patterns of those who received promotions were analyzed.
As customer control began more sophisticated, retailers attempted to further
differentiate their clientele by price line, taste, and average expenditures. Customers
with the means to buy expensive items were identified and addressed separately.
"Obviously there is iittle use in inducing a customer to buy a $3,000 mink coat if an
analysis of her credit purchases reveals that the top price of previous coat purchases
averaged $50.00."634 One retailer demonstrated the usefulness of income segmentation
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while seeking to boost sales of fur coats. Among the store's 40,000 charge customers,
10,000 female customers who had never purchased a coat but had the resources to do
so were mailed invitations to an exclusive one-day private sale. The event produced
$25,000 in sales and was a smashing success. 635 Additionally, price buyers-those
who waited for sales-and quality buyers were classified separately, permitting
retailers to tailor different promotions for bargain hunters and full-price customers.
Customer control allowed merchants to appeal to upper income customers exclusively,
in a way that did not leave them feeling that they were "being lumped with laborers,
clerks, women and children and be sought to buy, buy, buy."636 At the same time,
individuals in lower income brackets were tracked for promotional efforts. Customers
who had recently completed an installment purchase or budget plan, for instance, were
regarded as good prospects. "This class of people," the credit manager of a Davenport,
Iowa, department store noted, "have respect for the credit obligations which they have
assumed and are the type which will make the most desirable charge customers."637
The good consumer not only made prompt payments but promptly took on new debts
as soon as others were settled.
Customer control sought to reclaim, albeit by mechanical artifice, the personal
equation that was lost in the development of impersonal mass retailing. Where once
the neighborhood storekeeper knew all of his or her customers and could make
recommendations to suit individual tastes, the modem department store was a selling
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machine that processed thousands of transactions each day. "The individual customer
disappeared in the great crowds that thronged the stores," one proponent of customer
control observed. "Little attempt has been made to analyze these crowds, to reduce
them to the individual customer and know for certain whether or not profits came in
equal proportion with numbers. The time for that is coming."638 Customer control
offered a way to personalize mass retailing by appealing directly to the special
interests and habits of individual customers. While the specter of mass society loomed
in the minds of early-twentieth-century politicians and cultural critics, credit managers
were already beginning to deconstruct it. In an age of mass consumption and mass
advertising, customer control was far ahead of its time. The forces of target marketing
that broke up the American mass market during the late twentieth century-and with
it, as Joseph Turow has suggested, American society-began with the breakup of local
communities a half century earlier. 639
Customer control was complex and required a level of sophistication well
beyond most retailers except the largest and most progressive department stores.
Though dismissing customer control as "well nigh impossible for any but a group of
true geniuses," a St. Louis direct mail expert acknowledged, "It is unquestionably a
wonderful thing to be able to write to a large portion of your I 00,000 customer each
month and say, 'Mrs. Smith, six weeks ago you purchased half a dozen pairs of silk
stockings from us, size 8 ½, and we trust that they have been entirely satisfactory and
that we may have the pleasure of selling you some more during the next week when
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we have a special on two of our leading hosiery lines."640 By the late 1930s customer
control was touted as a powerful marketing tool. "A new technique is now being
developed by certain progressive stores which makes a customer of theirs virtually a
guinea-pig subject to the most elaborate and ramified classification of customer data
the modem punch card equipment pe1mits. " 641 The professional credit manager was at
the center of this development.
Underlying the development of customer control was a more profound
realization: not all customers are equally valuable. In 1930 Robert B. Gile,

manufacturer of the Selectric system, conducted a nationwide survey of more than 100
department, specialty, and men's clothing stores and reported that the forty percent of
the average store's customers purchased seventy-seven percent of its merchandise. 642
Several years later another study indicated that sixteen percent of charge customers
buy forty-nine percent of a store's merchandise. 643 These stunning findings n~t only
reinforced the importance of courting one's existing customers, but suggested that
whole segments of the buying public were not worth the expense of engaging at all.
Indeed, according to Gile, a full sixtypercent of a store's patrons produced little or no
profit. What Gile and his contemporaries intuited would come to be known as the
Pareto principle, or 80/20 rule, famously codified by management consultant Joseph
M. Juran a decade latter. 644 Applied to retailing, Juran's concept of the "the vital few
and trivial many" would suggest that twenty percent of a store's customer's produced
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eighty percent of its sales. By this logic, a retailer was wise to direct its promotional
effort to the small but profitable segment of regular customers rather than the "trivial
many." Invoking a Dust Bowl metaphor, Gile claimed that so much wasted effort on
useless land was ~in to "dry farming. " 645
While used to identity the most profitable segments of a store's patronage,
customer control facilitated a more sweeping form of market discrimination with
important ties to credit rating. The most valuable credit customers, after all, were those
who demonstrated their ability and willingness to pay. Trouble accounts or individuals
with poor credit ratings for whatever reason were by definition excluded. The
exclusionary effects of customer control were illustrated by a Chicago men's clothing
store whose promotional campaigns addressed only its "very best paying customers,"
roughly a third of its 20,000, with all those deemed "poor credit risk[s]" eliminated: 646
Customer control developed in credit departments, rather than sales or advertising
departments, precisely because it was there that financial viability of each customer
was known, and from which inferences could be made. Within such systems the credit
and purchasing histories of individuals appeared together, one informing the other. As
the author of a 1933 business school thesis indicated, "credit ratings, creclit limit,
overdue amounts, dates and amounts of installment payments, chronic conditions in
connection with adjustments and returned goods, and similar information," enhanced
the value of customer control records as sales tools. 647 As the privilege of credit was
diluted through ubiquity, customer control introduced a new and intensified form of
645
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target marketing and nascent customer relationship management that fostered bonds of
loyalty by rewarding the profitable few. "Never before has it been so necessary that
the credit department 'know your customer,"' one customer control advocate asserted.
It was necessary, he added, "to know them well enough to promote new business

through the contact their account affords to the credit department. '' 648
It is important to emphasize, however, that while credit departments were

increasingly involved in sales work, credit bureaus were not. Credit departments
provided local bureaus with confidential customer information, but the bureaus
themselves maintained their function as neutral compilers and repositories. Or, as one
journalist put it: "It is like the taking of an X-ray picture; the credit bureau takes the
picture and the credit store manager diagnoses it."649 Early twentieth-century credit
bureaus had nothing to do with the sales promotions or marketing campaigns of
individual stores. Their primary concern was to maintain the support and active
participation of their local subscribers and to improve the efficiency (thereby reducing
tlie cost) of credit bureau management. It was not until the late twentieth century that

computerized credit bureaus such as TransUnion, Equifax, and Experian began to
parlay their valuable databases of consumer information into marketable commodities.
Early-twentieth-century credit managers not only demonstrated how personal and
financial infonnation could be used to identify and segregate individuals based upon
preferred characteristics, but embedded such classificatory schemes within the moral
order of credit standing.
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CONCLUSION
On October 1, 1939, Sherman Lewis Gilfillan, founder of the Retail Credit
Men's National Association, died. A beloved figure, he was the "Christopher
Columbus" of the organization. "We owe practically our very existence to Mr.
Gilfillan," a Credit World tribute had earlier acknowledged. 650 Born in the village of
West Salem, Wisconsin, in 1870, just as the first retail reporting organizations
emerged more than a thousand miles away in Brooklyn and New York, Gilfillan's life
spanned the formative years of consumer credit reporting. Raised near the busy lumber
mills of La Crosse, Wisconsin, he went up the Mississippi River to Minneapolis at age
nineteen. There he followed the typical trajectory of the first credit professionals,
beginning work as a bookkeeper. After gaining experience with rubber and fuel
companies, he was hired as a credit manager for the department store L.S. Donaldson
in 1907. 651 "Thinking I would brush up on my newly chosen profession," he later
recalled, "I called at the library for literature bearing on it, but to no avail. In fact,
there was practically nothing published on Retail Credits in those days." 652
By the time of his death just three decades later all of this had changed. The
association he founded with a handful of colleagues in 1912 had grow into a national
credit reporting network supported by thousands of professionalized credit managers,
trade journals and numerous textbooks devoted to the subject, and standardized
protocols for identifying, classifying, and communicating credit information about
650
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individuals in every comer of the U.S. This must have astonished Gilfillan and others
of his generation. "The reader or the bureau worker of 1939 just hasn't any conception
of the raw, rank and rotten situation which prevailed prior to 1916," a California credit
bureau official reminded (citing the founding year of his own credit association as the
turning point). 653 By 1940 a national system of consumer credit surveillance was well
established. It weathered the Depression, even managing to expand its influence
during the economic nightmare, and was poised to oversee the massive expensive of
postwar consumer spending. In 1937 ArthurH. Hert, head of the national
association's research division, could claim with authority that "of the 26 million
families in the United States, approximately 20 million are recorded in the files of the
credit bureau. Total individual master cards approximate 60 million."
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strangers transacted with one another. The growing impersonality of economic life
was underscored by President Woodrow Wilson in one of his "plain talks" to the
American people in 1913. Railing against the tyranny of big corporations and
monopolistic trusts, he pointed to a fundamental shift in the everyday experience of
twentieth-century Americans. "We have changed our economic condition$ absolutely,
from top to bottom; and, with our economic society, the organization of our life," he
declared. "Today, the everyday relationships of men are largely with great impersonal
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concerns, with organizations, not with other individual men. Now this is nothing short
of a new social age, a new era of human relationships, a new stage setting for the
drama of life." 655 Wilson, to be sure, did not have credit reporting in mind. Yet the
estrangement of employers and laborers that he conder~med ran parallel to that of
creditors and borrowers, manufacturers and farmers, wholesalers and retailers,
retailers and consumers. The rise of the consumer credit bureau and store credit
departments reflected the growing impersonality of economic relationships, a process
that was already underway when the first mercantile agencies were formed after the
Panic of 1837.
Paradoxically, however, the foundation of credit, whether granted for
commercial investment or personal consumption, had not changed at all. Derived from
the Latin credere, to believe, credit depended upon the faith one party had in the good
intentions and reliability of another. Credit, after all, was intensely personal. "A debtor
is a man of mark," one writer noted with sarcasm in 1833. "Many eyes are fixed upon
him; many have interest in his well being; his movements are of concern; he cannot
disappear unheeded; his name is in many mouths; his name is upon many books; he is
a man of note-of promissory note; he fills the speculation of many minds; men
conjecture about him, wonder and conjecture whether he will pay."656 During the early
nineteenth century, the information upon which individuals made such calculated
leaps of faith-interpersonal knowledge, community opinion, and personal
endorsements-the underpinnings of credit itself, began to come undone. Amid of the
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tumult of the antebellum market revolution, the mercantile agency system introduced a
technical solution to the problem of credit evaluation. Where informal, embodied ways
of knowing were no longer feasible or considered reliable, a national apparatus of
remote surveillance was developed to codify and communicate detailed information
about the character and finances of individuals for the consideration of distant
creditors. In effect, this national surveillance system gave birth to the concept of
financial identity-a detached textual representation of one's life and circumstances
that circulated as an information commodity within the files and rating books of
remote institutions. The mercantile agency system provided for the institutional
mediation of credit communication. This mediation, with its quasi-empirical credit
ratings and aspirations to scientific precision, provided solace and a measure of ·
confidence for creditors who no longer meet their borrowers in person.
At the same time, the complexity of the national credit economy and its
increasing mediation by institutions such as credit reporting finns obscured as much as
it revealed. "In the complex march of modem affairs, business has become more
mechanical," the author of a credit textbook remarked in 1895. "We have lost the
personal equation of our customers, or get it only at second-hand. The name of the
debtor or creditor on our books is only a symbol which might as well be represented
by a number."657 In less than a century the great chain of credit and its deeply personal
relationships had become unfamiliar to many Americans. The nineteenth-century
interdependencies of Squire Jones, butcher Muggs, and shoemaker Cripps had lost
their valence in a twentieth-century world of strangers. By the end of the nineteenth
657
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century, retailers, like commercial creditors before them, found it difficult to evaluate
the creditworthiness of their more numerous and mobile customers. Moreover, the
threat of social sanction that compelled many individuals to honor their debts in small
communities exerted little force in new cities and towns where they were often
anonymous and transient. The problem of collecting debts was not new to late
nineteenth-century retailers; grocers, tailors, physicians, and publishers had long
complained of their victimization by negligent clients. But under new pressures to
complete, small storekeepers as well as mass retailers---especially department storesfelt forced against their better judgment to provide credit accommodations. Between
1870 and 1900 consumer credit reporting organizations emerged throughout the
country, some in the form of merchant-run associations, others as profit-making
ventures, all working to develop surveillance systems to classify and control the
nation's consumers.
Early credit managers such as Gilfillan were eager to embrace new methods
for gathering, transcribing, and processing information about their credit customers.
Their professionalization embodied the progressive ideals of scientific management at
the turn of the century. The movement toward systematic credit management-like the
development of commercial credit reporting a half century earlier-sought to convert
informal and embodied knowledge into easily learned and transferable textual
protocols. The adoption of standardized forms, filing systems, and cooperative
networks of information exchange all worked to this end while adding a patina of
formal expertise and legitimacy to the new profession. Though the impetus for
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professionalization came from credit managers in the commercial sphere rather than
among those selling directly to the general public, the basic principles ai1d institutional
infrastructure established to regulate commercial credit were soon adopted by retailers
to manage credit relationships with individual consumers. Where commercial creditors
worked to impose a new spirit of transparency through the use of signed financial
statements, retail creditors sought to lay bare the character-the moral disposition and
behavior-of consumers in personal interviews and in the analysis of ledger
experience that revealed patterns of responsibility or neglect (or more often a
confounding mix of both). A Time magazine story in 1936 suggested that it was futile
to hide one's private life or past mistakes; they would be quickly uncovered by the
credit bureau. Investigating a Chicago woman who had relocated to Los Angeles, for
,

'

example, the bureau "might learn that she was a widow of 40 with no children,
enjoyed no visible means of support, lived in swank apartments, entertained unsavory
characters, was late with her rent, lived in Chicago for only two years and left with
$500 of unpaid bills. " 658
Though consumer credit reporting originated among retailers-notably
department stores, large specialty houses, and installment dealers with their own credit
departments-it soon found applications in other domains. During the 1920s public
utilities found the credit bureau a useful resource and credit managers representing gas
and electric companies joined· the national association. 659 Around the same-time
personal finance companies looked to credit reporting organizations to evaluate
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borrowers, and the national association entered into contracts with the Federal
Housing Administration to provide credit information on prospective homebuyers.
Real estate companies and landlords also employed the services of the credit
bureau. The information in their voluminous files, a business magazine reported, was
used to investigate the "playing habits" rather than the "paying habits" of tenants.
"Credit bureau files have turned up such fascinating characters as the man who kept a
live alligator in his bath tub, another who decorated apartment walls with risque
murals," as well as noisy musicians, "chronic jitter-bugs" who caused chaos with their

late-night "rug-cutting," and "fire-bugs. " 660 Indeed, the interrelationship of financial
behavior and moral conduct made credit reports attractive for more general screening
practices. In 1896 a "pastorless church" consulted a mercantile agency to investigate a
minister it was interested in hiring. "The day is past when either a genius or religion
gives a person the right to be careless about social honesty," the church maintained.
"He is a man to avoid who cannot face the mercantile agency, by he howsoever
'doctored.' " 661
The credit bureau's dossiers also served as a resource for law enfo:cement.
During the First World War, NAMA made a show of its patriotism by offering the
U.S. government unfettered access to its credit records. 662 And in 1937, the U.S.
Department of Justice contracted with the National Consumer Credit Reporting
Corporation to purchase reports for agents of the Federal Bureau oflnvestigation
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through the organization's affiliates. 663 Credit reporting agencies had previously
provided this information gratis to such officials. Commenting on the usefulness of
cooperation with law enforcement, a California credit manager advised, "If the 'desk
sergeant' calls, ask no questions. Give him-get for him-all you ~ave or can get and
he will tell you what about and why, later, if and when it is proper."664 During the
1940s credit bureaus were also used to locate missing people, such as "wandering
husbands and wives," and assisted local police in the apprehension of "inveterate
swindlers." 665 The overlap of credit reporting and police work was unproblematic. The
interpenetration of surveillance systems-public and private, financial and criminal,
personal and professional-was suggested in 193 7 by a writer who praised the credit
bureau's total information awareness. The value of their vast clippings files alone had
been discovered by "government agents, police units, newspapermen, insurance
companies, finance companies and many other lines of endeavor," he ob~erved. "How
important a small clipping, showing an arrest or conviction, becomes when we are
later asked to prepare a special personnel report for a prospective employer, whether it
be in the employing of a clerk, salesman or cashier for the business, or a servant, maid
or child's nurse for the home .... Our ceaseless recordings are proving far more
valuable than our fondest expectations."666 The interconnection of public and private
surveillance systems was further facilitated by a new system of national identification
introduced in 1936: the Social Security number.·
663
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Early credit professionals were earnest in their desire to collect and compile
only "facts" about individual consumers. Though categories of analysis such as
occupation, gender, race, and residence were used to infer degrees of individual moral
hazard that have since been outlawed, these categories and their discriminatory
application were a reflection of cultural values implicit in white, middle class, maledominated American society during the first half of the twentieth century. This is to
say, early credit professionals were not wholly responsible for the discriminatory
practices they codified, though they did much to institutionalize them in their credit
reporting protocols. Their commitment to cooperation and progressive business
practices was certainly self-serving, but it also contributed toward a more equitable
expansion of personal credit. Those of modest means-wage workers and laborers,
both male and female-might be able to purchase goods formerly out of reach. Still,
credit privileges came with strings attached. To participate one entered into a system
of surveillance that was disciplinary by design; its implicit function was to regulate
individual behavior. In 1929 sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd noted the peculiar
disciplinary effects of credit relationships in small-town America. They were struck by
the degree to which credit circumscribed individual behavior. The "sensitive
institution of credit," they observed, "serve[d] as a repressive agent tending to
standardize widening sectors of the habits of the business class-to vote the
Republican ticket, to adopt golf as their recreation, and to refrain from 'queer,' i.e.,
atypical behavior-will be noted." 667 Credit relationships, they realized, imposed
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normative standards that regulated the conduct of individuals, even in seemingly 1M3neconomic aspects of life such as politics and sports.
One of the most striking aspects of early consumer credit reporting,
particularly from the perspective of our privacy obsessed age, is that it generated so
little public reaction. While many credit applicants feared and resented credit
manager's interrogation, and some were annoyed by administrative delays caused by
authorizations, there is nothing to suggest that Americans were particularly concerned
about their privacy or the circulation of their personal information among credit
bureaus and credit departments. This is conspicuous in light of the vitriol hurled at the
nineteenth-century mercantile agency system. Why investigations into th<;: business
assets and reputations of Americans incited more outrage than those used for granting
consumer credit can not be readily answered. Perhaps a half century of mercantile
credit reporting coupled with the American consumer's eagerness for instant
gratification mitigated this. The development ofconsumer credit reporting during the
early twentieth century was certainly no secret. As described in the previous chapter,
credit bureaus and local associations went to great lengths to advertise their role m the
community in order to maximize the disciplinary effects of their perpetual
surveillance. But despite such efforts, much of the American public seems to have
remained ignorant or indifferent. Analyzing popular press coverage of credit reporting
between 1910 ar..d 1930, one scholar has suggested that opposition was neutralized, or
at least kept at bay, by its portrayal as a "necessary, proper, non-threatening" check. 668

credit, their observations are relevant to both.
Arena, "Framing an Ideology oflnformatioa," 442,
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In this way, credit surveillance was presented as a socially redeeming technology that
merely affirmed the goodness of honest Americans while exposing the malignant,
professionaf crooks and the arrogant rich alike. A rare expression of discontent
appeared in a San Diego newspaper in 1930. "No reasonably honest citizen objects to
it," the writer observed. Such blind acceptance was "picturesque proof of the docility
with which we submit, for the sake of business, to a spy system which we would
indignantly resent if it were set up on behalf of government."669 Underwriting the
credit bureau's disciplinary surveillance was an ideology of financial morality the
privileged the economic welfare of the nation over that of the individual.
Recalling a lifetime of retail credit work, a Massachusetts credit manager
marveled at the rapid progression from cumbersome ledger books to rapid telephone
communication that he had witnessed since his start in 1886. "But the inventive genius
of man has not, yet produced a robot which can judge between a desirable and
undesirable applicant for credit," he concluded in 1935.

670

The fantasy of the robot

credit manager stirred mixed feelings: it signaled the perfection of the science of
credits and the obsolescence of the credit professional. The technological problem of
retail account management figures prominently in one of the most famous documents
oftwentieth~century computer history, Vannevar Bush's "As We May Think"671
Despite the millions of coded records documenting the personal and financial lives of
American's in every part of the nation by 1940, the idea that credit assessment could
be fully textualized and automated was doubted by practitioners. The development of
669
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consumer credit reporting was characterized, above all, by fundamental tensions
between vying forms of knowledge: embodied versus textual, intuition versus science,
singularity versus standardization, subjectivity versus system. These tensions were
largely resolved, in principle if not in practice, during the 1970s and 1980s when
consumer credit reporting was comput~rized and consolidated in the hands of several
national corporations. The use of sophisticated credit risk scoring algorithms,
particularly that introduced by Fair Isaac in the late 1960s, seemed to augur a new
technocratic age.
Yet, as this study has attempted to illustrate, financial identity-codified by
such institutions and used to predict the behavior of individuals-is a form of moral
identity. To be a good credit risk is, to some·extent, to be considered a good person,
one who is responsible and trustworthy. On the other hand, poor credit ratings may be
taken as a sign of incompetence, extravagance, weakness, or at best a sus.ceptibility to
misfortune. Indeed, the common causes of financial distress-illness, divorce, and job
loss-are themselves tinged with moral failure: a failure of self management in the
care of one's health, personal relationships, or career. Why else do some employers
conduct credit checks for prospective employees? The moral dimension of credit
reporting is hardly concealed even today. According a U.S. Federal Trade
Commission, a consumer report consists of "information about your personal and
credit characteristics, character, general reputation, and lifestyle." 672 But while
pointing to the conflation of the economic and the moral, it would be disingenuous to
672
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suggest that they should be held separate. Indeed, the problem of credit reporting and
financial identity is not that they should be more objective or technologically
sophisticated, but that the economic is always embedded in the social and thus cannot
help but reflect certain moral assumptions. In the end, all systems of credit reporting,
including those used to identify, track, and predict the behavior of consumers, are also
systems of moral communication. As a mechanism of social control, financial
surveillance works, if it works at all, because it is also a form of moral accounting.
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